A house price index defined in the potential outcomes framework

Current methods for constructing house price indices are based on comparisons of sale prices of residential properties sold two or more times and on regression of the sale prices on the attributes of the properties and of their locations. The two methods have well recognised deficiencies, selection bias and model assumptions, respectively. We introduce a new method based on propensity score matching. The average house prices for two periods are compared by selecting pairs of properties, one sold in each period, that are as similar on a set of available attributes (covariates) as is feasible to arrange. The uncertainty associated with such matching is addressed by multiple imputation, framing the problem as involving missing values. The method is applied to aregister of transactions ofresidential properties in New Zealand and compared with the established alternatives.

Age effects, unobserved characteristics and hedonic price indexes: The Spanish car market in the 1990s

This paper computes and compares alternative quality-adjusted price indexes for new cars in Spain in the period 1990-2000. The proposed hedonic approach simultaneously controls for time-invariant unobserved product e¤ects and time-variant unobserved quality changes, that are assumed to be captured by model age effects. The results show that the non-adjusted price index largely overstates the increase in the cost of living induced by changes in car prices and that previous evidence for this market have not measured the real extent of that bias, probably due to the omission of controls for unobservables. It is also shown that omitting age effects can also lead to misleading conclusions. The estimated price indexes give also some insights on what could have been the determinants of price evolution in the Spanish car market.

Age effects, unobserved characteristics and hedonic price indexes: The Spanish car market in the 1990's

This paper computes and compares alternative quality-adjusted price indexes for new cars in Spain in the period 1990-2000. The proposed hedonic approach simultaneously controls for time-invariant unobserved product effects and time-variant unobserved quality changes, that are assumed to be captured by model age effects. The results show that the non-adjusted price index largely overstates the increase in the cost of living induced by changes in car prices and that previous evidence for this market have not measured the real extent of that bias, probably due to the omission of controls for unobservables. It is also shown that omitting age effects can also lead to misleading conclusions. The estimated price indexes give also some insights on what could have been the determinants of price evolution in the Spanish car market. JEL classi…fication numbers: C43, E31, L11, L13, Keywords: Hedonic price indexes, Spanish car market, car prices, CPI, Cost of living

Differences in seasonal price patterns among second home rentals and hotels: Empirical evidence and practical implications

Hotels and second home rentals are two of the most important tourist accommodation options in Spain. In terms of seasonality, almost all previous studies have analysed tourism demand from the point of view either of total arrivals or the number of tourists lodged in a single accommodation type (hotels, rural accommodation, etc). However, there are no studies focusing on price seasonality orcomparing seasonality among different accommodation types. By using seasonality indicators and a price index constructed by means of hedonic methods, this paper aims to shed some light on seasonal pricing patterns among second home rentals and hotels. The paper relies on a 2004 database of 144 hotels and 1,002 apartments on the Costa Brava (northeast Spain). The results show that prices for second home rentals display a smoother seasonal pattern than hotels due to reduced price differences between shoulder (May and October) and peak periods (August)

Economic and environmental effects of the CO2 taxation: an input-output analysis for Spain

CO2 emissions induced by human activities are the major cause of climate change; hence, strong environmental policy that limits the growing dependence on fossil fuel is indispensable. Tradable permits and environmental taxes are the usual tools used in CO2 reduction strategies. Such economic tools provide incentives to polluting industries to reduce their emissions through market signals. The aim of this work is to investigate the direct and indirect effects of an environmental tax on Spanish products and services. We apply an environmentally extended input-output (EIO) model to identify CO2 emission intensities of products and services and, accordingly, we estimate the tax proportional to these intensities. The short-term price effects are analyzed using an input-output price model. The effect of tax introduction on consumption prices and its influence on consumers’ welfare are determined. We also quantify the environmental impacts of such taxation in terms of the reduction in CO2 emissions. The results, based on the Spanish economy for the year 2007, show that sectors with relatively poor environmental profile are subjected to high environmental tax rates. And consequently, applying a CO2 tax on these sectors, increases production prices and induces a slight increase in consumer price index and a decrease in private welfare. The revenue from the tax could be used to counter balance the negative effects on social welfare and also to stimulate the increase of renewable energy shares in the most impacting sectors. Finally, our analysis highlights that the environmental and economic goals cannot be met at the same time with the environmental taxation and this shows the necessity of finding other (complementary or alternative) measures to ensure both the economic and ecological efficiencies. Keywords: CO2 emissions; environmental tax; input-output model, effects of environmental taxation.

