Prescription in the proposal for a common european sales law

The rules on prescription in Part VIII, Chapter 18, of the Proposal for a Common European Sales Law (CESL) follow the provisions of the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), which, in general, have deserved favourable comments. Yet, a number of rules contained in those texts have been omitted. It is necessary to ascertain whether the CESL rules only apply to provisions on rights and claims resulting from sales or related services contracts, or whether they are also applicable to any other contractual right or claim and also to rights or claims of non-contractual origin. One of the most problematic issues concerns general prescription periods: firstly, because there are two general periods, a short one and a long one, without any specification about the claims or rights covered by each one of them; secondly, because neither period is suitable in case of non-conformity. There are also some interpretation problems due to missing, ambiguous or defective definitions. The systematic approach demands clarification too.

The methodological criteria of counterpropositions within the Roman social legal framework

Partiendo de la difundida distinción, entre unos ordenamientos jurídicos abiertos, como el derecho inglés y el anglo americano, que se vinculan en el pasado al Derecho Romano, y otros cerrados o codificados, como los derechos del continente europeo, y tras detenernos en el origen terminológico de ambos sistemas y en su rígida contraposición, se procura destacar en este trabajo que Roma y su Derecho tampoco abrazan en toda su pureza, un sistema abierto.

Tres nous fragments d'inscripció en bronze en col·leccions particulars

Presentació de tres bronzes de caràcter jurídic procedents un d'ells d'Hellin i els altres probablement de la Bètica. El primer sembla ésser una limitatio o una adsignatio. El segon sembla correspondre a un passatge d'una llei d'època flàvia, i el tercer és, probablement, una adsignatio.

Una reflexión sobre la impronta romana del 'beneficio de separación de patrimonios' en el Código Civil catalán

The roman institution of the separatio bonorum is a pretorian remedy that relies on the principle of equity, created as to protect the deceased creditors and/or legatees. It provides them a"benefit" in the case of selling the goods of the heir-deubtor, enabling them to separate and reserve for themselves that whole patrimonium, as to avoid that by the act of selling, the heirs creditors could go to it; and like this they maintain intact their guarantee, which relies on the whole goods and assets left by the deceased. The separation of patrimonies implied the existence of 2 different groups of goods: that of the heirs" and that one of the deceased, which are not the same in legal terms, in spite of having a common owner at this point, the heir. This institution was regulated in the 6th title of the 42nd book of the Digesto, and in the 72th title, 7th book of the Justinean Code, and its interest is really high due to its material complexity and its procedure. The aim of this work is to analyze the institution of the separatio bonorum in Roman Law, and its importance in the same figure, actually regulated in the 4th book of the Catalan civil code.

La Novela 53, 6 y sus precedentes inmediatos

Por ser la cuarta vidual, como corroboran las Nov. 53, 6; 74, 5 y 117, 5, una figura vinculada tanto al Derecho de familia, en concreto, a la denominada, en doctrina, cuarta marital o uxoria en su acepción penal, pues en ésta encuentra una parte importante de sus raíces, como al Derecho sucesorio; su historia y fines se entenderán mejor si se integra en la evolución de ambos sistemas. Lo dicho justifica, a mi juicio, el interés de un estudio que, como éste, se centre, por una parte, en la institución que fue el precedente histórico inmediato de la cuarta vidual y, por otra, en el análisis de la Novela que, por primera vez, reguló el derecho a la cuarta en favor del cónyuge viudo, esto es, la 53, 6.

Constitutio scimus: el heredero después de la confección del inventario

Sumario: 1. Introducción. 2. Posición particular del heredero beneficiado respecto del caudal relicto: examen de sus derechos o privilegios. 3. Relaciones del heredero beneficiado con los acreedores de la herencia, legatarios y fideicomisarios

The Law of Impersonal Transactions: Meaning and Difficulties

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchange in which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect to previous "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs by protecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent by property right holders to avoid damaging property enforcement-e.g., it is they as principals who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicial verifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automatic byproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, by requiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a sort of legal commodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocation and specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legal commoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency-the law first developed for personal trade-and an unbalance in vested interests, as luddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.

The law of impersonal transactions

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchangein which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect toprevious "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs byprotecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent byproperty rightholders to avoid damaging property enforcement?e.g., it isthey, as principals, who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicialverifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automaticbyproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, byrequiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a legalcommodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocationand specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legalcommoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency?the law firstdeveloped for personal trade?and an unbalance in vested interests, asluddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

Asymptotic equivalence between the unconditional maximum likelihood and the square-law nonlinearity symbol timing estimation

This paper provides a systematic approach to theproblem of nondata aided symbol-timing estimation for linearmodulations. The study is performed under the unconditionalmaximum likelihood framework where the carrier-frequencyerror is included as a nuisance parameter in the mathematicalderivation. The second-order moments of the received signal arefound to be the sufficient statistics for the problem at hand and theyallow the provision of a robust performance in the presence of acarrier-frequency error uncertainty. We particularly focus on theexploitation of the cyclostationary property of linear modulations.This enables us to derive simple and closed-form symbol-timingestimators which are found to be based on the well-known squaretiming recovery method by Oerder and Meyr. Finally, we generalizethe OM method to the case of linear modulations withoffset formats. In this case, the square-law nonlinearity is foundto provide not only the symbol-timing but also the carrier-phaseerror.

Challenges and Opportunities of Online Entertainment. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics. Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, 9-10 July, 2012.

El VIII Congrés Internacional Internet, Dret i Política (IDP 2012) que s'ha dut a terme a Barcelona els dies 9 i 10 de juliol de 2012 sota el títol genèric de "Reptes i oportunitats de l'entreteniment en línia", ha abordat alguns dels principals reptes als que s'enfronta la societat de la informació des de la perspectiva jurídica i politològica. Concretament, els temes centrals han estat el debat sobre l'entreteniment a la xarxa, així com altres qüestions relacionades amb Internet i els drets de propietat intel·lectual, la privacitat, la seguretat o la llibertat d'expressió.

Internet, Law and Politics. A decade of transformations.

Proceedings of Internet, Law and Politics. A decade of transformations.

Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? An application to common property resources

It is common to find in experimental data persistent oscillations in the aggregate outcomes and high levels of heterogeneity in individual behavior. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find significant deviations from aggregate Nash equilibrium predictions. In this paper, we employ an evolutionary model with boundedly rational agents to explain these findings. We use data from common property resource experiments (Casari and Plott, 2003). Instead of positing individual-specific utility functions, we model decision makers as selfish and identical. Agent interaction is simulated using an individual learning genetic algorithm, where agents have constraints in their working memory, a limited ability to maximize, and experiment with new strategies. We show that the model replicates most of the patterns that can be found in common property resource experiments.