Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Social Presence Approach Within the Question and Answering eLearning Model: An Experiment with a Multi-Agent System

The model of Questions Answering (Q&A) for eLearning is based on collaborative learning through questions that are posed by students and their answers to that questions which are given by peers, in contrast with the classical model in which students ask questions to the teacher only. In this proposal we extend the Q&A model including the social presence concept and a quantitative measure of it is proposed; besides it is considered the evolution of the resulting Q&A social network after the inclusion of the social presence and taking into account the feedback on questions posed by students and answered by peers. The social network behaviorwas simulated using a Multi-Agent System to compare the proposed social presence model with the classical and the Q&A models

Coherency and sharpness measures by using ICA algorithms. An investigation for Alzheimer’s disease discrimination

In this paper, we present a comprehensive study of different Independent Component Analysis (ICA) algorithms for the calculation of coherency and sharpness of electroencephalogram (EEG) signals, in order to investigate the possibility of early detection of Alzheimer’s disease (AD). We found that ICA algorithms can help in the artifact rejection and noise reduction, improving the discriminative property of features in high frequency bands (specially in high alpha and beta ranges). In addition to different ICA algorithms, the optimum number of selected components is investigated, in order to help decision processes for future works.