(When) would i lie to you? comment on? deception: the role of consequences?

This paper reconsiders the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (2005,American Economic Review). We argue that Gneezy?s data cannot reject the hipótesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person?s decisión of whether to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily gains relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner. We run new but similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order to test this hypothesis. We find that our data cannot reject this hypothesis either, but we also discover substantial differences in behavior between our sub jects and Gneezy?s sub jects.

Strongly non-degenerate Lie algebras

Let A be a semiprime 2 and 3-torsion free non-commutative associative algebra. We show that the Lie algebra Der(A) of(associative) derivations of A is strongly non-degenerate, which is a strong form of semiprimeness for Lie algebras, under some additional restrictions on the center of A. This result follows from a description of the quadratic annihilator of a general Lie algebra inside appropriate Lie overalgebras. Similar results are obtained for an associative algebra A with involution and the Lie algebra SDer(A) of involution preserving derivations of A

Les communautés bulu contre la plantation industrielle HEVECAM au Cameroun

In 1975 the Kribi region (Southern Cameroon) became host of the rubber plantation HEVECAM, the third largest employer in Cameroon. The establishment of the plantation has been preceded by the expropriation of customary land and by the destruction of the rainforest used by local populations. As a result, conflicts – mostly latent – pitting neighbouring Bulu communities against the plantation have occurred, especially during the last few years. Drawing on fieldwork data as well as on anthropological, economic and historical materials, I try to explore a new way of looking at such environmental conflicts by arguing that they reflect the struggle between two distinct institutional logics with different impacts on the environment, i.e. the logic of property versus the one of possession. In short, the logic of possession corresponds to a multi-functional community-based forest management, while the logic of property gave birth to the commercial monoculture model, the highest stage of the transformation of an ecosystem in order to match the requirements of property. It is argued that the conflict between the logic of possession and the logic of property is at the heart of many cases of “environmentalisms of the poor” that arise in reaction to “development”.