The influence of a certain volume of fluid in the lower tear meniscus on intraocular pressure measurements using the non-contact tonometer

Background: Intraocular pressure (IOP) is the pressure inside the eye that helps to maintain the integrity and the suitable form of the ocular globe. Precise and accurate measures of IOP are needed for the diagnosis as well as follow-up of glaucoma. In daily clinical practice, Goldmann applanation tonometer (GAT) and Non-contact tonometer (NCT) are the most common devices for measuring IOP. A close agreement between these methods has been showed, particularly in normotensive patients and a poor agreement, especially when IOP levels are above the normal range. Ophthalmologists have noticed a poor agreement between NCT and GAT, observing that by using NCT and after comparing with GAT, there is an overestimation of IOP readings, and particularly it occurs when the eyes are tearful. Previous studies investigate the effect of tears in Non-contact tonometer readings by the instillation of artificial tears, concluding in one of the studies that the variation was less than 1mmHg and not clinically significant, in contrast with another study which the increases were sadistically significant. Tear menisci are a thin strip of tear fluid located between the bulbar conjunctiva and the eyelid margins. We think that the overestimation of IOP readings using NCT could be due to the presence of a higher volume of tear in the lower tear meniscus which might cause an optical interference in the optoelectronic applanation monitoring system of this deviceObjectives: To research the influence of a certain volume of fluid in the lower tear meniscus on IOP measurements using the NCT in healthy eyes. Moreover, to investigate the agreement between IOP readings obtained by NCT and GAT in the presence and absence of this volume of fluidMethods: The study design will be transversal for diagnostic tests of repeated measures. We will study patients with no ocular pathology and IOP<21mmHg. It will consist in the measurement of IOP using NCT before and after the instillation of COLIRCUSÍ FLUOTEST, used as a volume of fluid in the lower tear meniscus, to observe if there will be differences using the paired t-test. Moreover, we will take IOP measures by GAT in order to know the agreement between these methods after and before the application of these eyedrops, using the ICC (intraclass correlation coefficient) and the Bland-Altmann method

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Repeated games played in a network

Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.

Inequality and a repeated joint project

Agents voluntarily contribute to an infinitely repeated joint project. We investigate the conditions for cooperation to be a renegotiation-proof and coalition-proof equilibrium before examining the influence of output share inequality on the sustainability of cooperation. When shares are not equally distributed, cooperation requires agents to be more patient than under perfect equality. Beyond a certain degree of share inequality, full efficiency cannot be reached without redistribution. This model also explains the coexistence of one cooperating and one free-riding coalition. In this case, increasing inequality can have a positive or negative impact on the aggregate level of effort.

A Model-to-model analysis of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma: genetic algorithms vs. evolutionary dynamics

We study the properties of the well known Replicator Dynamics when applied to a finitely repeated version of the Prisoners' Dilemma game. We characterize the behavior of such dynamics under strongly simplifying assumptions (i.e. only 3 strategies are available) and show that the basin of attraction of defection shrinks as the number of repetitions increases. After discussing the difficulties involved in trying to relax the 'strongly simplifying assumptions' above, we approach the same model by means of simulations based on genetic algorithms. The resulting simulations describe a behavior of the system very close to the one predicted by the replicator dynamics without imposing any of the assumptions of the analytical model. Our main conclusion is that analytical and computational models are good complements for research in social sciences. Indeed, while on the one hand computational models are extremely useful to extend the scope of the analysis to complex scenar

Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies

This paper addresses the puzzle of why legislation, even highly inefficient legislation, may pass with overwhelming majorities. We model a egislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by romising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because a ote in favor maintains the chance for membership in the minimum winning coalition in the future. The model thus generates situations in which egislators approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that enefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust: some institutional arrangements, such as super-majority rules or sequential voting, imit but do not eliminate the agenda setter's power to exploit the legislature, and other institutions such as secret voting do not limit his power.

Repeated Interaction and the Revelation of the Monitor's Type: A Principal-Monitor-Agent Problem

This paper studies a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation where a strategic principal delegates the task of monitoring the effort of a strategic agent to a third party. The latter we call the monitor, whose type is initially unknown. Through repeated interaction the agent might learn his type. We show that this process damages the principal's payoffs. Compensation is assumed exogenous, limiting to a great extent the provision of incentives. We go around this difficulty by introducing costly replacement strategies, i.e. the principal replaces the monitor, thus disrupting the agent's learning. We found that even when replacement costs are null, if the revealed monitor is strictly preferred by both parties, there is a loss in efficiency due to the impossibility of bene…tting from it. Nonetheless, these strategies can partially recover the principal's losses. Additionally, we establish upper and lower bounds on the payoffs that the principal and the agent can achieve. Finally we characterize the equilibrium strategies under public and private monitoring (with communication) for different cost and impatience levels.

Complementarities between mathematical and computational modeling: the case of the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

We study the properties of the well known Replicator Dynamics when applied to a finitely repeated version of the Prisoners' Dilemma game. We characterize the behavior of such dynamics under strongly simplifying assumptions (i.e. only 3 strategies are available) and show that the basin of attraction of defection shrinks as the number of repetitions increases. After discussing the difficulties involved in trying to relax the 'strongly simplifying assumptions' above, we approach the same model by means of simulations based on genetic algorithms. The resulting simulations describe a behavior of the system very close to the one predicted by the replicator dynamics without imposing any of the assumptions of the mathematical model. Our main conclusion is that mathematical and computational models are good complements for research in social sciences. Indeed, while computational models are extremely useful to extend the scope of the analysis to complex scenarios hard to analyze mathematically, formal models can be useful to verify and to explain the outcomes of computational models.

