Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.

Moral Hazard in Repeated Procurement of Services

This paper analyzes repeated procurement of services as a four-stage game divided into two periods. In each period there is (1) a contest stage à la Tullock in which the principal selects an agent and (2) a service stage in which the selected agent provides a service. Since this service effort is non-verifiable, the principal faces a moral hazard problem at the service stages. This work considers how the principal should design the period-two contest to mitigate the moral hazard problem in the period-one service stage and to maximize total service and contest efforts. It is shown that the principal must take account of the agent's past service effort in the period-two contest success function. The results indicate that the optimal way to introduce this `bias' is to choose a certain degree of complementarity between past service and current contest efforts. This result shows that contests with `additive bias' (`multiplicative bias') are optimal in incentive problems when effort cost is low (high). Furthermore, it is shown that the severity of the moral hazard problem increases with the cost of service effort (compared to the cost of contest effort) and the number of agents. Finally, the results are extended to more general contest success functions. JEL classification: C72; D82 Key words: Biased contests; Moral Hazard; Repeated Game; Incentives.

Hausman tests for inefficient estimators: application to demand for health care service (revised)

The Hausman (1978) test is based on the vector of differences of two estimators. It is usually assumed that one of the estimators is fully efficient, since this simplifies calculation of the test statistic. However, this assumption limits the applicability of the test, since widely used estimators such as the generalized method of moments (GMM) or quasi maximum likelihood (QML) are often not fully efficient. This paper shows that the test may easily be implemented, using well-known methods, when neither estimator is efficient. To illustrate, we present both simulation results as well as empirical results for utilization of health care services.

Technical innovations at the service of cheaper labour in pre-industrial Europe. The Enlightened agenda to transform the gender division of labour in silk manufacturing

In 1749, Jacques de Vaucanson patented his or tour pour tirer la soie or spindle for silk reeling. In that same year he presented his invention to the Academy of the Sciences in Paris, of which he was a member1. Jacques de Vaucanson was born in Grenoble, France, in 1709, and died in Paris in 1782. In 1741 he had been appointed inspector of silk manufactures by Louis XV. He set about reorganizing the silk industry in France, in considerable difficulty at the time due to foreign competition. Given Vaucanson’s position, his invention was intended to replace the traditional Piémontes method, and had an immediate impact upon the silk industry in France and all over Europe.

Trans-Atlantic Pedagogy for Teaching Pre-Service Teachers ICT: Bringing forward cultural issues

Projecte de recerca elaborat a partir d’una estada a la Universitat de Toronto, Canadà, des d’octubre del 2006 a febrer del 2007. El projecte Barchito és un projecte Interrnacional que va involucrar tres universitats: La Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, la Universitat de Toronto (Canadà) i la Universitat de Roosevelt (USA). El seu objectiu principal era posar en contacte estudiants de les tres universitats (de tres cursos diferents) per discutir al voltant de temes com ara l'ensenyament/aprenentatge i elements culturals de cada país. Aquest projecte presenta la natura de l'experiència des de la visió dels participants: alumnat i professorat. Superant diferències inicials de llengua, els participants van aprendre d'altra cultura, van aprendre sobre altres maneres d'ensenyar i van aprendre, en definitiva, sobre ells mateixos. L'eina d'aprenentatge col.laboratiu els va ajudar a sobrepassar el context immediat, emprant per això, l'eina tecnològica anomenada: Knowledge Forum.

Scheduled service versus personal transportation: the role of distance

This paper analyzes both theoretically and empirically the relationship between distance and frequency of scheduled transportation services. We study the interaction between a monopoly firm providing high-speed scheduled service and personal trans- portation (i.e., car). Most interestingly, the carrier chooses to increase frequency of service on longer routes when competing with personal transportation because provid- ing a higher frequency (at extra cost) it can also charge higher fares that can boost its profits. However, when driving is not a relevant option, frequency of service de- creases for longer flights consistently with prior studies. An empirical application of our analysis to the European airline industry con?rms the predictions of our theoretical model.

Scheduled Service Versus Personal Transportation: The Role of Distance

This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship be- tween frequency of scheduled transportation services and their substitutability with personal transportation (using distance as a proxy). We study the interaction between a monopoly firm providing a high-speed scheduled service and private transportation (i.e., car). Interestingly, the carrier chooses to increase the frequency of service on longer routes when competing with personal transportation because by providing higher frequency (at extra cost) it can also charge higher fares which can boost its profits. However, in line with the results of earlier studies, frequency decreases for longer flights when driving is not a viable option. An empirical application of our analysis to the European airline industry confirms the predictions of our theoretical model. Keywords: short-haul routes; long-haul routes; flight frequency; distance JEL Classification Numbers: L13; L2; L93

Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement

In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bank-ruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism. Informational rents are associated with unsound financial situations. By selecting the financially weakest contractor, stronger price competition (auctions) may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents. Thus, weak conditions are suffcient for auctions to be suboptimal. In particular, we show that pooling firms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor.

Service offshoring and white-collar employment

This paper empirically studies the effects of service offshoring on white-collar employment, using data for more than one hundred U.S. occupations. A model of firm behavior based on separability allows to derive the labor demand elasticity with respect to service offshoring for each occupation. Estimation is performed with Quasi-Maximum Likelihood, to account for high degrees of censoring in the employment variable. The estimated elasticities are then related to proxies for the skill level and the degree of tradability of the occupations. Results show that service offshoring increases high skilled employment and decreases medium and low skilled employment. Within each skill group, however, service offshoring penalizes tradable occupations and benefits non-tradable occupations.

Employment effects of service offshoring: evidence from matched firms

This paper studies the effects of service offshoring on the level and skill composition of domestic employment, using a rich data set of Italian firms and propensity score matching techniques. The results show that service offshoring has no effect on the level of employment but changes its composition in favor of high skilled workers.

Service offshoring and the skill composition of labor demand

This paper studies the effects of service offshoring on the skill composition of labor demand, using novel comparable data for nine Western European countries between 1990 and 2004. The empirical analysis delivers three main results. First, service offshoring is skill-biased, because it increases the demand for high and medium skilled labor and decreases the demand for low skilled labor. Second, the effects of service offshoring are similar to those of material offshoring, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Third, the economic magnitude of these effects is not large.

Competition for Procurement Shares

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par- ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma- tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex- penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format. Keywords: Procurement Auction, Affirmative Action. JEL: C72, D44, H57

Accounting for Big City Growth in Low Paid Occupations: Immigration and/or Service Class Consumption

Growth of 'global cities' in the 1980s was supposed to have involved an occupational polarisation, including growth of low paid service jobs. Though held to be untrue for European cities, at the time, some such growth did emerge in London a decade later than first reported for New York. The question is whether there was simply a delay before London conformed to the global city model, or whether another distinct cause was at work in both cases. This paper proposes that the critical factor in both cases was actually an upsurge of immigration from poor countries providing an elastic supply of cheap labour. This hypothesis and its counterpart based on growth in elite jobs are tested econometrically for the British case with regional data spanning 1975-2008, finding some support for both effects, but with immigration from poor countries as the crucial influence in late 1990s London. Keywords: regional labour markets; wages; employment; international migration; consumer demand JEL Codes: J21, J23, F22, R12

Diseño y Desarrollo de un cliente Web Processing Service (WPS) para gvSIG

Estudi dels estàndards definits per l'Open Geospatial Consortium, i més concretament en l'estàndard Web Processing Service (wps). Així mateix, ha tingut una component pràctica que ha consistit en el disseny i desenvolupament d'un client capaç de consumir serveis Web creats segons wps i integrat a la plataforma gvSIG.