Political autonomy and independence: theory and experimental evidence

We study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both regions engage in a costly political conflict which can only lead to the maintenance of the initial subordination of the region in question or to its complete independence. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium the voting process always leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts. Hence, the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe a large amount of fighting involving high material losses, even in a case in which the possibilities for an arrangement without conflict are very salient. In our experimental environment intermediate solutions are feasible and stable, but purely emotional elements prevent them from being reached.

New multiple matched filter: design and experimental realization

A method of making a multiple matched filter which allows the recognition of different characters in successive planes in simple conditions is proposed. The generation of the filter is based on recording on the same plate the Fourier transforms of the different patterns to be recognized, each of which is affected by different spherical phase factors because the patterns have been placed at different distances from the lens. This is proved by means of experiments with a triple filter which allows satisfactory recognition of three characters.

New multiple matched filter: design and experimental realization

A method of making a multiple matched filter which allows the recognition of different characters in successive planes in simple conditions is proposed. The generation of the filter is based on recording on the same plate the Fourier transforms of the different patterns to be recognized, each of which is affected by different spherical phase factors because the patterns have been placed at different distances from the lens. This is proved by means of experiments with a triple filter which allows satisfactory recognition of three characters.

Nonlinear filtering in object and Fourier space in a joint transform optical correlator: comparison and experimental realization

The use of different kinds of nonlinear filtering in a joint transform correlator are studied and compared. The study is divided into two parts, one corresponding to object space and the second to the Fourier domain of the joint power spectrum. In the first part, phase and inverse filters are computed; their inverse Fourier transforms are also computed, thereby becoming the reference in the object space. In the Fourier space, the binarization of the power spectrum is realized and compared with a new procedure for removing the spatial envelope. All cases are simulated and experimentally implemented by a compact joint transform correlator.

Parametric analysis of different compact tension specimens for fracture toughness characterisation in woven composite materials

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada a l’ Imperial College London, entre juliol i novembre de 2006. En aquest treball s’ha investigat la geometria més apropiada per a la caracterització de la tenacitat a fractura intralaminar de materials compòsits laminats amb teixit. L’objectiu és assegurar la propagació de l’esquerda sense que la proveta falli abans per cap altre mecanisme de dany per tal de permetre la caracterització experimental de la tenacitat a fractura intralaminar de materials compòsits laminats amb teixit. Amb aquesta fi, s’ha dut a terme l’anàlisi paramètrica de diferents tipus de provetes mitjançant el mètode dels elements finits (FE) combinat amb la virtual crack closure technique (VCCT). Les geometries de les provetes analitzades corresponen a la proveta de l’assaig compact tension (CT) i diferents variacions com la extended compact tension (ECT), la proveta widened compact tension (WCT), tapered compact tension (TCT) i doubly-tapered compact tension (2TCT). Com a resultat d’aquestes anàlisis s’han derivat diferents conclusions per obtenir la geometria de proveta més apropiada per a la caracterització de la tenacitat a fractura intralaminar de materials compòsits laminats amb teixit. A més, també s’han dut a terme una sèrie d’assaigs experimentals per tal de validar els resultats de les anàlisis paramètriques. La concordança trobada entre els resultats numèrics i experimentals és bona tot i la presència d’efectes no previstos durant els assaigs experimentals.

Approximate solution to the speed of spreading viruses

Recently, it has been shown that the speed of virus infections can be explained by time-delayed reactiondiffusion [J. Fort and V. Me´ndez, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 178101 (2002)], but no analytical solutions were found. Here we derive formulas for the front speed, valid in appropriate limits. We also integrate numerically the evolution equations of the system. There is good agreement with both numerical and experimental speeds

Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyzewhether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions dependon the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment thesecond player responds to the first player s observed actionwhile in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action foreach and every possible first player move, without firstobserving this move. Our analysis centers on the degree towhich subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniaryrewards, as a response to others actions. Our results show nodifference in behavior between the two treatments. We also findevidence of the stability of subjects preferences with respectto their behavior over time and to the consistency of theirchoices as first and second mover.

Do market conditions affect preferences? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand

We study whether people's preferences in an unbalanced market are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' motivation, as second movers, workers, might react differently to favorable actions by first movers, firms, in the two cases. Our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction. However, we only find secondary treatment effects. First movers are not more generous when they are in excess supply and second movers do not respond less favorably when they are in excess demand. Competition has only minor psychological effects in our data.

