How enforcement institutions affect markets

In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce repayment but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges according to lenders votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying judges according to borrowers votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market and producing the lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges paid the average earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender voting. We employ a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different institutions. When voting and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the difficulty of their task changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus equilibria.

Guerra y crisis generacional: el caso de Jean-Richard Bloch

El presente artículo trata de mostrar cómo la primera guerra mundial originó entre los intelectuales franceses un particular concepto de generación: se consideran una generación malograda, incapaz de haber podido evitar la catástrofe y, a la vez, inexperta para construir una nueva coherencia social. El análisis toma como eje principal al escritor Jean-Richard Bloch cuyas tesis son comparadas con las de sus contemporáneos con el fin de reconstruir el contexto cultural que condiciona tanto sus vidas privadas como sus trayectorias artísticas.

A Grid Supercomputing Enviroment for High Demand Computational Applications

Despite the huge increase in processor and interprocessor network performace, many computational problems remain unsolved due to lack of some critical resources such as floating point sustained performance, memory bandwidth, etc... Examples of these problems are found in areas of climate research, biology, astrophysics, high energy physics (montecarlo simulations) and artificial intelligence, among others. For some of these problems, computing resources of a single supercomputing facility can be 1 or 2 orders of magnitude apart from the resources needed to solve some them. Supercomputer centers have to face an increasing demand on processing performance, with the direct consequence of an increasing number of processors and systems, resulting in a more difficult administration of HPC resources and the need for more physical space, higher electrical power consumption and improved air conditioning, among other problems. Some of the previous problems can´t be easily solved, so grid computing, intended as a technology enabling the addition and consolidation of computing power, can help in solving large scale supercomputing problems. In this document, we describe how 2 supercomputing facilities in Spain joined their resources to solve a problem of this kind. The objectives of this experience were, among others, to demonstrate that such a cooperation can enable the solution of bigger dimension problems and to measure the efficiency that could be achieved. In this document we show some preliminary results of this experience and to what extend these objectives were achieved.

A change would do you good . . . An experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj

On the weights of nations: assigning voting weights in a heterogenous union

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

How tight should one's hands be tied? Fear of floating and credibility of exchange rate regimes

This paper analyzes the linkages between the credibility of a target zone regime, the volatility of the exchange rate, and the width of the band where the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate. These three concepts should be related since the band width induces a trade-off between credibility and volatility. Narrower bands should give less scope for the exchange rate to fluctuate but may make agents perceive a larger probability of realignment which by itself should increase the volatility of the exchange rate. We build a model where this trade-off is made explicit. The model is used to understand the reduction in volatility experienced by most EMS countries after their target zones were widened on August 1993. As a natural extension, the model also rationalizes the existence of non-official, implicit target zones (or fear of floating), suggested by some authors.

Human capital in growth regressions: how much difference does data quality make? An update and further results

We construct estimates of educational attainment for a sample of OECD countries using previously unexploited sources. We follow a heuristic approach to obtain plausible time profiles for attainment levels by removing sharp breaks in the data that seem to reflect changes in classification criteria. We then construct indicators of the information content of our series and a number of previously available data sets and examine their performance in several growth specifications. We find a clear positive correlation between data quality and the size and significance of human capital coefficients in growth regressions. Using an extension of the classical errors in variables model, we construct a set of meta-estimates of the coefficient of years of schooling in an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function. Our results suggest that, after correcting for measurement error bias, the value of this parameter is well above 0.50.

How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.

Endogeneizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments

In this paper we carefully link knowledge flows to and from a firms innovation process with this firms investment decisions. Three types of investments are considered: investments in applied research, investments in basic research, and investments in intellectual property protection. Only when basic research is performed, can the firm effectively access incoming knowledge flows and these incoming spillovers serve to increase the efficiency of own applied research.. The firm can at the same time influence outgoing knowledge flows, improving appropriability of its innovations, by investing in protection. Our results indicate that firms with small budgets for innovation will not invest in basic research. This occurs in the short run, when the budget for know-how creation is restricted, or in the long-run, when market opportunities are low, when legal protection is not very important, or, when the pool of accessible and relevant external know-how is limited. The ratio! of basic to applied research is non-decreasing in the size of the pool of accessible external know-how, the size and opportunity of the market, and, the effectiveness of intellectual property rights protection. This indicates the existence of economies of scale in basic research due to external market related factors. Empirical evidence from a sample of innovative manufacturing firms in Belgium confirms the economies of scale in basic research as a consequence of the firms capacity to access external knowledge flows and to protect intellectual property, as well as the complementarity between legal and strategic investments.

EU foreign policy towards Georgia: just for energy?

The paper analyses how the EU foreign policy towards Georgia changed after the Rose Revolution, reaching greater levels of involvement and assistance. It is argued that the pro-western and reformist new government in Georgia triggered a new orientation in the EU foreign policy towards the country based on a logic of appropriateness, that is EU´s values, in addition to energy interests. Comparative analysis in the Southern-Caucasus and other Eastern-European countries shows how reformist and pro-EU governments receive more EU support and assistance. This does not mean that material interest do not play an important role. However, the EU seems to be coherent with its values when regarding the European neighbourhood.

Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge

Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concerning regulation. First, a compulsory clinical trial registry complemented through a voluntary clinical trial results database can implement full transparency (the existence of all trials as well as their results is known). Second, full transparency comes at a price. It has a deterrence effect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the firms'gains from trials. Third, in principle, a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualified support for additional compulsory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies' decisions whether to conduct trials. Keywords: pharmaceutical firms, strategic information transmission, clinical trials, registries, results databases, scientific knowledge JEL classification: D72, I18, L15