Incidencia de hipertensión ocular y glaucoma agudo por bloqueo pupilar tras implante de lente intraocular fáquica tipo ICL. Resultados anatómicos y funcionales a corto y medio plazo. Resultados preliminares

L'implant d’una lent intraocular fàquica tipus ICL (Implantable Collamer Lens) pot produir glaucoma agut per tancament angular degut a un bloqueig pupil•lar amb el consegüent augment de la pressió intraocular, el mecanisme i epidemiologia del qual no són ben coneguts. Aquest estudi preliminar pretén avaluar la incidència d'hipertensió ocular i glaucoma agut per tancament angular degut a bloqueig pupil·lar després de l'implant d'una lent posterior fàquica tipus ICL i plantejar hipòtesis sobre el seu mecanisme fisiopatològic.

Long-term azithromycin therapy in patients with severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and repeated pulmonary exacerbations

L’objectiu es determinar si el tractament amb azitromicina a llarg termini redueix la freqüència d’exacerbacions respiratòries en pacients amb malaltia pulmonar obstructiva crònica (MPOC) greu. Estudi retrospectiu observacional que avalua els beneficis clínics del tractament amb azitromicina a llarg termini (500 mg per via oral tres vegades per setmana) durant 12 mesos en pacients amb MPOC greu amb un mínim de 4 exacerbacions agudes (EAMPOC) per any o colonitzats per Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Es comparen amb els 12 mesos previs a l’introducció de l’azitromicina: nombre de EAMPOC, hospitalitzacions i dies d'estada hospitalària. L’azitromicina a llarg termini s’associa a una reducció significativa de EAMPOC, hospitalitzacions i dies d’estada hospitalària en pacients amb EPOC greu independentment de la colonització basal.

The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments

This paper studies the limits of discrete time repeated games with public monitoring. We solve and characterize the Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) problem. We found that for the "bad" ("good") news model the lower (higher) magnitude events suggest cooperation, i.e., zero punishment probability, while the highrt (lower) magnitude events suggest defection, i.e., punishment with probability one. Public correlation is used to connect these two sets of signals and to make the enforceability to bind. The dynamic and limit behavior of the punishment probabilities for variations in ... (the discount rate) and ... (the time interval) are characterized, as well as the limit payo¤s for all these scenarios (We also introduce uncertainty in the time domain). The obtained ... limits are to the best of my knowledge, new. The obtained ... limits coincide with Fudenberg and Levine (2007) and Fudenberg and Olszewski (2011), with the exception that we clearly state the precise informational conditions that cause the limit to converge from above, to converge from below or to degenerate. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Pub- lic Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.

Characteristics of the cornea and ocular surface in patients with congenital aniridia

We performed complete eye exams on 50 eyes in 25 patients with congenital aniridia. Factors such as age, history of ocular surgery, dry eye score and aesthesiometry results correlated with the degree of aniridia-related keratopathy. Schirmer’s test I in 86.8%, Schirmer’s test II in 94.4% and TFBUT in 83.3% of cases were all normal. Corneal staining was altered in 54.2%, and conjunctival staining was altered in 45.7%. The tear ferning pattern was abnormal in 80%. Conjunctival metaplasia was present in 76.9%.Corneal endothelial cell density was normal. Ultrasonic pachymetry was higher than average in all eyes examined.

Estimating the probability of leaving unemployment using uncompleted spells from repeated cross-section data

We propose a new econometric estimation method for analyzing the probabilityof leaving unemployment using uncompleted spells from repeated cross-sectiondata, which can be especially useful when panel data are not available. Theproposed method-of-moments-based estimator has two important features:(1) it estimates the exit probability at the individual level and(2) it does not rely on the stationarity assumption of the inflowcomposition. We illustrate and gauge the performance of the proposedestimator using the Spanish Labor Force Survey data, and analyze the changesin distribution of unemployment between the 1980s and 1990s during a periodof labor market reform. We find that the relative probability of leavingunemployment of the short-term unemployed versus the long-term unemployedbecomes significantly higher in the 1990s.

On the consequences of misspecifing assumptions concerning residuals distribution in a repeated measures and nonlinear mixed modelling context

In this paper we describe the results of a simulation study performed to elucidate the robustness of the Lindstrom and Bates (1990) approximation method under non-normality of the residuals, under different situations. Concerning the fixed effects, the observed coverage probabilities and the true bias and mean square error values, show that some aspects of this inferential approach are not completely reliable. When the true distribution of the residuals is asymmetrical, the true coverage is markedly lower than the nominal one. The best results are obtained for the skew normal distribution, and not for the normal distribution. On the other hand, the results are partially reversed concerning the random effects. Soybean genotypes data are used to illustrate the methods and to motivate the simulation scenarios

Impact of incorrect assumptions on the covariance structure of random effects and/or residuals in nonlinear mixed models for repeated measures data

In this paper we analyse, using Monte Carlo simulation, the possible consequences of incorrect assumptions on the true structure of the random effects covariance matrix and the true correlation pattern of residuals, over the performance of an estimation method for nonlinear mixed models. The procedure under study is the well known linearization method due to Lindstrom and Bates (1990), implemented in the nlme library of S-Plus and R. Its performance is studied in terms of bias, mean square error (MSE), and true coverage of the associated asymptotic confidence intervals. Ignoring other criteria like the convenience of avoiding over parameterised models, it seems worst to erroneously assume some structure than do not assume any structure when this would be adequate.