Optimal regulation of specialized medical care in a mixed system

We study the optimal public intervention in setting minimum standards of formation for specialized medical care. The abilities the physicians obtain by means of their training allow them to improve their performance as providers of cure and earn some monopoly rents.. Our aim is to characterize the most efficient regulation in this field taking into account different regulatory frameworks. We find that the existing situation in some countries, in which the amount of specialization is controlled, and the costs of this process of specialization are publicly financed, can be supported as the best possible intervention.

Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and Autocrats’ Duration

This paper enquires into whether economic sanctions are effective in destabilizing authoritarian rulers. We argue that this effect is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime against which sanctions are imposed. Thus, personalist regimes and monarchies, which are more dependent on aid and resource rents to maintain their patronage networks, are more likely to be affected by sanctions. In contrast, single-party and military regimes are able to maintain (and even increase) their tax revenues and to reallocate their expenditures and so increase their levels of cooptation. Data on sanction episodes, authoritarian rulers and regimes covering the period 1946–2000 have allowed us to test our hypotheses. To do so, duration models have been run, and the results confirm that personalist autocrats are more vulnerable to foreign pressure. Concretely, the analysis of the modes of exit reveals that sanctions increase the likelihood of an irregular change of ruler, such as a coup. Sanctions are basically ineffective when targeting single-party or military regimes.

Capacitación en meliponicultura de la población de Poço Redondo (Sergipe, Brasil)

Con la deforestación, los incendios y la utilización indebida de los agrotóxicos, las abejas nativas de Brasil corren un serio peligro de extinción. Ello se debe a que estas abejas construyen sus nidos en los huecos de los troncos de los árboles y también a que sus fuentes de alimentación son cada vez más escasas. Por ello cada vez son más los que se dedican a la meliponicultura, de esta manera se conservan las abejas y además, se obtiene una renta extra. Mediante el presente proyecto se capacitó en meliponicultura a una muestra de la población de Poço Redondo, para que de esta manera se empiece a recuperar su entorno y también su situación económica actual. Para poder conseguirlo se llevó a cabo el diseño del curso mediante la documentación previa, el trabajo de campo y el análisis de los datos. El resultado fue la capacitación, con la que se formó y concienció ambientalmente a personas para que se dedicaran a la meliponicultura de manera profesional.

Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement

In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bank-ruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism. Informational rents are associated with unsound financial situations. By selecting the financially weakest contractor, stronger price competition (auctions) may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents. Thus, weak conditions are suffcient for auctions to be suboptimal. In particular, we show that pooling firms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor.

Strategic mass killings

Since World War II there have been about fifty episodes of large-scale mass killings of civilians and massive forced displacements. They were usually meticulously planned and independent of military goals. We provide a model where conflict onset, conflict intensity and the decision to commit mass killings are all endogenous, with two main goals: (1) to identify the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to occur; and (2) to distinguish conditions under which mass killings and military conflict intensity reinforce each other from situations where they are substitute modes of strategic violence. We predict that mass killings are most likely in societies with large natural resources, significant proportionality constraints for rent sharing, low productivity and low state capacity. Further, massacres are more likely in a civil than in an interstate war, as in the latter group sizes matter less for future rents. In non polarized societies there are asymmetric equilibria with only the larger group wanting to engage in massacres. In such settings the smaller group compensates for this by fighting harder in the first place. In this case we can talk of mass killings and fighting efforts to be substitutes. In contrast, in polarized societies either both or none of the groups can be ready to do mass killings in case of victory. Under the "shadow of mass killings" groups fight harder. Hence, in this case massacres and fighting are complements. We also present novel empirical results on the role of natural resources in mass killings and on what kinds of ethnic groups are most likely to be victimized in massacres and forced resettlements, using group level panel data.

Recursos naturales y desarrollo en el Chad: ¿maldición de los recursos o inserción periférica?

El significativo incremento de las inversiones extranjeras en el sector extractivo africano en la última década, ha hecho renacer el debate acerca de los efectos sobre el desarrollo de las rentas generadas por este sector. Desde la teoría de la maldición de los recursos se argumenta que los efectos negativos sobre el desarrollo de estas rentas tienen que ver básicamente con disfunciones internas, soslayando los elementos y actores externos que dan forma e influyen en éstas. El caso del Chad, país productor de petróleo desde 2003 con el apoyo del Banco Mundial, es presentado y analizado en este artículo, llegando a la conclusión de que el análisis de la inserción periférica es crucial para comprender las disfunciones generadas por la renta petrolera en el país.

Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil

We report results from a randomized policy experiment designed to test whether increasedaudit risk deters rent extraction in local public procurement and service delivery in Brazil. Ourestimates suggest that temporarily increasing annual audit risk by about 20 percentage pointsreduced the proportion of irregular local procurement processes by about 17 percentage points.This reduction was driven entirely by irregularities involving mismanagement or corruption. Incontrast, we find no evidence that increased audit risk affected the quality of publicly providedpreventive and primary health care services -measured based on user satisfaction surveys- orcompliance with national regulations of the conditional cash transfer program "Bolsa Família".

