Altruism, Equity, and Reciprocity in a Gift-Exchange Experiment: An Encompassing Approach

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent models of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as either altruism- based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based. We estimate and compare leading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. We then offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches, thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determining the relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition, the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we find that intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruistic considerations all play a significant role in players' decisions.

Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market: An experimental investigation

While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making, there is little explicit empirical evidence of reciprocal altruism in economic environments. This paper tests whether attribution of volition in choosing a wage has a significant effect on subsequent costly effort provision. An experiment was conducted in which subjects are first randomly divided into groups of employers and employees. Wages were selected and employees asked to choose an effort level, where increased effort is costly to the employee, but highly beneficial to the employer. The wage-determination process was common knowledge and wages were chosen either by the employer or by an external process. There is evidence for both distributional concerns and reciprocal altruism. The slope of the effort/wage profile is clearly positive in all cases, but is significantly higher when wages are chosen by the employer, offering support for the hypothesis of reciprocity. There are implications for models of utility and a critique of some current models is presented.

Altruism, equity and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: An encompassing approach

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motivesmust be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recentmodels of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as either altruism-based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based. We estimate and compareleading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. Wethen offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches,thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determiningthe relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition,the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we findthat intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruisticconsiderations all play a significant role in players' decisions.

Social reciprocity measures based on dyadic discrepancies: Methodological review and software development

This paper examines statistical analysis of social reciprocity at group, dyadic, and individual levels. Given that testing statistical hypotheses regarding social reciprocity can be also of interest, a statistical procedure based on Monte Carlo sampling has been developed and implemented in R in order to allow social researchers to describe groups and make statistical decisions.

A statistical procedure for testing social reciprocity at group, dyadic and individual levels

This paper examines statistical analysis of social reciprocity, that is, the balance between addressing and receiving behaviour in social interactions. Specifically, it focuses on the measurement of social reciprocity by means of directionality and skew-symmetry statistics at different levels. Two statistics have been used as overall measures of social reciprocity at group level: the directional consistency and the skew-symmetry statistics. Furthermore, the skew-symmetry statistic allows social researchers to obtain complementary information at dyadic and individual levels. However, having computed these measures, social researchers may be interested in testing statistical hypotheses regarding social reciprocity. For this reason, it has been developed a statistical procedure, based on Monte Carlo sampling, in order to allow social researchers to describe groups and make statistical decisions.

Measuring and making decisions for social reciprocity

Social reciprocity may explain certain emerging psychological processes, which are likely to be founded on dyadic relations. Although some indices and statistics have been proposed to measure and make statistical decisions regarding social reciprocity in groups, these were generally developed to identify association patterns rather than to quantify the discrepancies between what each individual addresses to his/her partners and what is received from them in return. Additionally, social researchers are not only interested in measuring groups at the global level, since dyadic and individual measurements are also necessary for a proper description of social interactions. This study is concerned with a new statistic for measuring social reciprocity at the global level and with decomposing it in order to identify those dyads and individuals which account for a significant part of asymmetry in social interactions. In addition to a set of indices some exact analytical results are derived and a way of making statistical decisions is proposed.

Testing reciprocity in social interactions: A comparison between the Directional consistency and Skew symmetry statistics

In the present work we focus on two indices that quantify directionality and skew-symmetrical patterns in social interactions as measures of social reciprocity: the Directional consistency (DC) and Skew symmetry indices. Although both indices enable researchers to describe social groups, most studies require statistical inferential tests. The main aims of the present study are: firstly, to propose an overall statistical technique for testing null hypotheses regarding social reciprocity in behavioral studies, using the DC and Skew symmetry statistics (Φ) at group level; and secondly, to compare both statistics in order to allow researchers to choose the optimal measure depending on the conditions. In order to allow researchers to make statistical decisions, statistical significance for both statistics has been estimated by means of a Monte Carlo simulation. Furthermore, this study will enable researchers to choose the optimal observational conditions for carrying out their research, as the power of the statistical tests has been estimated.

