Regulation in the Age of Globalization: The Difussion of Regulatory Agencies across Europe and Latin America

One of the most notable characteristics of the change in governance of the past two decades has been the restructuring of the state, most notably the delegation of authority from politicians and ministries to technocrats and regulatory agencies. Our unique dataset on the extent of these reforms in seven sectors in 36 countries reveals the widespread diffusion of these reforms in recent decades. In 1986 there were only 23 agencies across these sectors and countries (less than one agency per country); by 2002 this number had increased more than seven-fold, to 169. On average these 36 countries each have more than four agencies in the seven sectors studied. Yet the widespread diffusion of these reforms is characterized by cross-regional and cross-sectoral variations. Our data reveal two major variations: first, reforms are more widespread in economic regulation that in social spheres; second, regulatory agencies in the social spheres are more widespread in Europe than in Latin America. Why these variations in the spread of the reforms? In this paper we present for the first time the regulatory gaps across regions and sectors and then move on to offer some explanations for these gaps in a way that sheds some light on the nature of these reforms and on their limits. Our explanatory framework combines diffusion and structural explanations and in doing so sheds new light on the global diffusion of public policy ideas.

Productive efficiency and regulatory reform: The case of vehicle inspection services

Measuring productive efficiency provides information on the likely effects of regulatory reform. We present a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) of a sample of 38 vehicle inspection units under a concession regime, between the years 2000 and 2004. The differences in efficiency scores show the potential technical efficiency benefit of introducing some form of incentive regulation or of progressing towards liberalization. We also compute scale efficiency scores, showing that only units in territories with very low population density operate at a sub-optimal scale. Among those that operate at an optimal scale, there are significant differences in size; the largest ones operate in territories with the highest population density. This suggests that the introduction of new units in the most densely populated territories (a likely effect of some form of liberalization) would not be detrimental in terms of scale efficiency. We also find that inspection units belonging to a large, diversified firm show higher technical efficiency, reflecting economies of scale or scope at the firm level. Finally, we show that between 2002 and 2004, a period of high regulatory uncertainty in the sample’s region, technical change was almost zero. Regulatory reform should take due account of scale and diversification effects, while at the same time avoiding regulatory uncertainty.

Private Governance of Financial Markets: the US Regulatory Regime on Hedge Funds

The article investigates the private governance of financial markets by looking at the evolution of the regulatory debate on hedge funds in the US market. It starts from the premise that the privatization of regulation is always the result of a political decision and analyzes how this decision came about and was implemented in the case of hedge funds. The starting point is the failure of two initiatives on hedge funds that US regulators launched between 1999 an 2004, which the analysis explains by elaborating the concept of self-capture. Facing a trade off between the need to tackle publicly demonized issues and the difficulty of monitoring increasingly sophisticated and powerful private markets, regulators purposefully designed initiatives that were not meant to succeed, that is, they “self-captured” their own activity. By formulating initiatives that were inherently flawed, regulators saved their public role and at the same time paved the way for the privatization of hedge fund regulation. This explanation identifies a link between the failure of public initiatives and the success of private ones. It illustrates a specific case of formation of private authority in financial markets that points to a more general practice emerging in the regulation of finance.

The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies: Channels of Transfer and Stages of Diffusion

The autonomous regulatory agency has recently become the ‘appropriate model’ of governance across countries and sectors. The dynamics of this process is captured in our data set, which covers the creation of agencies in 48 countries and 16 sectors since the 1920s. Adopting a diffusion approach to explain this broad process of institutional change, we explore the role of countries and sectors as sources of institutional transfer at different stages of the diffusion process. We demonstrate how the restructuring of national bureaucracies unfolds via four different channels of institutional transfer. Our results challenge theoretical approaches that overemphasize the national dimension in global diffusion and are insensitive to the stages of the diffusion process. Further advance in study of diffusion depends, we assert, on the ability to apply both cross-sectoral and cross-national analysis to the same research design and to incorporate channels of transfer with different causal mechanisms for different stages of the diffusion process.

Nanomaterials in the European Union [the quest for a regulatory regime]

Mentre que les nanotecnologies s'espera que porti beneficis importants en molts sectors i contribuir a la competitivitat, hi ha un creixent cos de dades científiques que indiquin que hi ha motius raonables per témer que els nanomaterials en particular pot donar lloc a els possibles riscos i efectes nocius per a la salut i el medi ambient. El meu objectiu és examinar com la Unió Europea està donant forma a un règim regulatori per nanomaterials: l'opció regulatòria escollida, la legislació vigent aplicable i la seva eficàcia (amb especial atenció sobre REACH buits normatius), la posició adoptada per la els diferents actors en aquest procés i l'evolució prevista legal en el curt termini.

Regulatory federalism in network industries

Report for the scientific sojourn at the UC Berkeley, USA, from march until july 2008. This document starts by surveying the literature on economic federalism and relating it to network industries. The insights and some new developments (which focus on the role of interjurisdictional externalities, multiple objectives and investment incentives) are used to analyze regulatory arrangements in telecommunications and energy in the EU and the US. In the long history of vertically integrated monopolies in telecommunications and energy, there was a historical trend to move regulation up in the vertical structure of government, at least form the local level to the state or nation-state level. This move alleviated the pressure on regulators to renege on the commitment not to expropriate sunk investments, although it did not eliminate the practice of taxation by regulation that was the result of multiple interest group action. Although central or federal policy making is more focused and especialized and makes it difficult for more interest groups to organize, it is not clear that under all conditions central powers will not be associated with underinvestment. When technology makes the introduction of competition in some segments possible, the possibilities for organizing the institutional architechture of regulation expand. The central level may focus on structural regulation and the location of behavioral regulation of the remaining monopolists may be resolved in a cooperative way or concentrated at the level where the relevant spillovers are internalized.

Bargaining failures and merger policy

In this paper we study the optimal ex-ante merger policy in a model where merger proposals are the result of strategic bargaining among alternative candidates. We allow for firm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize the fact that potential synergies generated by a merger may vary substantially depending on the identity of the participating firms. The model demonstrates that, under some circumstances, relatively inefficient mergers may take place. That is, a particular merger may materialize despite the existence of an alternative merger capable of generating higher social surplus and even higher profits. Such bargaining failures have important implications for the ex-ante optimal merger policy. We show that a more stringent policy than the ex-post optimal reduces the scope of these bargaining failures and raises expected social surplus. We use a bargaining model that is flexible, in the sense that its strategic structure does not place any exogenous restriction on the endogenous likelihood of feasible mergers.

Regulatory ambivalence and the limitations of pharmaceutical policy in Spain

Broadly speaking, pharmaceutical policy in Spain has been unable to control either the price or thevolume of drugs prescribed. Limited attempts have been made to bring together the regulation of thepharmaceutical market and policies, in pursuit of the desired goals of efficiency and quality. Thispaper assesses the regulation of the Spanish pharmaceutical market over the last two decades byexamining regulation and policy and the available empirical evidence on their appreciable effects,and presents recommendations for policy design. Our findings suggest that policies aiming to improveefficiency and quality have not managed to contain costs, while cost-effectiveness is still overlooked.We argue that future policies should encourage broader participation in the decision-making processesand promote a higher degree of competition, especially from generic drugs.

Merger failures

This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the interactionbetween the pre- and post-merger processes. We argue that failure may stem from informationalasymmetries arising from the pre-merger period, and problems of cooperation andcoordination within recently merged firms. We show that a partner may optimally agree tomerge and abstain from putting forth any post-merger effort, counting on the other partnerto make the necessary efforts. If both follow the same course of action, the merger goesahead but fails. Our unique equilibrium allows us to make predictions on which mergers aremore likely to fail.

The credit ratings game

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interestin the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit RatingsAgencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of conflicts: 1) the CRA conflictof interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuersto purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investorclienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give riseto three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reducemarket efficiency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, andwhen the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industrypractice of tranching of structured products distorts market efficiency as its role is to deceivetrusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront paymentsfor rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure ofany rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantiallymitigate ratings inflation and promote efficiency.

