The "New Political Economy": Two Recent Books

This paper reviews two recent books on Political Economy by Allan Drazen and Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. It discusses some problems of the recent Political Economy literature.

The 'new political economy': Two recent books

This paper reviews two recent books on Political Economy by Allan Drazen and Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. It discusses some problems of the recent Political Economy literature.

A comparison of the processes of institutionalisation of political economy in Spain and Italy (1860-1900)

[spa] El estudio de los procesos a través de los cuales la economía política se ha transformado en una disciplina académica es un área de creciente interés en la historia del pensamiento económico. Dicho estudio se ha abordado a través del análisis de la importancia de la economía política en un conjunto de instituciones, consideradas clave en la expansión de la economía en las sociedades occidentales en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX y primeras décadas del XX: universidades, sociedades económicas, publicaciones periódicas de contenido económico y los parlamentos nacionales. Este papel presenta una comparación entre los desarrollos del proceso de institutionalización de la economía política en España e Italia, a través del estudio de la presencia de esta disciplina en las instituciones mencionadas para el periodo 1860-1900. El objetivo es medir la posible existencia de una vía común en la institucionalización de la economía política en ambos países, como un primer paso hacia la elaboración de un modelo supranacional de institucionalización de la economía en este periodo.

A comparison of the processes of institutionalisation of political economy in Spain and Italy (1860-1900)

[spa] El estudio de los procesos a través de los cuales la economía política se ha transformado en una disciplina académica es un área de creciente interés en la historia del pensamiento económico. Dicho estudio se ha abordado a través del análisis de la importancia de la economía política en un conjunto de instituciones, consideradas clave en la expansión de la economía en las sociedades occidentales en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX y primeras décadas del XX: universidades, sociedades económicas, publicaciones periódicas de contenido económico y los parlamentos nacionales. Este papel presenta una comparación entre los desarrollos del proceso de institutionalización de la economía política en España e Italia, a través del estudio de la presencia de esta disciplina en las instituciones mencionadas para el periodo 1860-1900. El objetivo es medir la posible existencia de una vía común en la institucionalización de la economía política en ambos países, como un primer paso hacia la elaboración de un modelo supranacional de institucionalización de la economía en este periodo.

Economic Booms, Trade Deficits, and Economic Policy

Many economic booms have been accompanied by real exchange rate appreciations, large trade defcits -which have sometimes persisted after the return to the initial exchange rate parity- and a deteriorating traded sector. Those circumstances have typically raised the question of the de-sirability of some stabilization policy. We show that the dynamics induced by an expected productivity shock in an economy where the capital stock is non-mobile across sectors, match those circumstances. Furthermore, we obtain that credit market imperfections tend to exacerbate trade deficits, and to cause an inefficient capacity reduction in the traded sector. Some stabilization policies are explored.

Economic booms, trade deficits and economic policy

Many economic booms have been accompanied by realexchange rate appreciations, large trade defcits -whichhave sometimes persisted after the return to the initialexchange rate parity- and a deteriorating traded sector.Those circumstances have typically raised the questionof the de-sirability of some stabilization policy. We show that the dynamics induced by an expectedproductivity shock in an economy where the capital stockis non-mobile across sectors, match those circumstances.Furthermore, we obtain that credit market imperfectionstend to exacerbate trade deficits, and to cause aninefficient capacity reduction in the traded sector.Some stabilization policies are explored.

Political economy of municipal water service privatization in Spain: a duration model analysis

This empirical work applies a duration model to the study of factors determining privatization of local water services. I assess how factors determining privatization decision evolve as time goes by. A sample of 133 Spanish municipalities during the six terms of office taken place during the 1980-2002 period is analyzed. A dynamic neighboring effect is hypothesized and successfully tested. In a first stage, private water supply firms may try to expand to regions where there is no service privatized, in order to spread over this region after having being installed thanks to its scale advantages. Other factors influencing privatization decision evolve during the two decades under study, from the priority to fix old infrastructures to the concern about service efficiency. Some complementary results regarding political and budgetary factors are also obtained

Long-run Inflation-Unemployment Dynamics: The Spanish Phillips Curve and Economic Policy

This paper takes a new look at the long-run dynamics of inflation and unemployment in response to permanent changes in the growth rate of the money supply. We examine the Phillips curve from the perspective of what we call "frictional growth", i.e. the interaction between money growth and nominal frictions. After presenting theoretical models of this phenomenon, we construct an empirical model of the Spanish economy and, in this context, we evaluate the long-run inflation-unemployment trade for Spain and examine how recent policy changes have afected it.

