Improving the risk concept: a revision of Arrow-Pratt theory in the context of controlled dynamic stochastic environments

In the literature on risk, one generally assume that uncertainty is uniformly distributed over the entire working horizon, when the absolute risk-aversion index is negative and constant. From this perspective, the risk is totally exogenous, and thus independent of endogenous risks. The classic procedure is "myopic" with regard to potential changes in the future behavior of the agent due to inherent random fluctuations of the system. The agent's attitude to risk is rigid. Although often criticized, the most widely used hypothesis for the analysis of economic behavior is risk-neutrality. This borderline case must be envisaged with prudence in a dynamic stochastic context. The traditional measures of risk-aversion are generally too weak for making comparisons between risky situations, given the dynamic �complexity of the environment. This can be highlighted in concrete problems in finance and insurance, context for which the Arrow-Pratt measures (in the small) give ambiguous.

Money, Fame and the Allocation of Talent: Brain Drain, the Matthew Effect and the Institution of Science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in the private sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In this paper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role of the institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector and the private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model the institution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). We show that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the science sector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate the brain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through the market might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and thereby worsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetary and non-monetary incentives in science.

Free and fragmenting filling length

The filling length of an edge-circuit η in the Cayley 2-complex of a finite presentation of a group is the minimal integer length L such that there is a combinatorial null-homotopy of η down to a base point through loops of length at most L. We introduce similar notions in which the full-homotopy is not required to fix a base point, and in which the contracting loop is allowed to bifurcate. We exhibit a group in which the resulting filling invariants exhibit dramatically different behaviour to the standard notion of filling length. We also define the corresponding filling invariants for Riemannian manifolds and translate our results to this setting.

Los mecanismos de cohesión territorial en España: un análisis y algunas propuestas

El presente informe describe y cuantifica los principales mecanismos de cohesión social y territorial existentes en España, analiza su incidencia sobre la distribución regional de la renta y su contribución a la nivelación de la calidad de los servicios básicos, y propone algunos cambios en su diseño con el objetivo de mejorar sus propiedades de eficiencia y su adecuación a los principios constitucionales de igualdad, solidaridad y autonomía. La tesis central del tabajo es que el proceso de reformas autonómicas que ahora se inicia no debería en ningún caso suponer la ruptura de los mecanismos existentes de cohesión y debería aprovecharse para perfeccionarlos.

On the weights of nations: assigning voting weights in a heterogenous union

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model.

Choosing how to choose: self-stable majority rules and constitutions

Constitutional arrangements affect the decisions made by a society. We study how this effect leads to preferences of citizens over constitutions; and ultimately how this has a feedback that determines which constitutions can survive in a given society. Constitutions are stylized here, to consist of a voting rule for ordinary business and possibly different voting rule for making changes to the constitution. We deffine an equilibrium notion for constitutions, called self-stability, whereby under the rules of a self-stable constitution, the society would not vote to change the constitution. We argue that only self-stable constitutions will endure. We prove that self-stable constitutions always exist, but that most constitutions (even very prominent ones) may not be self-stable for some societies. We show that constitutions where the voting rule used to amend the constitution is the same as the voting rule used for ordinary business are dangerously simplistic, and there are (many) societies for which no such constitution is self-stable rule. We conclude with a characterization of the set of self-stable constitutions that use majority rule for ordinary business.

Stochastic dominance and absolute risk aversion

In this paper we propose the infimum of the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion as a measure of global risk aversion of a utility function. We then show that, for any given arbitrary pair of distributions, there exists a threshold level of global risk aversion such that all increasing concave utility functions with at least as much global risk aversion would rank the two distributions in the same way. Furthermore, this threshold level is sharp in the sense that, for any lower level of global risk aversion, we can find two utility functions in this class yielding opposite preference relations for the two distributions.

Organisational structure, communication and group ethics

This paper investigates experimentally how organisational decision processes affect the moral motivations of actors inside a firm that must forego profits to reduce harming a third party. In a "vertical" treatment, one insider unilaterally sets the harm-reduction strategy; the other can only accept or quit. In a "horizontal" treatment, the insiders decide by consensus. Our 2-by-2 design also controls for communication effects. In our data, communication makes vertical firms more ethical; voice appears to mitigate "responsibility-alleviation" in that subordinates with voice feel responsible for what their firms do. Vertical firms are then more ethical than the horizontal firms for which our bargaining data reveal a dynamic form of responsibility-alleviation and our chat data indicate a strong "insider-outsider" effect.

El concepto de sana laicidad de Benedicto XVI en la democracia de Tocqueville

Davant els canvis polítics de la Modernitat, l’Església catòlica ha desenvolupat una extensa doctrina en matèria política, que l’actual papa, Benet XVI, continua actualitzant i ampliant. A partir de les afirmacions del Sant Pare, existiria la possibilitat de preguntar-se fins a quin punt l’Església ha mantingut una única línia en el seu magisteri polític al llarg dels segles, i, en concret, entre la doctrina anterior i la posterior al Concili Vaticà II. Aquest treball té per objectiu, en primer lloc, aclarir la continuïtat o discontinuïtat de la doctrina de l’Església postconciliar respecte de l’anterior e il•lustrar les principals línies del magisteri político-social de Benet XVI. Així mateix, hom es podria preguntar en quina mesura la proposta de Benet XVI és realitzable en el context polític actual. Per donar resposta a aquesta segona qüestió, es recorrerà al anàlisis que Alexis de Tocqueville va fer de la democràcia americana i que és extrapolable a la resta de democràcies d’Occident. Mitjançant la contraposició de la doctrina política de Benet XVI i l’anàlisi que fa Tocqueville del paper de la religió en les democràcies, es tractarà d’esclarir fins a quin punt el magisteri de Benet XVI sobre qüestions polítiques és compatible amb la racionalitat política.

El còmic i els estereotips de gènere : tres mirades independents

El tractament dels estereotips de gènere per mitjà dels personatges, en el còmic europeu de la segona meitat del segle XX. Es concreta en l'anàlisi de tres autors: el català Víctor Mora, l'italià Hugo Pratt i el francès Gérard Lauzier.

PFC-J2EE Online Bookstore OLBS

Es planteja el projecte de la creació d'una tenda de llibres en línea (Online Bookstore - OLBS), com a extensió d'una actual cadena de tendes físiques, o bé com a ens independent de nova aparició. Amb la OLBS pretenem que el mitjà de comunicació amb el client sigui un mitjà de l'àmbit de les noves tecnologies, per tal de poder arribar a aquell sector de la població que les usa majoritàriament, ampliant la nostra clientela potencial, alhora que facilitem l'accés als clients tradicionals. Així mateix renovem la imatge de la nostra organització, adequant-la als temps actuals.

Let's talk: how communication affects contract design

We study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency and effectiveness of flexible and inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers can adjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent and lead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller. By contrast, in the presence of communication, flexible contracts are much more frequent and considerably more productive, both for buyers and sellers. Also, both buyer and seller earn considerably more from flexible with communication than rigid without communication. Our results show quite strongly that communication, a normal feature in contracting, can remove the potential cost of flexibility (disagreements caused by conflicting perceptions). We offer an explanation based on social norms.