Patients' right to information: a review of the regulatory and ethical framework

[eng] Aim: The paper examines the current situation of recognition of patients' right to information in international standards and in the national laws of Belgium, France, Italy, Spain (and Catalonia), Switzerland and the United Kingdom.Methodology: International standards, laws and codes of ethics of physicians and librarians that are currently in force were identified and analyzed with regard to patients' right to information and the ownership of this right. The related subjects of access to clinical history, advance directives and informed consent were not taken into account.Results: All the standards, laws and codes analyzed deal with guaranteeing access to information. The codes of ethics of both physicians and librarians establish the duty to inform.Conclusions: Librarians must collaborate with physicians in the process of informing patients.

Identification of Ligands for the Tau Exon 10 Splicing Regulatory Element RNA Using Dynamic Combinatorial Chemistry

We describe the use of dynamic combinatorial chemistry (DCC) to identify ligands for the stem-loop structure located at the exon 10-5'-intron junction of Tau pre-mRNA, which is involved in the onset of several tauopathies including frontotemporal dementia with Parkinsonism linked to chromosome 17 (FTDP-17). A series of ligands that combine the small aminoglycoside neamine and heteroaromatic moieties (azaquinolone and two acridines) have been identified by using DCC. These compounds effectively bind the stem-loop RNA target (the concentration required for 50% RNA response (EC(50)): 2-58 μM), as determined by fluorescence titration experiments. Importantly, most of them are able to stabilize both the wild-type and the +3 and +14 mutated sequences associated with the development of FTDP-17 without producing a significant change in the overall structure of the RNA (as analyzed by circular dichroism (CD) spectroscopy), which is a key factor for recognition by the splicing regulatory machinery. A good correlation has been found between the affinity of the ligands for the target and their ability to stabilize the RNA secondary structure.

ABS: a database of Annotated regulatory Binding Sites from orthologous promoters

Information about the genomic coordinates and the sequence of experimentally identified transcription factor binding sites is found scattered under a variety of diverse formats. The availability of standard collections of such high-quality data is important to design, evaluate and improve novel computational approaches to identify binding motifs on promoter sequences from related genes. ABS (http://genome.imim.es/datasets/abs2005/index.html) is a public database of known binding sites identified in promoters of orthologous vertebrate genes that have been manually curated from bibliography. We have annotated 650 experimental binding sites from 68 transcription factors and 100 orthologous target genes in human, mouse, rat or chicken genome sequences. Computational predictions and promoter alignment information are also provided for each entry. A simple and easy-to-use web interface facilitates data retrieval allowing different views of the information. In addition, the release 1.0 of ABS includes a customizable generator of artificial datasets based on the known sites contained in the collection and an evaluation tool to aid during the training and the assessment of motif-finding programs.

Positional bias of general and tissue-specific regulatory motifs in mouse gene promoters

Background: The arrangement of regulatory motifs in gene promoters, or promoterarchitecture, is the result of mutation and selection processes that have operated over manymillions of years. In mammals, tissue-specific transcriptional regulation is related to the presence ofspecific protein-interacting DNA motifs in gene promoters. However, little is known about therelative location and spacing of these motifs. To fill this gap, we have performed a systematic searchfor motifs that show significant bias at specific promoter locations in a large collection ofhousekeeping and tissue-specific genes.Results: We observe that promoters driving housekeeping gene expression are enriched inparticular motifs with strong positional bias, such as YY1, which are of little relevance in promotersdriving tissue-specific expression. We also identify a large number of motifs that show positionalbias in genes expressed in a highly tissue-specific manner. They include well-known tissue-specificmotifs, such as HNF1 and HNF4 motifs in liver, kidney and small intestine, or RFX motifs in testis,as well as many potentially novel regulatory motifs. Based on this analysis, we provide predictionsfor 559 tissue-specific motifs in mouse gene promoters.Conclusion: The study shows that motif positional bias is an important feature of mammalianproximal promoters and that it affects both general and tissue-specific motifs. Motif positionalconstraints define very distinct promoter architectures depending on breadth of expression andtype of tissue.