Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.

Economic and legal analysis of mandatory non-recourse mortgages with applications to Spain

“The liquidity crisis of the Spanish banks is largely due to the lack of confidence of foreign investors and, therefore, the changes that occur in the legislation should not affect the credibility, stability, legal certainty, predictability that markets expect”.Sergio Nasarre (2011)In the current situation of economic crisis, many people have found they can no longer pay back the mortgage loans that were granted to them in order to purchase a dwelling. It is for this reason that, in light of the economic, political and social problems this poses, our paper studies the state of the Spanish real-estate system and of foreclosure, paying special attention to the solution that has been proposed recently as the best option for debtors that cannot make their mort-gage payments: non-recourse mortgaging. We analyze this proposal from legal and economic perspectives in order to fully understand the effects that this change could imply. At the same time, this paper will also examine several alternatives we believe would ameliorate the situation of mortgage-holders, among them legal reforms, mortgage insurance, and non-recourse mortgaging itself.