Bias and standard error for social reciprocity measurements

The directional consistency and skew-symmetry statistics have been proposed as global measurements of social reciprocity. Although both measures can be useful for quantifying social reciprocity, researchers need to know whether these estimators are biased in order to assess descriptive results properly. That is, if estimators are biased, researchers should compare actual values with expected values under the specified null hypothesis. Furthermore, standard errors are needed to enable suitable assessment of discrepancies between actual and expected values. This paper aims to derive some exact and approximate expressions in order to obtain bias and standard error values for both estimators for round-robin designs, although the results can also be extended to other reciprocal designs.

Fair procedures. Evidence from games involving lotteries

Procedural fairness plays a prominent role in the social discourse concerning the marketplace in particular, and social institutions in general. Random procedures are a simple case, and they have found application in several important social allocation decisions. We investigate random procedures in the laboratory. We find that an unbiased random procedure is an acceptable substitute for an unbiased allocation: similar patterns of acceptance and rejection result when either is inserted as a feasible proposal in a sequential battle-of-the-sexes. We also find that unbiasedness, known to be a crucial characteristic of allocation fairness, is important to procedural fairness: in the context of a random offer game, a biased outcome is more readily accepted when chosen by an unbiased random draw than by one that is biased. Procedural fairness is conceptually different than allocation fairness or attribution-based behavior, and none of the current models of fairness and reciprocity captures our results. Post hoc extension of one of these models (ERC) suggests that a deeper understanding of procedural fairness requires further investigation of competing fairness norms.

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.

When are layoffs acceptable? Evidence from a quasi-experiment

Many authors have discussed a decline in internal labor markets and an apparent shift to a new employment contract, characterized by less commitment between employer and employee and more portable skills. These discussions occur without much evidence on what employment contract employees currently feel is fair. We perfomed quasi-experimental surveys to study when employees in the U.S. andCanada feel that layoffs are fair.Layoffs were perceived as more fair if they were due to lower product demand than if the result of employee suggestions. This result appears to be solely due to norms of reciprocity (companiesshould not punish employees for their efforts), rather than norms of sharing rents, as new technology was also considered a justification for layoffs.Consistent with theories of distributive and procedural equity, layoffs were perceived as more fair if the CEO voluntarily shared the pain. CEO bonuses due to layoffs lowered their reported fairness only slightly.Respondents in Silicon Valley were not more accepting of layoffsthan were those in Canada on average, although the justificationsconsidered valid differed slightly.

Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people chooseto punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person's payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers' rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender's intention,as is suggested by the literature on deception and proceduralsatisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charnessand Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender's perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.

Estratègies de cura i presa de decisions en persones grans amb dependència ingressades en una unitat geriàtrica d'atenció intermèdia : estudi descriptiu

Aquest estudi té com objectiu observar les relacions entre les estratègies de cura (formal, informal, mixta) que fan servir els cuidadors de persones grans dependents, la seva situació social i les seves motivacions per la decisió respecte a com fan la cura. L’estat del tema destaca el predomini de les cures informals sobre les formals en els models de benestar mediterranis i la rellevància de la interacció entre factors personals socioculturals i les polítiques socials en la presa de decisions individuals sobre la cura de la dependència. La llei de la dependència, de recent implementació a l’Estat espanyol, ha universalitzat l’accés als recursos formals, creant un nou paradigma d’interacció cuidadors-recursos. Es tracta d’un estudi observacional, transversal, descriptiu de tipus mixt quantitatiu/qualitatiu realitzat a partir d’entrevistes individuals als cuidadors de dependents ingressats en una unitat geriàtrica d’atenció intermèdia. Es recullen dades sobre el context sociofamiliar, l’estratègia de cura, l’autopercepció i les motivacions. Els resultats mostren que els cuidadors combinen prestacions econòmiques i serveis (públics i privats) per adaptar al màxim l’estratègia a les condicions del dependent i a les seves pròpies. Tenen la convicció generalitzada que l’atenció cal fer-la al domicili per motius de reciprocitat i respecte a la persona cuidada. El pas a l’atenció residencial és una decisió molt difícil pels cuidadors. La implantació de la llei de la dependència ha normalitzat la relació entre cuidadors i recursos formals, però la burocratització i la insuficiència de l’oferta de serveis no afavoreixen canvis substancials en la provisió de l’ajut, que continua essent majoritàriament informal. La millora en la percepció de continuïtat d’atenció entre el domicili i la residència, i també en la gestió i l’oferta de serveis formals públics es presenten com a reptes de treball importants al nostre país.