I want you! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power.

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

Inequality in CO2 emissions across countries and its relationship with income inequality: a distributive approach

This paper analyses the inequality in CO2 emissions across countries (and groups of countries) and the relationship of this inequality with income inequality across countries for the period (1971-1999). The research employs the tools that are usually applied in income distribution analysis. The methodology used here gives qualitative and quantitative information on some of the features of the inequalities across countries that are considered most relevant for the design and discussion of policies aimed at mitigating climate change. The paper studies the relationship between CO2 emissions and GDP and shows that income inequality across countries has been followed by an important inequality in the distribution of emissions. This inequality has diminished mildly, although the inequality in emissions across countries ordered in the increasing value of income (inequality between rich and poor countries) has diminished less than the “simple” inequality in emissions. Lastly, the paper shows that the inequality in CO2 emissions is mostly explained by the inequality between groups with different per capita income level. The importance of the inequality within groups of similar per capita income is much lower and has diminished during the period, especially in the low-middle income group.

Merging the hypothetical extraction method and the classical multiplier approach: a hybrid possibility for identifying key distributive sectors

The two main alternative methods used to identify key sectors within the input-output approach, the Classical Multiplier method (CMM) and the Hypothetical Extraction method (HEM), are formally and empirically compared in this paper. Our findings indicate that the main distinction between the two approaches stems from the role of the internal effects. These internal effects are quantified under the CMM while under the HEM only external impacts are considered. In our comparison, we find, however that CMM backward measures are more influenced by within-block effects than the proposed forward indices under this approach. The conclusions of this comparison allow us to develop a hybrid proposal that combines these two existing approaches. This hybrid model has the advantage of making it possible to distinguish and disaggregate external effects from those that a purely internal. This proposal has also an additional interest in terms of policy implications. Indeed, the hybrid approach may provide useful information for the design of ''second best'' stimulus policies that aim at a more balanced perspective between overall economy-wide impacts and their sectoral distribution.

The significance of distributive effects in social assessment of health care

In this paper we address the importance of distributive effects in the social valuation of QALY's. We propose a social welfarefunction that generalises the functions traditionally used in the health economic literature. The novelty is that, depending on the individual health gains, our function can representeither preferences for concentrating or preferences for spreading total gain or both together, an issue which has notbeen addressed until now. Based on an experiment, we observe that this generalisation provides a suitable approximation tothe sampled social preferences.

International Equity on Greenhouse Gas Emissions and World Levels: an integrated analysis through distributive welfare indices

Up until now, analyses of the international distribution of pollutant emissions have not paid sufficient attention to the implications that, in terms of social welfare, the combined evolution of the global world average entails. In this context, this paper proposes the use of environmental welfare indices, taken and adapted from the literature on social welfare and inequality, in order to make a comprehensive examination of the international equity factor and the mean factor in this field. The proposed methodology is implemented empirically in order to explore the evolution in distributive-based environmental welfare on a global level for the three main pollutants with greenhouse gas effects: CO2, CH4 and NO, both globally and for selected years during the period of 1990- 2005. The main results found are as follows: firstly, typically, the environmental welfare associated with the overall greenhouse gases decreased significantly over the period, due primarily to the role of CO2; secondly, in contrast, the global welfare associated with CH4 and NO improved; and thirdly, typically, the evolutions can be attributed to a greater extent to the mean component than to the distributive component, although there are exceptions. These results would seem to be relevant in policy terms. JEL codes: D39; Q43; Q56. Keywords: environmental welfare: greenhouse gases; environmental equity.

The Proposals for a European tax on CO2 and their implications for intercountry distribution

This paper analyzes the advantages and implications of the implementation of a European tax on carbon dioxide emissions as an own resource of the European Union. In contrast to a harmonized tax, which would only have distributive effects within each member state, a tax collected at European scale would also have important distributive effects among different countries. These effects would also depend on the use of tax revenues. The paper investigates the distributive effects among the member states of three tax models: a pure CO2

Personal relations and their effect on behavior in an organizational setting: an experimental study

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.

Altruism, Equity, and Reciprocity in a Gift-Exchange Experiment: An Encompassing Approach

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent models of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as either altruism- based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based. We estimate and compare leading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. We then offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches, thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determining the relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition, the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we find that intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruistic considerations all play a significant role in players' decisions.

Equity considerations in health care: An axiomatic bargaining approach

The general issues of equity and efficiency are placed at the center of the analysis of resource allocation problems in health care. We examine them using axiomatic bargaining theory. We study different solutions that have been proposed and relate them to previous literature on health care allocation. In particular, we focus on the solutions based on axiomatic bargaining with claims and suggest that they may be particularly appealing as distributive criteria in health policy. Finally, we present the results of a survey that tries to elicit moral intuitions of people about resource allocation problems and their different solutions.

Altruism, equity and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: An encompassing approach

Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motivesmust be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recentmodels of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as either altruism-based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based. We estimate and compareleading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. Wethen offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches,thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determiningthe relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition,the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we findthat intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruisticconsiderations all play a significant role in players' decisions.

When are layoffs acceptable? Evidence from a quasi-experiment

Many authors have discussed a decline in internal labor markets and an apparent shift to a new employment contract, characterized by less commitment between employer and employee and more portable skills. These discussions occur without much evidence on what employment contract employees currently feel is fair. We perfomed quasi-experimental surveys to study when employees in the U.S. andCanada feel that layoffs are fair.Layoffs were perceived as more fair if they were due to lower product demand than if the result of employee suggestions. This result appears to be solely due to norms of reciprocity (companiesshould not punish employees for their efforts), rather than norms of sharing rents, as new technology was also considered a justification for layoffs.Consistent with theories of distributive and procedural equity, layoffs were perceived as more fair if the CEO voluntarily shared the pain. CEO bonuses due to layoffs lowered their reported fairness only slightly.Respondents in Silicon Valley were not more accepting of layoffsthan were those in Canada on average, although the justificationsconsidered valid differed slightly.

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting

This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in the future. Legislators may therefore approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that benefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust; but institutional arrangements (such as entitlements) can reduce the agenda setter's power by reducing his discretion to reward and punish legislators, and rules (such as sequential voting) can increase a legislator's ability to resist exploitation. Keywords: Legislative bargaining, distributive politics, agenda-setting, proposal power. JEL C72, D72, D78.

Divisió social i justícia distributiva

La justícia distributiva es defineix com la percepció d"equitat pel que fa a la manera com la societat comparteix els costos i els beneficis, ara en equilibri precari.