Judicial presence and rent extraction

We estimate the effect of state judiciary presence on rent extraction in Brazilian local governments.We measure rents as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by auditors.Our unique dataset at the level of individual inspections allows us to separately examine extensiveand intensive margins of rent extraction. The identification strategy is based on an institutionalrule of state judiciary branches according to which prosecutors and judges tend to be assigned tothe most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. Our research designexploits this rule by comparing counties that are largest in their district to counties with identicalpopulation size from other districts in the same state, where they are not the most populous. IVestimates suggest that state judiciary presence reduces the share of inspections with irregularitiesrelated to waste or corruption by about 10 percent or 0.3 standard deviations. In contrast, we findno effect on the intensive margin of rent extraction. Finally, our estimates suggest that judicialpresence reduces rent extraction only for first-term mayors.

Selling to consumers with endogenous types

For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist s optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer s valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume that consumers are anonymous, i.e. the monopolist can t observe a consumer s past consumption history. For myopic consumers, the optimal consumption schedule is distorted upwards, involving substantial discounts for low valuation types. This pushes low types into higher valuations, from which rents can be extracted.For forward looking consumers, there may be a further upward distortion of consumption due to a reversal of the adverse selection effect; low valuation consumers now have a strong interest in consumption in order to increase their valuations. Firms will find it profitable to educate consumers and encourage forward looking behavior.

Value and depreciation of mineral resources over the very long run: An empirical contrast of different methods

The paper contrasts empirically the results of alternative methods for estimating thevalue and the depreciation of mineral resources. The historical data of Mexico andVenezuela, covering the period 1920s-1980s, is used to contrast the results of severalmethods. These are the present value, the net price method, the user cost method andthe imputed income method. The paper establishes that the net price and the user costare not competing methods as such, but alternative adjustments to different scenariosof closed and open economies. The results prove that the biases of the methods, ascommonly described in the theoretical literature, only hold under the most restrictedscenario of constant rents over time. It is argued that the difference between what isexpected to happen and what actually did happen is for the most part due to a missingvariable, namely technological change. This is an important caveat to therecommendations made based on these models.

The dot-com bubble, the Bush deficits and the US current account

Over the past decade the US has experienced widening current account deficits and a steady deterioration of its net foreign asset position. During the second half of the 1990s, this deterioration was fueled by foreign investment in a booming US stock market. During the first half of the 2000s, this deterioration has been fuelled by foreign purchases of rapidly increasing US government debt. A somewhat surprising aspect of the current debate is thatstock market movements and fiscal policy choices have been largely treated as unrelated events. Stock market movements are usually interpreted as reflecting exogenous changes in perceived or real productivity, while budget deficits are usually understood as a mainly political decision. We challenge this view here and develop two alternative interpretations. Both are based on the notion that a bubble (the dot-com bubble) has been driving the stock market, but differ in their assumptions about the interactions between this bubble and fiscal policy (the Bush deficits). The benevolent view holds that a change in investorsentiment led to the collapse of the dot-com bubble and the Bush deficits were a welfare-improving policy response to this event. The cynical view holds instead that the Bush deficits led to the collapse of the dot-com bubble as the new administration tried to appropriate rents from foreign investors. We discuss the implications of each of these views for the future evolution of the US economy and, in particular, its net foreign asset position.

On information and competition in private value auctions

How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment?We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers updated expected valuations. We define the class of precision criteria following this approach and different notions of dispersion, and relate them to existing criteria of informativeness. Using supermodular precision, we obtain three results: (1) a more precise information structure yields a more efficient allocation; (2) the auctioneer provides less than the efficient level of information since more information increases bidder informational rents; (3) there is a strategic complementarity between information and competition, so that both the socially efficient and the auctioneer s optimal choice of precision increase with the number of bidders, and both converge as the number of bidders goes to infinity.

The economics of organized crime and optimal law enforcement

This paper extends the optimal law enforcement literature to organized crime.We model the criminal organization as a vertical structure where the principal extracts some rents from the agents through extortion. Depending on the principal's information set, threats may or may not be credible. As long as threats are credible, the principal is able to fully extract rents.In that case, the results obtained by applying standard theory of optimal law enforcement are robust: we argue for a tougher policy. However, when threats are not credible, the principal is not able to fully extract rents and there is violence. Moreover, we show that it is not necessarily true that a tougher law enforcement policy should be chosen when in presence of organized crime.

The curse of aid

Foreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient countries and may result in the same rent seeking behavior as documented in the curse of natural resources literature. In this paper we discuss this effect and document its magnitude. Using data for 108 recipient countries in the period 1960 to 1999, we find that foreign aid has a negative impact on democracy. In particular, if the foreign aid over GDP that a country receives over a period of five years reaches the 75th percentile in the sample, then a 10-point index of democracy is reduced between 0.6 and one point, a large effect. For comparison, we also measure the effect of oil rents on political institutions. The fall in democracy if oil revenues reach the 75th percentile is smaller, (0.02). Aid is a bigger curse than oil.

Audit quality: Attributes, private safeguards and the role of regulation

This article examines the private mechanisms used to safeguard quality in auditing, with a view to defining rules capable of facilitating the performance of market forces. An outline is given of a general theory of private quality assurance in auditing, based on the use of quasi-rents to self-enforce quality dimensions. Particular attention is paid to the role of fee income diversification as the key ingredient of private incentives for audit quality. The role of public regulation is then situated in the context defined by the presence of these safeguard mechanisms. This helps in defining the content of rules and the function of regulatory bodies in facilitating and strengthening the protective operation of the market. By making sense of the interaction between regulation, quality attributes and private safeguards, the analysis helps to evaluate the relative merits of different regulatory options.