Ideas, Possibilities and Limitations of Sustainable Economic Policy – the Example of Ecological Economics

A mesura que el suport del creixement econòmic constitueix un objectiu fonamental de la formulació de polítiques econòmiques, cal assenyalar que aquest tipus de creixement està limitat naturalment per un planeta finit. Aquest article argumenta que, des del punt de vista de la justícia intergeneracional, la realització d'un concepte de desmaterialització i, com a efecte, d'una economia que no creix (en el sentit de dissociació absoluta del creixement econòmic i consum d'energia i materials) es pot justificar. Per tant, el creixement pot ser també entesa com la millora de la qualitat de vida sobretot en comptes d'ampliar quantitats escarpats de sortida. Per tant, una dràstica reducció del cabal de material es necessita, sobretot en els països d'alts ingressos. Després de presentar alguns crítica de les propostes, en el focus d'aquest article es dibuixen en els arguments de per què la política econòmica en el futur han de ser etiquetats com "ecològic" i, a continuació, les opcions de posar en acció les idees del teòric presentat marc en tasques manejables polítiques seran discutides. En aquest cas, s'argumentarà que l'enfocament clàssic de internalització d'efectes externs sovint seguides de decisions de política econòmica ortodoxa no és completament capaç de reflectir canvis ecològics en les estructures de preus dels mercats. Per tant, formal (industrial i l'establiment de la política de consum) i institucions informals (llars) representen punts clau de la política econòmica sostenible, assenyalant l'individu com així com la responsabilitat col · lectiva per omplir aquest buit substancial.

The political economy of employment protection

This paper develops a model of job creation and job destruction in agrowing economy with embodied technical progress, that we use toanalyze the political support for employment protection legislationssuch as the ones that are observed in most European countries.We analyze the possibility of Condorcet cycles due to the fact thatworkers about to become unemployed prefer both an increase and areduction in firing costs over the status quo. Despite this problem, we show the existence of local, and sometimes global majority winners.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. We show that the gains from, and consequently the politicalsupport for employment protection (as defined by maximunjob tenure) are larger, the lower the rate of creative destruction and the largerthe worker's bargaining power. Numerical simulations suggest a hump-shaped response of firing costs to these variables, as well as negative impact of exogeneous turnover on employment protection.

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

From urban political economy to the cultural political economy : rethinking culture and economy in and beyond the urban

Discussions about the culture-economy articulation have occurred largely within theconfines of economic geography. In addition, much attention has been diverted intocaricaturized discussions over the demise of political economy or the invalidity ofculturalist arguments. Moving the argument from the inquiry on the ¿nature¿ of theeconomy itself to the transformation of the role of culture and economy inunderstanding the production of the urban form from an urban political economy (UPE)this paper focuses on how the challenges posed by the cultural turn have enabled urbanpolitical economy to participate constructively in interdisciplinary efforts to reorientpolitical economy in the direction of a critical cultural political economy.

The Political Economy of Resource Rent Distribution

I model the link between political regime and level of diversification following a windfall of natural resource revenues. The explanatory variables I make use of are the political support functions embedded within each type of regime and the disparate levels of discretion, openness, transparency, and accountability of government. I show that a democratic government seeks to maximize the long-term consumption path of the representative consumer, in order to maximize its chances of re-election, while an authoritarian government, in the absence of any electoral mechanism of accountability, seeks to buy off and entrench a group of special interests loyal to the government and potent enough to ensure its short-term survival. Essentially the contrast in the approaches towards resource rent distribution comes down to a variation in political weights on aggregate welfare and rentierist special interests endogenized by distinct political support functions.