Aggregate shocks or vertical tax interdependence? Evidende from gasoline and cigarettes

[cat] Besley i Rosen -1998- van ser els primers autors en estimar empíricament la rellevància de les externalitats impositives verticals. Aquests autors varen fer-ho per al cas dels impostos sobre la benzina i el tabac, en concret, per al cas dels EEUU. Ara bé, no varen tenir en compte les diferències en el nivell de vida entre Estats: àrees amb un nivell elevat paguen menys en termes reals que àrees amb un nivell de vida baix, doncs l'impost unitari sobre la benzina o sobre el tabac no difereix d'acord amb l'Estat on l'impost s'aplica. En conseqüència, proposem que la competència impositiva vertical sigui estimada deflactant totes les variables monetàries utilitzant l'anomenat "House Price Index (HPI)", el qual està disponible al nivell dels Estats. Això genera una variable impositiva federal expressada en termes reals i que presenta variació entre Estats. Aquesta estratègia empírica ens permet diferenciar entre la interdependència vertical entre els tipus impositius federals i els estatals de shocks agregats al llarg del temps, utilitzant dades per als EEUU durant el període 1975 a 2006 per a benzina i tabac. Trobem una nivell significatiu de competència impositiva horitzontal, la qual és més elevada en el cas del tabac, però en cap cas reacció impositiva vertical. Els resultats són robustos al període analitzat.

Aggregate shocks or vertical tax interdependence? Evidende from gasoline and cigarettes

[cat] Besley i Rosen -1998- van ser els primers autors en estimar empíricament la rellevància de les externalitats impositives verticals. Aquests autors varen fer-ho per al cas dels impostos sobre la benzina i el tabac, en concret, per al cas dels EEUU. Ara bé, no varen tenir en compte les diferències en el nivell de vida entre Estats: àrees amb un nivell elevat paguen menys en termes reals que àrees amb un nivell de vida baix, doncs l'impost unitari sobre la benzina o sobre el tabac no difereix d'acord amb l'Estat on l'impost s'aplica. En conseqüència, proposem que la competència impositiva vertical sigui estimada deflactant totes les variables monetàries utilitzant l'anomenat "House Price Index (HPI)", el qual està disponible al nivell dels Estats. Això genera una variable impositiva federal expressada en termes reals i que presenta variació entre Estats. Aquesta estratègia empírica ens permet diferenciar entre la interdependència vertical entre els tipus impositius federals i els estatals de shocks agregats al llarg del temps, utilitzant dades per als EEUU durant el període 1975 a 2006 per a benzina i tabac. Trobem una nivell significatiu de competència impositiva horitzontal, la qual és més elevada en el cas del tabac, però en cap cas reacció impositiva vertical. Els resultats són robustos al període analitzat.

Trade disclosure and price dispersion

This paper determines the effects of post-trade opaqueness on market performance. We find that the degree of market transparency has important effects on market equilibria. In particular, we show that dealers operating in a transparent structure set regret-free prices at each period making zero expected profits in each of the two trading rounds, whereas in the opaque market dealers invest in acquiring information at the beginning of the trading day. Moreover, we obtain that if there is no trading activity in the first period, then market makers only change their quotes in the opaque market. Additionally, we show that trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices and reduces volatility. Finally, concerning welfare of market participants, we obtain ambiguous results. Keywords: Market microstructure, Post-trade transparency, Price experimentation, Price dispersion.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Elicited bid functions in (a)symmetric first-price auctions

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior, we use an experimental design that elicits bidders' complete bid functions in each round (auction) of the experiment. In the aggregate, behavior is consistent with the basic equilibrium predictions for risk neutral or homogenous risk averse bidders (extent of bid shading, average seller's revenues and deviations from equilibrium). However, when we look at the extent of best reply behavior and the shape of bid functions, we find that individual behavior is not in line with the received equilibrium models, although it exhibits strategic sophistication.

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.