Higher education as formation of the self and citizenship: an ethnography of the University Students from Amman, