Poor, Hungry and Stupid: Numeracy and the Impact of High Food Prices in Industrializing Britain, 1780-1850

This paper argues that low levels of nutrition impaired cognitive development in industrializing England, and that welfare transfers mitigated the adverse effects of high food prices. Age heaping is used as an indicator of numeracy, as derived from census data. For the cohorts from 1780-1850, we analyse the effect of high grain prices during the Napoleonic Wars. We show that numeracy declined markedly for those born during the war years, especially when wheat was dear. Crucially, where the Old Poor Law provided for generous relief payments, the adverse impact of high prices for foodstuffs was mitigated. Finally, we show some tentative evidence that Englishmen born in areas with low income support selected into occupations with lower cognitive requirements.

Credit rationing and crowding out during the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare's Bank, 1702-1862

Crowding-out during the British Industrial Revolution has long been one of the leadingexplanations for slow growth during the Industrial Revolution, but little empirical evidence exists to support it. We argue that examinations of interest rates are fundamentally misguided, and that the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century private loan market balanced through quantity rationing. Using a unique set of observations on lending volume at a London goldsmith bank, Hoare s, we document the impact of wartime financing on private credit markets. We conclude that there is considerable evidence that government borrowing, especially during wartime, crowded out private credit.

Aigua, agricultura i regadiu a la Catalunya contemporània, 1800-2010

L‟objectiu d‟aquest article és mostrar quina ha estat l‟evolució i les característiques del regadiu a Catalunya entre mitjan segle XIX i principis del segle XXI. Per portar-ho a terme, a més d‟aquesta introducció, el text s‟estructura en quatre seccions. En la primera s‟expliquen quines havien estat les principals respostes de l‟agricultura tradicional a les disponibilitats d‟aigua i es destaca el paper que va tenir el regadiu. En la segona s‟analitzen els principis, les planificacions i els programes de foment del regadiu sorgits de la política hidràulica implementada per l‟estat espanyol entre finals del segle XIX i la dictadura franquista. En la tercera es destaca el protagonisme de la gran hidràulica i es mostra l‟evolució del regadiu i de la capacitat d‟embassament a Catalunya. Finalment, en la quarta secció, es realitza un balanç de la política de grans obres hidràuliques que ha imperat durant el segles XIX i XX i es destaca l‟emergència del nou paradigma hidràulic de la nova cultura de l‟aigua.

Can You Home Again? Desertion and Control of Hometowns in Civil Wars

What allows an armed group in a civil war to prevent desertion? This paper addresses this question with a focus on control in the rearguard. Most past studies focus on motivations for desertion. They explain desertion in terms of where soldiers stand in relation to the macro themes of the war, or in terms of an inability to provide positive incentives to overcome the collective action problem. However, since individuals decide whether and how to participate in civil wars for multiple reasons, responding to a variety of local conditions in an environment of threat and violence, a focus only on macro-level motivations is incomplete. The opportunities side of the ledger deserves more attention. I therefore turn my attention to how control by an armed group eliminates soldiers’ opportunities to desert. In particular, I consider the control that an armed group maintains over soldiers’ hometowns, treating geographic terrain as an important exogenous indicator of the ease of control. Rough terrain at home affords soldiers and their families and friends advantages in ease of hiding, the difficulty of using force, and local knowledge. Based on an original dataset of soldiers from Santander Province in the Spanish Civil War, gathered from archival sources, I find statistical evidence that the rougher the terrain in a soldier’s home municipality, the more likely he is to desert. I find complementary qualitative evidence indicating that soldiers from rough-terrain communities took active advantage of their greater opportunities for evasion. This finding has important implications for the way observers interpret different soldiers’ decisions to desert or remain fighting, for the prospect that structural factors may shape the cohesion of armed groups, and for the possibility that local knowledge may be a double-edged sword, making soldiers simultaneously good at fighting and good at deserting.

Guerra, pàtria i estadística: el despertar polític dels hisendats gironins (1795-1800)

Sobre l'emergència i presa de consciència d'una classe dirigent a la societat gironina de finals del segle XVIII

Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars

Importa si una guerra civil es combat com un conflicte irregular, convencional o simètric no convencional? En altres paraules, tenen les “tecnologies de la rebel·lió” un impacte sobre la gravetat d’una guerra, la seva durada o el seu resultat? Aquest treball mostra que els conflictes irregulars duren més que els altres tipus de conflicte, mentre els convencionals tendeixen a ser més greus en termes de letalitat al camp de batalla. D’altra banda, els conflictes irregulars tendeixen a ser guanyats pels governs, mentre els altres són més propensos a acabar en empat. Substancialment, aquests resultats ens ajuden a donar sentit a l’evolució de les guerres civils, les quals tendeixen a ser més curtes, més intenses i més difícils per als governs. Teòricament, aquests resultats donen suport a la importància de la tecnologia de rebel·lió a l’estudiar la gravetat, la durada i els resultats de les guerres civils; a més, contribueixen a una millor comprensió de la contribució històrica de la guerra irregular a la construcció de l’Estat i al canvi social.

Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars

This paper analyzes the relationship between ethnic fractionalization, polarization, and conflict. In recent years many authors have found empirical evidence that ethnic fractionalization has a negative effect on growth. One mechanism that can explain this nexus is the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on rent-seeking activities and the increase in potential conflict, which is negative for investment. However the empirical evidence supporting the effect of ethnic fractionalization on the incidence of civil conflicts is very weak. Although ethnic fractionalization may be important for growth, we argue that the channel is not through an increase in potential ethnic conflict. We discuss the appropriateness of indices of polarization to capture conflictive dimensions. We develop a new measure of ethnic heterogeneity that satisfies the basic properties associated with the concept of polarization. The empirical section shows that this index of ethnic polarization is a significant variable in the explanation of the incidence of civil wars. This result is robust to the presence of other indicators of ethnic heterogeneity, other sources of data for the construction of the index, and other data structures.

Fighting against Malaria: Prevent wars while waiting for the "miraculous" vaccine

The World Health Organization estimates that 300 million clinical cases of malaria occur annually and observed that during the 80's and part of the 90's its incidence increased. In this paper we explore the influence of refugees from civil wars on the incidence of malaria in the refugee-receiving countries. Using civil wars as an instrumental variable we show that for each 1,000 refugees there are between 2,000 and 2,700 cases of malaria in the refugee receiving country. On average 13% of the cases of malaria reported by the WHO are caused by forced migration as a consequence of civil wars.

Ethnic polarization, potential conflict and civil wars

This paper analyzes the relationship between ethnic fractionalization, polarization, and conflict. In recent years many authors have found empirical evidence that ethnic fractionalization has a negative effect on growth. One mechanism that can explain this nexus is the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on rent-seeking activities and the increase in potential conflict, which is negative for investment. However the empirical evidence supporting the effect of ethnic fractionalization on the incidence of civil conflicts is very weak. Although ethnic fractionalization may be important for growth, we argue that the channel is not through an increase in potential ethnic conflict. We discuss the appropriateness of indices of polarization to capture conflictive dimensions. We develop a new measure of ethnic heterogeneity that satisfies the basic properties associated with the concept of polarization. The empirical section shows that this index of ethnic polarization is a significant variable in the explanation of the incidence of civil wars. This result is robust to the presence of other indicators of ethnic heterogeneity, other sources of data for the construction of the index, and other data structures.

Vertical integration or specialisation: producing and commercialising cotton goods (1815-1913)

This article describes the ways in which cotton goods were commercialised during the nineteenth century and the first third of the twentieth. Several national cases are analysed: Britain, as the Workshop of the World; France, Germany, Switzerland and the US, as core economies; and Italy and Spain as countries on the European periphery. The main question that we address is why some cotton industries vertically integrated their production and commercialisation processes, but others did not. We present a model that combines industrial district size and product differentiation to explain why vertical integration was present in most cases and why there was vertical specialisation in Lancashire and Lowell.

La reducción de los costes de transporte en España (1800-1936)

This paper describes the improvement that took place in the Spanish transport system between 1800 and 1936. The text points out that, despite the investment efforts that were carried out between 1840 and 1855, the process of transport cost reduction only experienced substantial progress after 1855. The largest transport cost decrease of the period under consideration took place during the three decades between 1855 and the great depression of the late nineteenth century, through the substitution of the railroad for the traditional transport means in the main routes of the country, as well as through the gradual reduction of the price of railway transport. The process went on more slowly later on, thanks to the construction of additional raillway lines (until 1895) and the enlargement of the secondary road network. The process of transport cost reduction accelerated again from the 1920s onwards, thanks to the diffusion of the automobile technology.

Vertical integration or specialisation: producing and commercialising cotton goods (1815-1913)

This article describes the ways in which cotton goods were commercialised during the nineteenth century and the first third of the twentieth. Several national cases are analysed: Britain, as the Workshop of the World; France, Germany, Switzerland and the US, as core economies; and Italy and Spain as countries on the European periphery. The main question that we address is why some cotton industries vertically integrated their production and commercialisation processes, but others did not. We present a model that combines industrial district size and product differentiation to explain why vertical integration was present in most cases and why there was vertical specialisation in Lancashire and Lowell.