On codes, matroids, and secure multiparty computation from linear secret-sharing schemes

Error-correcting codes and matroids have been widely used in the study of ordinary secret sharing schemes. In this paper, the connections between codes, matroids, and a special class of secret sharing schemes, namely, multiplicative linear secret sharing schemes (LSSSs), are studied. Such schemes are known to enable multiparty computation protocols secure against general (nonthreshold) adversaries.Two open problems related to the complexity of multiplicative LSSSs are considered in this paper. The first one deals with strongly multiplicative LSSSs. As opposed to the case of multiplicative LSSSs, it is not known whether there is an efficient method to transform an LSSS into a strongly multiplicative LSSS for the same access structure with a polynomial increase of the complexity. A property of strongly multiplicative LSSSs that could be useful in solving this problem is proved. Namely, using a suitable generalization of the well-known Berlekamp–Welch decoder, it is shown that all strongly multiplicative LSSSs enable efficient reconstruction of a shared secret in the presence of malicious faults. The second one is to characterize the access structures of ideal multiplicative LSSSs. Specifically, the considered open problem is to determine whether all self-dual vector space access structures are in this situation. By the aforementioned connection, this in fact constitutes an open problem about matroid theory, since it can be restated in terms of representability of identically self-dual matroids by self-dual codes. A new concept is introduced, the flat-partition, that provides a useful classification of identically self-dual matroids. Uniform identically self-dual matroids, which are known to be representable by self-dual codes, form one of the classes. It is proved that this property also holds for the family of matroids that, in a natural way, is the next class in the above classification: the identically self-dual bipartite matroids.

On the computational security of a distributed key distribution scheme

In a distributed key distribution scheme, a set of servers helps a set of users in a group to securely obtain a common key. Security means that an adversary who corrupts some servers and some users has no information about the key of a noncorrupted group. In this work, we formalize the security analysis of one such scheme which was not considered in the original proposal. We prove the scheme is secure in the random oracle model, assuming that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard to solve. We also detail a possible modification of that scheme and the one in which allows us to prove the security of the schemes without assuming that a specific hash function behaves as a random oracle. As usual, this improvement in the security of the schemes is at the cost of an efficiency loss.

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

Numerical schemes of diffusion asymptotics and moment closures for kinetic equations

We investigate different models that are intended to describe the small mean free path regime of a kinetic equation, a particular attention being paid to the moment closure by entropy minimization. We introduce a specific asymptotic-induced numerical strategy which is able to treat the stiff terms of the asymptotic diffusive regime. We evaluate on numerics the performances of the method and the abilities of the reduced models to capture the main features of the full kinetic equation.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment.

How to foster sharing of educational resources?

The future of OER is highly dependent on the future of education in general. A future that will be determined by major changes in society that demand more people with a higher education and life long learning. Each vision for the long term future needs to take the qualitative and quantitative demands into account. Backcasting from a vision we arrive at useful steps to take, some of which we managed to start up in the form of pilots as part of the European research project Share.TEC.

TwHistory : Sharing History Using Twitter

In light of the fact that several studies indicate that students can benefit from deeper understandings of the processes by which historical accounts are constructed, history educators have increasingly been focused on finding ways to teach students how to read and reason about events in the same manner as professional historians (Wineburg, 2001; Spoehr & Spoehr, 1994; Hynd, Holschuh, & Hubbard, 2004; Wiley & Voss, 1996). One possible resource for supporting this development may come out of emerging web-based technologies. New technologies and increased access to historical records and artifacts posted the Internet may be precisely the tools that can help students (Bass, Rosenzweig, & Mason, 1999). Given the right context, we believe it is possible to combine such resources and tools to create an environment for students that could strengthen their abilities to read and reason about historical events. Moreover, we believe that social media, specifically, microblogging (Nardi, Schiano, Gumbrecht, & Swartz, 2004) could play a key role.

CAC controlled services sharing a link with connectionless data services in an ATM network: a performance evaluation study

In the B-ISDN there is a provision for four classes of services, all of them supported by a single transport network (the ATM network). Three of these services, the connected oriented (CO) ones, permit connection access control (CAC) but the fourth, the connectionless oriented (CLO) one, does not. Therefore, when CLO service and CO services have to share the same ATM link, a conflict may arise. This is because a bandwidth allocation to obtain maximum statistical gain can damage the contracted ATM quality of service (QOS); and vice versa, in order to guarantee the contracted QOS, the statistical gain have to be sacrificed. The paper presents a performance evaluation study of the influence of the CLO service on a CO service (a circuit emulation service or a variable bit-rate service) when sharing the same link

Two complementary molecular energy decomposition schemes: the Mayer and Ziegler-Rauk methods in comparison

In the present paper we discuss and compare two different energy decomposition schemes: Mayer's Hartree-Fock energy decomposition into diatomic and monoatomic contributions [Chem. Phys. Lett. 382, 265 (2003)], and the Ziegler-Rauk dissociation energy decomposition [Inorg. Chem. 18, 1558 (1979)]. The Ziegler-Rauk scheme is based on a separation of a molecule into fragments, while Mayer's scheme can be used in the cases where a fragmentation of the system in clearly separable parts is not possible. In the Mayer scheme, the density of a free atom is deformed to give the one-atom Mulliken density that subsequently interacts to give rise to the diatomic interaction energy. We give a detailed analysis of the diatomic energy contributions in the Mayer scheme and a close look onto the one-atom Mulliken densities. The Mulliken density ρA has a single large maximum around the nuclear position of the atom A, but exhibits slightly negative values in the vicinity of neighboring atoms. The main connecting point between both analysis schemes is the electrostatic energy. Both decomposition schemes utilize the same electrostatic energy expression, but differ in how fragment densities are defined. In the Mayer scheme, the electrostatic component originates from the interaction of the Mulliken densities, while in the Ziegler-Rauk scheme, the undisturbed fragment densities interact. The values of the electrostatic energy resulting from the two schemes differ significantly but typically have the same order of magnitude. Both methods are useful and complementary since Mayer's decomposition focuses on the energy of the finally formed molecule, whereas the Ziegler-Rauk scheme describes the bond formation starting from undeformed fragment densities

Methodology for studying the numerical speed of sound in finite differences schemes

The space and time discretization inherent to all FDTD schemesintroduce non-physical dispersion errors, i.e. deviations ofthe speed of sound from the theoretical value predicted bythe governing Euler differential equations. A generalmethodologyfor computing this dispersion error via straightforwardnumerical simulations of the FDTD schemes is presented.The method is shown to provide remarkable accuraciesof the order of 1/1000 in a wide variety of twodimensionalfinite difference schemes.