Business-science research collaboration under moral hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio

¿Charles Taylor en Operación Triunfo?. Análisis de la propuesta filosófico-moral de Taylor -en especial su ideal de autenticidad- y de su posible aplicación al reality show español

Aquest Treball Final de Carrera de la Llicenciatura de Periodisme de la Universitat Abat Oliba CEU té un doble objectiu: a)dur a terme una aproximació teòrico-filosòfica a la proposta cultural de Charles Taylor, i així aprofundir en l'examen dels elements centrals de la seva bibliografia -sobre tot en els pressupòsits antropològics i socials més destacats, així com també en el seu peculiar "ideal d'autenticitat"-; i b)projectar els dits fonaments teòrics en un apartat de naturalesa pràctica, com a forma de concretar la proposta del pensador nord-americà en algun dels fenòmens més interessants de la realitat mediàtica i cultural espanyola. Així, ens vam decidir per un dels programes televisius que més èxit ha tingut al nostre país als darrers temps: Operación Triunfo, donat que en tractar-se d'un concurs vinculat als somnis i a les aspiracions més profundes dels individus que hi participen, té una relació molt més estreta amb l'ideal d'autenticitat. A més, la justificació fonamental d'aquest estudi es basa en el fet que l'aportació filosòfica de Taylor és molt profitosa respecte a la situació cultural actual pels següents dos motius: a) la seva obra presenta una veritable i complerta proposta en positiu, basada en raons i arguments molt clars, que a més porten una esperança de recuperació a la societat occidental; i b) la seva crítica a la Modernitat no és totalment destructiva sinó que més aviat es basa en una comprensió correcta i una recuperació adequada del sentit originari d'algunes de les fonts morals que defineixen la nostra cultura.

Generic drugs in Spain: price competition vs. moral hazard

This paper examines competition between generic and brand-name drugs in the regulated Spanish pharmaceutical market. A nested logit demand model is specified for the three most consumed therapeutic subgroups in Spain: statins (anticholesterol), selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (antidepressants) and proton pump inhibitors (antiulcers). The model is estimated with instrumental variables from a panel of monthly prescription data from 1999 to 2005. The dataset distinguishes between three different levels of patients’ copayments within the prescriptions and the results show that the greater the level of insurance that the patient has (and therefore the lower the patient’s copayment), the lower the proportion of generic prescriptions made by physicians. It seems that the low level of copayment has delayed the penetration of generics into the Spanish market. Additionally, the estimation of the demand model suggests that the substitution rules and promotional efforts associated with the reference pricing system have increased generic market share, and that being among the first generic entrants has an additional positive effect.

La constitució de la naturalesa moral de l'home

En aquest treball filosòfic pretenem reflexionar sobre l'origen natural del fet moral, tot fent una comparació amb fets culturals, com ara, els Drets Humans o la mutilació genital femenina. La conclusió és que la moral es basa en el sentit dels comportaments més que no els comportaments en si mateixos.

Ètica de la benevolència : Reflexions sobre el pensament moral de Robert Spaemann

Qui és Robert Spaemann?, en què consisteix l'ètica de la benevolència?, quina correlació hi ha entre la visió antropològica d'aquest filòsof i les seves propostes ètiques? El treball vol respondre aquestes i altres preguntes sobre aquest filòsof i docent, especialitzat en filosofia pràctica, que ha rebut reconeixements arreu, tot i que encara és poc conegut en el nostre país.

Sobre geografía moral

Els geògrafs s’inclouen tant en el camp de les ciències de la terra com en el de les ciències socials, tot i que també es poden considerar filòsofs morals, perquè es preocupen i s’interessen pels valors, els costums i les aspiracions humanes de no només limitar-se a sobreviure, sinó també d’aconseguir una vida fructuosa i agradable. En aquest intent per aconseguir una bona vida, els éssers humans han hagut d’organitzar-se i servir-se del poder, amb el qual és fàcil, per altra banda, cometre abusos contra els més febles i també contra la natura. El vessant moral és inevitable en qualsevol detallada consideració de la realitat humana. Aquest article pretén explorar l’esmentat vessant en societats senzilles i complexes, és a dir, tant entre els pobles caçadors-recol·lectors com en aquelles cultures més sofisticades que han transformat el camp, el jardí i la ciutat

Sobre la facticitat de la consideració moral dels animals no humans

Aquest treball s'enquadra en l'àmbit del que s'anomena bioètica animal i es desenvolupa al voltant de la consideració moral dels animals no humans a partir d'un tractament interdisciplinari que implica l'encontre de disciplines tan diverses com filosofia, història, psicologia o estudis de gènere, entre d'altres.

Catholic Confession of Sins as Third-Party Moral Enforcement

Catholicism has built up a legalistic religion based on two pillars: salvation by works and 'auricular' confession of sins to a priest with judicial functions. Since the Reformation, many consider auricular confession inferior to less institutional and more individual conceptions of faith. This article analyzes how all these historical solutions trade off specialization advantages against exchange costs to produce moral enforcement. After showing the behavioral foundations of confession and the adaptiveness of its historical evolution, it tests hypotheses on its efficacy, exploitation and opportunity cost. Econometric evidence supports the efficacy but not the exploitative character of Catholic confession. It also explains its secular decline as a consequence of two factors. First, the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly. Second, the productivity gap suffered by confession, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.

The role of moral values in the economic analysis of crime: A general equilibrium approach

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime and show thatlaw enforcement has different roles depending on the equilibrium characterization and the value of social norms. When an economy has a unique stable equilibrium where a fraction of the population is productive and the remaining predates, the government can choose an optimal law enforcement policy to maximize a welfare function evaluated at the steady state. If such steady state is not unique, law enforcement is still relevant but in a completely different way because the steady state that prevails depends on the initial proportions of productive and predator individuals in the economy. The relative importance of these proportions can be changed through law enforcement policy.

Rules or consequences? The role of ethical mindsets in moral dynamics

Recent research on the dynamics of moral behavior has documented two contrastingphenomena - moral consistency and moral balancing. Moral balancing refers to thephenomenon whereby behaving (un)ethically decreases the likelihood of doing so againat a later time. Moral consistency describes the opposite pattern - engaging in(un)ethical behavior increases the likelihood of doing so later on. Three studies supportthe hypothesis that individuals' ethical mindset (i.e., outcome-based versus rule-based)moderates the impact of an initial (un)ethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethicallyin a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mindset facilitates moralbalancing and a rule-based mindset facilitates moral consistency.

Specialization and rent-seeking in moral enforcement: The case of confession

Moral codes are produced and enforced by more or less specialized means and are subject to standard economic forces. This paper argues that the intermediary role played by the Catholic Church between God and Christians, a key difference from Protestantism, faces the standard trade-off of specialization benefits and agency costs. It applies this trade-off hypothesis to confession of sins to priests, an institution that epitomizes such intermediation, showing that this hypothesis fits cognitive, historical and econometric evidence better than a simpler rent-seeking story. In particular, Catholics who confess more often are observed to comply more with the moral code; however, no relationship is observed between mass attendance and moral compliance. The data also links the current decline in confession to the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly, and to the productivity gap suffered by confession services, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).