Razonamiento moral y educación

El texto se basa en el análisis del razonamiento moral a partir del marco de los modelos organizadores. A partir de la determinación de las diferentes representaciones que una serie de sujetos realizaron sobre un dilema basado en un conflicto moral entre iguales de edad, y que incluyó tres núcleos (justicia, felicidad y cuidado) se detectó que existen cuatro grandes modelos organizadores que se presentan en diferentes líneas evolutivas. La tesis que se defiende es que la inclusión de los sentimientos puede guiar el razonamiento a niveles más elevados y puede integrar las perspectivas de justicia y solidaridad a la hora de resolver conflictos interpersonales. En el artículo se afirma que todo esto son retos en los cuales es necesario trabajar para conseguir un modelo educativo integrador dentro de las escuelas.

Razonamiento moral y educación

El texto se basa en el análisis del razonamiento moral a partir del marco de los modelos organizadores. A partir de la determinación de las diferentes representaciones que una serie de sujetos realizaron sobre un dilema basado en un conflicto moral entre iguales de edad, y que incluyó tres núcleos (justicia, felicidad y cuidado) se detectó que existen cuatro grandes modelos organizadores que se presentan en diferentes líneas evolutivas. La tesis que se defiende es que la inclusión de los sentimientos puede guiar el razonamiento a niveles más elevados y puede integrar las perspectivas de justicia y solidaridad a la hora de resolver conflictos interpersonales. En el artículo se afirma que todo esto son retos en los cuales es necesario trabajar para conseguir un modelo educativo integrador dentro de las escuelas.

A Model of ethnic conflict

We present a model of conflict, in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. It is this perceived responsiveness -captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proponed change in ethnic policy- that induces individuals to mobilize in support for their cause. Yet, mobilization is costly and demonstrators have to be compensated accordingly. Individuals have to weigh their ethnic radicalism with their material well-being to determine the size of their money contribution to the cause. Our main results are: (i) a one-sided increase in radicalism or in population size increases conflict; (ii) a one-sided increase in income has ambiguous effects depending on the elasticity of contributions to income; (iii) an increase in within-group inequality increases conflict; and (iv) an increase in the correlation between ethnic radicalism and inequality also increases conflict.

Polarization, fractionalization and conflict

A recent upsurge of empirical studies on the causes of conflict attempts to connect various features of the distribution of the relevant characteristic (typically ethnicity or religion) to conflict. The distributional indices differ (polarization, fractionalization or Lorenz-domination) and so do the various specifications of "conflict" (onset, incidence or intensity). Overall, the results are far from clear, and combined with the mixture of alternative indices and notions of "conflict" it is not surprising that the reader may come away thoroughly perplexed. The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework that permits us to distinguish between the occurrence of conflict and its severity and that clarifies the role of polarization and fractionalization in each of these cases.

An instrumental analysis of the European Union's capability to act in conflict response

Descripció i anàlisi dels instruments polítics, econòmics, civils i militars de la Unió Europea per enfrontar qualsevol conflicte.

Creating the Gorizia-Goriska euroregion: an European cross-border administrative model for integrated socio-economic development in the upper adriatic. Crossborder co-operation as a tool for trans-national integration and conflict resolution

Contribució al Seminari: "Les Euroregions: Experiències i aprenatges per a l’Euroregió Pirineus-Mediterrània", 15-16 de desembre de 2005

Business-science research collaboration under moral hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Linking conflict to inequality and polarization

In this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for choosing certain indices of dispersion as indicators for conflict. We show that the (equilibrium) level of conflict can be expressed as an (approximate) linear function of the Gini coefficient, the Herfindahl-Hirschman fractionalization index, and a specific measure of polarization due to Esteban and Ray

¿Charles Taylor en Operación Triunfo?. Análisis de la propuesta filosófico-moral de Taylor -en especial su ideal de autenticidad- y de su posible aplicación al reality show español

Aquest Treball Final de Carrera de la Llicenciatura de Periodisme de la Universitat Abat Oliba CEU té un doble objectiu: a)dur a terme una aproximació teòrico-filosòfica a la proposta cultural de Charles Taylor, i així aprofundir en l'examen dels elements centrals de la seva bibliografia -sobre tot en els pressupòsits antropològics i socials més destacats, així com també en el seu peculiar "ideal d'autenticitat"-; i b)projectar els dits fonaments teòrics en un apartat de naturalesa pràctica, com a forma de concretar la proposta del pensador nord-americà en algun dels fenòmens més interessants de la realitat mediàtica i cultural espanyola. Així, ens vam decidir per un dels programes televisius que més èxit ha tingut al nostre país als darrers temps: Operación Triunfo, donat que en tractar-se d'un concurs vinculat als somnis i a les aspiracions més profundes dels individus que hi participen, té una relació molt més estreta amb l'ideal d'autenticitat. A més, la justificació fonamental d'aquest estudi es basa en el fet que l'aportació filosòfica de Taylor és molt profitosa respecte a la situació cultural actual pels següents dos motius: a) la seva obra presenta una veritable i complerta proposta en positiu, basada en raons i arguments molt clars, que a més porten una esperança de recuperació a la societat occidental; i b) la seva crítica a la Modernitat no és totalment destructiva sinó que més aviat es basa en una comprensió correcta i una recuperació adequada del sentit originari d'algunes de les fonts morals que defineixen la nostra cultura.

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

Ethnicity and conflict : an empirical study

This paper examines the impact of ethnic divisions on conflict. The analysis relies on a theoretical model of conflict (Esteban and Ray, 2010) in which equilibrium conflict is shown to be accurately described by a linear function of just three distributional indices of ethnic diversity: the Gini coefficient, the Hirschman-Herfindahl fractionalization index, and a measure of polarization. Based on a dataset constructed by James Fearon and data from Ethnologue on ethno-linguistic groups and the "linguistic distances" between them, we compute the three distribution indices. Our results show that ethnic polarization is a highly significant correlate of conflict. Fractionalization is also significant in some of the statistical exercises, but the Gini coefficient never is. In particular, inter-group distances computed from language and embodied in polarization measures turn out to be extremely important correlates of ethnic conflict.

Conflict prevention and decentralized governance: some remarks about the state of the art in theory and practice

Is there a link between decentralized governance and conflict prevention? This article tries to answer the question by presenting the state of the art of the intersection of both concepts. Provided that social conflict is inevitable and given the appearance of new threats and types of violence, as well as new demands for security based on people (human security), our societies should focus on promoting peaceful changes. Through an extensive analysis of the existing literature and the study of several cases, this paper suggests that decentralized governance can contribute to these efforts by transforming conflicts, bringing about power-sharing and inclusion incentives of minority groups. Albeit the complexity of assessing its impact on conflict prevention, it can be contended that decentralized governance might have very positive effects on the reduction of causes that bring about conflicts due to its ability to foster the creation of war/violence preventors. More specifically, this paper argues that decentralization can have a positive impact on the so-called triggers and accelerators (short- and medium-term causes).