Are parties domocratizing themselves? the evolution of leardership selection in Spain (1977-2008)

The aim of this paper is to verify, for the Spanish case, whether between 1977 and 2008 has increased the internal democracy of the major political parties (PSOE, AP / PP, PCE / IU, PNV and CDC). To do this, we will focus on their leadership selection processes, one of the key elements associated with intra-party democracy. The paper is going to introduce data on four different dimensions of leadership selection: the certification process, the voting procedure, the inclusiveness of the selectorate and, finally, the degree of competitiveness. The results will show that have been few changes in the leadership selection processes of the Spanish political parties since 1977. However, the results of the Spanish case will also be used to suggest some preliminary links between the four dimensions.

Electoral competition through issue selection

Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters' true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention to the issues that they intend to mute. We develop a model of endogenous issue ownership in which two vote-seeking parties (i) invest to attract voters with "better" policy proposals and (ii) choose a communication campaign to focus voter attention on specific issues. We identify novel feedbacks between communication and investment. In particular, we find that stronger priming effects can backfire by constraining parties to invest more resources in all issues, including the ones they would otherwise intend to mute. We also identify under which conditions parties prefer to focus on their "historical issues" or to engage in issue stealing. Typically, the latter happens when priming effects are strong, and historical reputations differentiates parties less.

Single period Markowitz portfolio selection, performance gauging and duality: a variation on Luenberger's shortage function

Markowitz portfolio theory (1952) has induced research into the efficiency of portfolio management. This paper studies existing nonparametric efficiency measurement approaches for single period portfolio selection from a theoretical perspective and generalises currently used efficiency measures into the full mean-variance space. Therefore, we introduce the efficiency improvement possibility function (a variation on the shortage function), study its axiomatic properties in the context of Markowitz efficient frontier, and establish a link to the indirect mean-variance utility function. This framework allows distinguishing between portfolio efficiency and allocative efficiency. Furthermore, it permits retrieving information about the revealed risk aversion of investors. The efficiency improvement possibility function thus provides a more general framework for gauging the efficiency of portfolio management using nonparametric frontier envelopment methods based on quadratic optimisation.