Integrated assessment of agricultural sustainability: the pros and cons of reductionism

In this paper I review a series of theoretical concepts that are relevant for the integrated assessment of agricultural sustainability but that are not generally included in the curriculum of the various scientific disciplines dealing with quantitative analysis of agriculture. I first illustrate with plain narratives and concrete examples that sustainability is an extremely complex issue requiring the simultaneous consideration of several aspects, which cannot be reduced into a single indicator of performance. Following, I justify this obvious need for multi-criteria analysis with theoretical concepts dealing with the epistemological predicament of complexity, starting from classic philosophical lessons to arrive to recent developments in complex system theory, in particular Rosen´s theory of modelling relation which is essential to analyze the quality of any quantitative representation. The implications of these theoretical concepts are then illustrated with applications of multi-criteria analysis to the sustainability of agriculture. I wrap up by pointing out the crucial difference between "integrated assessment" and "integrated analysis". An integrated analysis is a set of indicators and analytical models generating an analytical output. An integrated assessment is much more than that. It is about finding an effective way to deal with three key issues: (i) legitimacy – how to handle the unavoidable existence of legitimate but contrasting points of view about different meanings given by social actors to the word "development"; (ii) pertinence – how to handle in a coherent way scientific analyses referring to different scales and dimensions; and (iii) credibility – how to handle the unavoidable existence of uncertainty and genuine ignorance, when dealing with the analysis of future scenarios.

On the foundations of well-being economics and policy

When one wishes to implement public policies, there is a previous need of comparing different actions and valuating and evaluating them to assess their social attractiveness. Recently the concept of well-being has been proposed as a multidimensional proxy for measuring societal prosperity and progress; a key research topic is then on how we can measure and evaluate this plurality of dimensions for policy decisions. This paper defends the thesis articulated in the following points: 1. Different metrics are linked to different objectives and values. To use only one measurement unit (on the grounds of the so-called commensurability principle) for incorporating a plurality of dimensions, objectives and values, implies reductionism necessarily. 2. Point 1) can be proven as a matter of formal logic by drawing on the work of Geach about moral philosophy. This theoretical demonstration is an original contribution of this article. Here the distinction between predicative and attributive adjectives is formalised and definitions are provided. Predicative adjectives are further distinguished into absolute and relative ones. The new concepts of set commensurability and rod commensurability are introduced too. 3. The existence of a plurality of social actors, with interest in the policy being assessed, causes that social decisions involve multiple types of values, of which economic efficiency is only one. Therefore it is misleading to make social decisions based only on that one value. 4. Weak comparability of values, which is grounded on incommensurability, is proved to be the main methodological foundation of policy evaluation in the framework of well-being economics. Incommensurability does not imply incomparability; on the contrary incommensurability is the only rational way to compare societal options under a plurality of policy objectives. 5. Weak comparability can be implemented by using multi-criteria evaluation, which is a formal framework for applied consequentialism under incommensurability. Social Multi-Criteria Evaluation, in particular, allows considering both technical and social incommensurabilities simultaneously.

Toward partial redirection of energy policy for responsible development

This paper addresses the surprising lack of quality control on the analysis and selection on energy policies observable in the last decades. As an example, we discuss the delusional idea that it is possible to replace fossil energy with large scale ethanol production from agricultural crops. But if large scale ethanol production is not practical in energetic terms, why huge amount of money has been invested in it and is it still being invested? In order to answer this question we introduce two concepts useful to frame, in general terms, the predicament of quality control in science: (i) the concept of “granfalloons” proposed by K. Vonnegut (1963) flagging the danger of the formation of “crusades to save the world” void of real meaning. These granfalloons are often used by powerful lobbies to distort policy decisions; and (ii) the concept of Post-Normal science by S. Funtowicz and J. Ravetz (1990) indicating a standard predicament faced by science when producing information for governance. When mixing together uncertainty, multiple-scale and legitimate but contrasting views it becomes impossible to deal with complex issue using the conventional scientific approach based on reductionism. We finally discuss the implications of a different approach to the assessment of alternative energy sources by introducing the concept of Promethean technology.

Los determinantes sociales del pensamiento: ni anomalismo ni funcionalización

El principal objetivo del presente trabajo es indagar si las habituales tentativas por descifrarel pensamiento desde un punto de vista sociológico, a pesar de su vehemente compromisoantirreduccionista, podrían aceptar en último término la reducción de ideas, argumentos y doctrinasa sus presuntos determinantes sociales. En una primera etapa analizamos el ¿sociologismoanómalo¿ de Martin Kusch, señalamos algunas de sus lagunas, y establecemos que la panopliaconceptual en losofía de la mente es fértilmente aplicable al ámbito racional-social. A continuaciónconsideramos el funcionalismo reduccionista de Jaegwon Kim, nos centramos en latesis de que los estados intencionales de la mente, al contrario de lo que ocurre con los qualia,son causalmente funcionalizables, e intentamos establecer sus posibles repercusiones en la interpretaciónsocial del pensamiento. La aplicación de la metodología funcionalista al horizonteracional-social, de todos modos, parece venir desmentida por la evidencia, ya que las propiedadesdel pensamiento equiparables a los qualia son de hecho eminentemente funcionalizablesen la medida que fundamentan la efectividad social de los recursos gurativos y retóricos. Enun sentido análogo, la obra de Hans Blumenberg demuestra que los inescrutables ingredientes gurativos de todo pensamiento que él denomina ¿metáforas absolutas¿ son tan decisivos paracualquier proceso abstractivo que los conceptos nunca llegan a agotar su alcance determinador.Con lo cual los conceptos y las ideas más generales, antes considerados del todo funcionalizables,ahora dependen de algunas metáforas básicas, aun cuando por analogía con los qualia selas creía inmunes a toda funcionalización. Por tanto parece que la reducción no puede resolverlas di cultades que plantean los presuntos ¿determinantes sociales del pensamiento¿. Al mismotiempo, y con rmando así algunos emergentismos, los aspectos causal-funcionales del ámbitoracional-social dan la impresión de ser inconciliables con la enigmática estructura causal queponen de mani esto las aproximaciones losó cas al problema mente-cuerpo.