The Effect of relationship lending on firm performance

We examine how relationship lending affects firm performance using a panel dataset of about 70,000 small and medium Spanish firms in the period 1993-2004. We model firm performance jointly with the firm's choice of the number of bank relationships. Controlling for firm fixed effects and using instrumental variables for the decision on the number of bank relationships, we find that firms maintaining exclusive bank relationships have lower profitability. The result is consistent with the view that banks appropriate most of the value generated through close relationships with its borrowers as long as they do not face competition from other lenders.

Is there Descriminatory Mortgage Pricing against Immigrants in the Spanish Lending Market?

In this paper, we investigate whether evidence of discriminatory treatment against immigrants in the Spanish mortgage market exists. More specifically, we test whether, ceteris paribus, immigrant borrowers tend to be charged with higher interest rates on their mortgages than their Spanish born counterparts. To do so, we use a unique dataset on granted mortgages that contains information not only regarding the conditions of the loan but also the socio-economic characteristics of the mortgagors. We observe that immigrants are systematically charged with higher interest rates. We apply the well known Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to measure the extent to which this disparate treatment of lenders in mortgage pricing against immigrants is due to discrimination. Our results indicate that approximately two thirds of the gap in the interest rate between Spanish born and immigrant borrowers can be attributed to discriminatory treatment. Key words: Immigration, discrimination, mortgage pricing, housing market. JEL codes: R21, G21, J14

Does it pay to be socially responsible? Evidence from spanish retail banking sector

This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of strategic competition in retail banking when some of the financial firms are non-profit organisations that invest in social activities. Banking literature about competition is fairly large, but the strategic interaction between profit maximizing and non profit maximizers has not been extensively analysed except for Purroy and Salas (1999). In this paper, a completely different approach is taken. An adaptation of Hotelling’s two stage model of spatial competition is developed to take into account consumer perceptions respect to the two different types of financial institutions. The empirical analysis confirms that consumers take into account other features different from the price, such as social contribution or closer service to make a deposit or mortgage decision. These conclusions are of interest in the debate about a firm’s social or ethical activities. It is shown that if consumers value social activities, firms can improv

One person in the battlefield is not a warrior: Self-construal, perceived ability to make a difference, and socially responsible behavior

We suggest that cultivating an individual's connectedness to others promotes sociallyresponsible behavior both directly and indirectly through increased perceived abilityto make a difference. Individuals whose interdependent self is more prominent feel theyhave more of an impact on larger scale societal outcomes and, therefore, engage more insocially responsible behaviors than do individuals whose independent self is moreprominent. We test these hypotheses in two experiments in which participants makefinancial contributions or exert an effort for a social cause. In a survey, we find thatperceived effectiveness mediates the effect of self-construal on socially responsibleconsumption.

Serial defaults, serial profits: Returns to sovereign lending in Habsburg Spain, 1566-1600

Philip II of Spain accumulated debts equivalent to 60% of GDP. He also defaulted four times onhis short-term loans, thus becoming the first serial defaulter in history. Contrary to a commonview in the literature, we show that lending to the king was profitable even under worst-casescenario assumptions. Lenders maintained long-term relationships with the crown. Lossessustained during defaults were more than compensated by profits in normal times. Defaultswere not catastrophic events. In effect, short-term lending acted as an insurance mechanism,allowing the king to reduce his payments in harsh times in exchange for paying a premium intranquil periods. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Lending to the borrower from hell: Debt and default in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598

What sustained borrowing without third-party enforcement, in the early days of sovereignlending? Philip II of Spain accumulated towering debts while stopping all payments tohis lenders four times. How could the sovereign borrow much and default often? Weargue that bankers ability to cut off Philip II s access to smoothing services was key. Aform of syndicated lending created cohesion among his Genoese bankers. As a result,lending moratoria were sustained through a cheat the cheater mechanism (Kletzer andWright, 2000). Our paper thus lends empirical support to a recent literature emphasizingthe role of bankers incentives for continued sovereign borrowing.

Relationship and transaction lending in a crisis

We study how relationship lending and transaction lending varyover the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationshipbanks gather information on their borrowers, which allows them toprovide loans for profitable firms during a crisis. Due to the servicesthey provide, operating costs of relationship-banks are higher thanthose of transaction-banks. In our model, where relationship-bankscompete with transaction-banks, a key result is that relationship-banks charge a higher intermediation spread in normal times, butoffer continuation-lending at more favorable terms than transactionbanks to profitable firms in a crisis. Using detailed credit registerinformation for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers'default, we are able to study how relationship and transaction-banksresponded to the crisis and we test existing theories of relationshipbanking. Our empirical analysis confirms the basic prediction of themodel that relationship banks charged a higher spread before the crisis, offered more favorable continuation-lending terms in response tothe crisis, and suffered fewer defaults, thus confirming the informational advantage of relationship banking.

Leverage and beliefs: Personal experience and risk taking in margin lending

What determines risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets? Thispaper uses unique micro-data on collateralized lending contracts during a period of financialdistress to address this question. An investor syndicate speculating in English stocks wentbankrupt in 1772. Using hand-collected information from Dutch notarial archives, we examinechanges in lenders' behavior following exposure to potential (but not actual) losses. Before thedistress episode, financiers that lent to the ill-fated syndicate were indistinguishable from therest. Afterwards, they behaved differently: they lent with much higher haircuts. Only lendersexposed to the failed syndicate altered their behavior. The differential change is remarkable sincethe distress was public knowledge, and because none of the lenders suffered actual losses ? allfinanciers were repaid in full. Interest rates were also unaffected; the market balanced solelythrough changes in collateral requirements. Our findings are consistent with a heterogeneousbeliefs-interpretation of leverage. They also suggest that individual experience can modify thelevel of leverage in a market quickly.

Toward partial redirection of energy policy for responsible development

This paper addresses the surprising lack of quality control on the analysis and selection on energy policies observable in the last decades. As an example, we discuss the delusional idea that it is possible to replace fossil energy with large scale ethanol production from agricultural crops. But if large scale ethanol production is not practical in energetic terms, why huge amount of money has been invested in it and is it still being invested? In order to answer this question we introduce two concepts useful to frame, in general terms, the predicament of quality control in science: (i) the concept of “granfalloons” proposed by K. Vonnegut (1963) flagging the danger of the formation of “crusades to save the world” void of real meaning. These granfalloons are often used by powerful lobbies to distort policy decisions; and (ii) the concept of Post-Normal science by S. Funtowicz and J. Ravetz (1990) indicating a standard predicament faced by science when producing information for governance. When mixing together uncertainty, multiple-scale and legitimate but contrasting views it becomes impossible to deal with complex issue using the conventional scientific approach based on reductionism. We finally discuss the implications of a different approach to the assessment of alternative energy sources by introducing the concept of Promethean technology.