Excess entry, ambiguity seeking and competence: An experimental investigation

Excess entry refers to the high failure rate of new entrepreneurial ventures. Economic explanations suggest 'hit and run' entrants and risk-seeking behavior. A psychological explanation is that people (entrepreneurs) are overconfident in their abilities (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999). Characterizing entry decisions as ambiguous gambles, we alternatively suggest following Heath and Tversky (1991) that people seek ambiguity when the source of uncertainty is related to their competence. Overconfidence, as such, plays no role. This hypothesis is confirmed in an experimental study that also documents the phenomenon of reference group neglect. Finally, we emphasize the utility that people gain from engaging in activities that contribute to a sense of competence. This is an important force in economic activity that deserves more explicit attention.

The provision of relative performance feedback information: An experimental analysis of performance and happiness

This paper studies the effect of providing relative performance feedback information onindividual performance and on individual affective response, when agents are rewardedaccording to their absolute performance. In a laboratory set-up, agents perform a realeffort task and when receiving feedback, they are asked to rate their happiness, arousaland feeling of dominance. Control subjects learn only their absolute performance, whilethe treated subjects additionally learn the average performance in the session.Performance is 17 percent higher when relative performance feedback is provided.Furthermore, although feedback increases the performance independent of the content(i.e., performing above or below the average), the content is determinant for theaffective response. When subjects are treated, the inequality in the happiness and thefeeling of dominance between those subjects performing above and below the averageincreases by 8 and 6 percentage points, respectively.

Relative payoffs and happiness: An experimental study

Some current utility models presume that people are concerned with their relative standing in a reference group. If this is true, do certain types care more about this than others? Using simple binary decisions and self-reported happiness, we investigate both the prevalence of ``difference aversion'' and whether happiness levels influence the taste for social comparisons. Our decision tasks distinguish between a person s desire to achieving the social optimum, equality or advantageous relative standing. Most people appear to disregard relative payoffs, instead typically making choices resulting in higher social payoffs. While we do not find a strong general correlation between happiness and concern for relative payoffs, we do observe that a willingness to lower another person s payoff below one s own (competitive preferences) seems correlated with unhappiness.

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation

While the theoretical industrial organization literature has long arguedthat excess capacity can be used to deter entry into markets, there islittle empirical evidence that incumbent firms effectively behave in thisway. Bagwell and Ramey (1996) propose a game with a specific sequence ofmoves and partially-recoverable capacity costs in which forward inductionprovides a theoretical rationalization for firm behavior in the field. Weconduct an experiment with a game inspired by their work. In our data theincumbent tends to keep the market, in contrast to what the forwardinduction argument of Bagwell and Ramey would suggest. The results indicatethat players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without havingto pre-commit capacity. In our game, evolution and learning do not driveout this perception. We back these claims with data analysis, atheoretical framework for dynamics, and simulation results.

Ethical differentiation and market behavior: An experimental approach

Does ethical differentiation of products affect market behavior? We examined this issue in triopolistic experimental markets where producers set prices. One producer s costs were higher than the others. In two treatments, the additional costs were attributed tocompliance with ethical guidelines. In the third, no justification was provided. Manyparticipants playing the role of consumers reduced their experimental gains by purchasing the ethically differentiated product at a higher price whether or not they knew the amount of extra cost. Individual differences were important (students of business/economics paid smaller premia than others). Finally, we speculate about the observed demand function for ethics and emphasize the use of experimental methodology to complement empirical studies designed to assess the potential market for ethically differentiated products.

Bargaining efficiency and screening: An experimental investigation

This paper investigates whether information about fairness types canbe useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency.An experiment was conducted in which subjects were first screened usinga dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participantsinto two types. Mutually anonymous pairs of subjects then bargained, witha dispute cost structure imposed. Sorting with identification reducesdispute costs; there are also significant differences in bargainingefficiency across pairing types. Information about types is crucial forthese differences and also strongly affects the relative bargainingsuccess of the two types and the hypothetical optimal bargaining strategy.

Depinning transition of dislocation assemblies: Pileups and low-angle grain boundaries

We investigate the depinning transition occurring in dislocation assemblies. In particular, we consider the cases of regularly spaced pileups and low-angle grain boundaries interacting with a disordered stress landscape provided by solute atoms, or by other immobile dislocations present in nonactive slip systems. Using linear elasticity, we compute the stress originated by small deformations of these assemblies and the corresponding energy cost in two and three dimensions. Contrary to the case of isolated dislocation lines, which are usually approximated as elastic strings with an effective line tension, the deformations of a dislocation assembly cannot be described by local elastic interactions with a constant tension or stiffness. A nonlocal elastic kernel results as a consequence of long-range interactions between dislocations. In light of this result, we revise statistical depinning theories of dislocation assemblies and compare the theoretical results with numerical simulations and experimental data.