The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Improving the effort concept: a revision of the traditional approach in the context of controlled Dynamic Stochastic Environments

The objective of this paper is to re-evaluate the attitude to effort of a risk-averse decision-maker in an evolving environment. In the classic analysis, the space of efforts is generally discretized. More realistic, this new approach emploies a continuum of effort levels. The presence of multiple possible efforts and performance levels provides a better basis for explaining real economic phenomena. The traditional approach (see, Laffont, J. J. & Tirole, J., 1993, Salanie, B., 1997, Laffont, J.J. and Martimort, D, 2002, among others) does not take into account the potential effect of the system dynamics on the agent's behavior to effort over time. In the context of a Principal-agent relationship, not only the incentives of the Principal can determine the private agent to allocate a good effort, but also the evolution of the dynamic system. The incentives can be ineffective when the environment does not incite the agent to invest a good effort. This explains why, some effici

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Agency problems with non-smooth decision profiles: the case of monopoly under product quality

A method for dealing with monotonicity constraints in optimal control problems is used to generalize some results in the context of monopoly theory, also extending the generalization to a large family of principal-agent programs. Our main conclusion is that many results on diverse economic topics, achieved under assumptions of continuity and piecewise differentiability in connection with the endogenous variables of the problem, still remain valid after replacing such assumptions by two minimal requirements.

Vertical relations and local competition : an empirical approach

The analysis of vertical industry relations forms an essential element in the field of industrial organization. This paper tests hypotheses derived from transaction cost theory and the principal-agent problem in Chile’s petrol market. It shows that local competition plays an important role in the choice of a disintegrated vertical structure, and that low levels of service investment have the same effect. Conversely, the number of own-brand outlets and a high level of investment in services reduce the probability of disintegration. The paper demonstrates that vertical disintegration has a null effect on wholesale petrol prices and a positive effect on retail petrol prices of between 1.6 and 7 per cent, depending on fuel type.

Repeated Interaction and the Revelation of the Monitor's Type: A Principal-Monitor-Agent Problem

This paper studies a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation where a strategic principal delegates the task of monitoring the effort of a strategic agent to a third party. The latter we call the monitor, whose type is initially unknown. Through repeated interaction the agent might learn his type. We show that this process damages the principal's payoffs. Compensation is assumed exogenous, limiting to a great extent the provision of incentives. We go around this difficulty by introducing costly replacement strategies, i.e. the principal replaces the monitor, thus disrupting the agent's learning. We found that even when replacement costs are null, if the revealed monitor is strictly preferred by both parties, there is a loss in efficiency due to the impossibility of bene…tting from it. Nonetheless, these strategies can partially recover the principal's losses. Additionally, we establish upper and lower bounds on the payoffs that the principal and the agent can achieve. Finally we characterize the equilibrium strategies under public and private monitoring (with communication) for different cost and impatience levels.

Escola i diversitat lingüística i cultural: desafiaments i oportunitats. El paper d'un Servei Educatiu de Zona com a agent d'innovació i canvi

Davant dels nous reptes educatius que planteja l’augment de la diversitat lingüística i cultural al conjunt del Sistema Educatiu Català, el present treball descriu els resultats i experiències obtinguts en les tres primeres fases d’un projecte de recerca centrat en la identificació d’indicadors vàlids que permetin dissenyar i implementar estratègies educatives inclusives adequades per atendre la diversitat lingüística i cultural present als nostres centres. La part central de la memòria descriu les primeres dades d’un estudi quantitatiu , realitzat en diferents moments del període d’escolarització (Pàrvuls 5 anys , segon i sisè de Primària i segon d’ESO) a quatre centres públics de Vilafranca del Penedès a finals del curs 2009-2010 , sobre el coneixement de català i de castellà i les possibles influències que en aquest hi juguen els factors de diversitat lingüística i cultural. El segon bloc d’aquest projecte presenta un seguit d’experiències i propostes d’assessorament centrades en el procés de sensibilització inicial sobre les implicacions educatives a nivell d’aula i de centre de la diversitat lingüística i cultural. També es presenta, com a annex final, un recull dels principals materials emprats en aquest procés d’intervenció en centre. A la part final del treball, s’hi desenvolupa una reflexió sobre les condicions que poden afavorir la implementació d’aquestes estratègies a nivell de centre i de sistema educatiu; i sobre el paper que , en aquests processos de canvi i millora educativa , hi podrien jugar els Serveis Educatius de Zona del Departament d’Ensenyament de la Generalitat de Catalunya.

Relying on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation

I study the optimal project choice when the principal relies on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation. The principal has to choose between a safe project generating a fixed revenue and a risky project generating an uncertain revenue. The agent has private information about the production cost under each project but also about the signal regarding the profitability of the risky project. If the signal favoring the adoption of the risky project is goods news to the agent, integrating production and project evaluation tasks does not generate any loss compared to the benchmark in which the principal herself receives the signal. By contrast, if it is bad news, task integration creates an endogenous reservation utility which is type-dependent and thereby generates countervailing incentives, which can make a bias toward either project optimal. Our results can offer an explanation for why good firms can go bad and a rationale for the separation of day-to-day operating decisions from long-term strategic decisions stressed by Williamson.

Implementation of the ordinal shapley value for a three-agent economy

We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

Las ideas de Marx llegan a la corriente principal de la economía

The paper first sets out simplified versions of recent mainstream papers which explain the rise of democracy in 19th century Europe and its instabliity in Latin America. Then it attempts to convince Marxists of the importance of these works for Marxist thought.

Sobre "clase y explotación" en la corriente principal de la economía

Recently a number of articles have appeared in the mainstream that deal with the economy in terms of class and exploitation. This paper sets out two of them in a simplified maner and explains why they may be of interest to left wing Latin American economists.

Incorporació del català en agent conversacional animat per computador

Dins del marc del projecte europeu HERMES, al Centre de Visió per Computador de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona s'està desenvolupant un agent conversacional animat per ordinador el qual haurà de ser capaç d'interactuar amb l'usuari a través de diferents canals de forma simultània, o, el que és el mateix, parlar, gesticular, expressar emocions... Partint, doncs, d'un software capaç de fer que un model 3D d'un cap humà expressi emocions i parli en anglès, donat un arxiu d'àudio prèviament generat, en el treball que aquí es presenta es duu a terme la recerca d'una eina sintetitzadora de parla a partir de text que permeti fer això mateix en català. En aquest document s'explica el procés seguit per a trobar aquesta eina, la investigació realitzada sobre el funcionament d'ambdues per tal d'entendre-les i poder-hi treballar, així com, finalment, les modificacions realitzades per a fer que aquestes puguin interactuar i generar parla inteligible en català a partir de textos escrits en aquest idioma.