Multi-scale label interaction to improve object detection and segmentation

The project aims at advancing the state of the art in the use of context information for classification of image and video data. The use of context in the classification of images has been showed of great importance to improve the performance of actual object recognition systems. In our project we proposed the concept of Multi-scale Feature Labels as a general and compact method to exploit the local and global context. The feature extraction from the discriminative probability or classification confidence label field is of great novelty. Moreover the use of a multi-scale representation of the feature labels lead to a compact and efficient description of the context. The goal of the project has been also to provide a general-purpose method and prove its suitability in different image/video analysis problem. The two-year project generated 5 journal publications (plus 2 under submission), 10 conference publications (plus 2 under submission) and one patent (plus 1 pending). Of these publications, a relevant number make use of the main result of this project to improve the results in detection and/or segmentation of objects.

Productivities, preferences, and parental child care

We study the interplay of preferences and market productivities on parenting, and show the preferences, when identified, provide a better explanation of caring decisions than has, so far, been demonstrated in the literature. We qualify the standard finding the parental education in a key determinant of care by showing important interaction effects with marital homogamy. We find that homogamy has opposite effects on child care and couple specialization for high and low educated parents. Identification has been made possible by a unique couple-based time diary study for Denmark

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.

Social preferences and skill segregation

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals dependnot only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of otherpersons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study theallocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. Weshow that even small deviations from purely selfish preferences leadsto widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers ofdifferent abilities tend to work in di¤erent firms, as long as theycare somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are close .

Social Preferences and Transport Policy: The case of US speed limits

This article, in reviewing the longrunning US debate on speed limits, illustrates how a different valuation of the trade-off between private mobility needs and safety concerns can shape transport policies. It is argued that the regulatory decentralization debate, together with the speed limit in force in each state, obey the social preferences and valuation given to this tradeoff. Such a view is consistent with evidence that higher speed limits are to be found in states with greater private mobility needs, even though their fatality rates might be among the highest in the country. By contrast, lower speed limits and supporters of a low national speed limit are to be found in states that show a greater concern for safety outcomes and which are less dependent on private mobility. By reviewing these events and examining the role played by the main actors and analyzing their motivations, the article identifies important lessons for similar future discussions on transport policy.

A segmentation analysis and segments profile of budget air travelers

Many Spanish destinations are now considering low cost airlines (LCA) important for attracting tourists. However, there is little evidence on the characteristics travelers using low cost airlines and their flight preferences. Typical segmentation of air travelers are business versus leisure travelers and business versus tourist fares. The aim of this paper is to obtain a deeper understanding of the demand of LCA through a segmentation analysis, based on 808 foreign travelers who used Girona airport, that focuses on low cost travelers’ valuations of different flight attributes and trip related characteristics

The gain-loss asymmetry and single-self preferences

Kahneman and Tversky asserted a fundamental asymmetry between gains and losses, namely a reflection effect which occurs when an individual prefers a sure gain of $ pz to anuncertain gain of $ z with probability p, while preferring an uncertain loss of $z with probability p to a certain loss of $ pz.We focus on this class of choices (actuarially fair), and explore the extent to which thereflection effect, understood as occurring at a range of wealth levels, is compatible with single-self preferences.We decompose the reflection effect into two components, a probability switch effect,which is compatible with single-self preferences, and a translation effect, which is not. To argue the first point, we analyze two classes of single-self, nonexpected utility preferences, which we label homothetic and weakly homothetic. In both cases, we characterize the switch effect as well as the dependence of risk attitudes on wealth.We also discuss two types of utility functions of a form reminiscent of expected utility but with distorted probabilities. Type I always distorts the probability of the worst outcome downwards, yielding attraction to small risks for all probabilities. Type II distorts low probabilities upwards, and high probabilities downwards, implying risk aversion when the probability of the worst outcome is low. By combining homothetic or weak homothetic preferences with Type I or Type II distortion functions, we present four explicit examples: All four display a switch effect and, hence, a form of reflection effect consistent a single self preferences.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.

Work, risk and health: differences between immigrants and natives in Spain

We analyze the impact of working and contractual conditions, particularly exposure to job risks, on the probability of acquiring a disability. We postulate a model in which this impact is mediated by the choice of occupation, with a level of risk associated to it. We assume this choice is endogenous, and that it depends on preferences and opportunities in the labour market, both of which may differ between immigrants and natives. To test this hypothesis we use data from the Continuous Sample of Working Lives of the Spanish SS system. It contains individual, job and firm information of over a million workers, including a representative sample of immigrants. We find that risk exposure increases the probability of permanent disability by 5.3%; temporary employment also influences health. Migrant status -with differences among regions of origin- significantly affects both disability and the probability of being employed in a risky occupation. Most groups of immigrants work in riskier jobs, but have lower probability of becoming disabled. Nevertheless, our theoretical hypothesis that disability and risk are jointly determined is not valid for immigrants: i.e. for them working conditions is not a matter of choice in terms of health.

Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.

Neglected risks, financial innovation and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.

The domain and interpretation of utility functions: An exploration

This paper proposes an exploration of the methodology of utilityfunctions that distinguishes interpretation from representation. Whilerepresentation univocally assigns numbers to the entities of the domainof utility functions, interpretation relates these entities withempirically observable objects of choice. This allows us to makeexplicit the standard interpretation of utility functions which assumesthat two objects have the same utility if and only if the individual isindifferent among them. We explore the underlying assumptions of suchan hypothesis and propose a non-standard interpretation according towhich objects of choice have a well-defined utility although individualsmay vary in the way they treat these objects in a specific context.We provide examples of such a methodological approach that may explainsome reversal of preferences and suggest possible mathematicalformulations for further research.

Eliciting consumers preferences using stated preference discrete choice models: Contingent ranking versus choice experiment

The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to carry out a theoreticalreview of the most recent stated preference techniques used foreliciting consumers preferences and, secondly, to compare the empiricalresults of two dierent stated preference discrete choice approaches.They dier in the measurement scale for the dependent variable and,therefore, in the estimation method, despite both using a multinomiallogit. One of the approaches uses a complete ranking of full-profiles(contingent ranking), that is, individuals must rank a set ofalternatives from the most to the least preferred, and the other usesa first-choice rule in which individuals must select the most preferredoption from a choice set (choice experiment). From the results werealize how important the measurement scale for the dependent variablebecomes and, to what extent, procedure invariance is satisfied.

Learning and adaptation in physical heterogeneous teams of robots

In this paper we present a novel approach to assigning roles to robots in a team of physical heterogeneous robots. Its members compete for these roles and get rewards for them. The rewards are used to determine each agent’s preferences and which agents are better adapted to the environment. These aspects are included in the decision making process. Agent interactions are modelled using the concept of an ecosystem in which each robot is a species, resulting in emergent behaviour of the whole set of agents. One of the most important features of this approach is its high adaptability. Unlike some other learning techniques, this approach does not need to start a whole exploitation process when the environment changes. All this is exemplified by means of experiments run on a simulator. In addition, the algorithm developed was applied as applied to several teams of robots in order to analyse the impact of heterogeneity in these systems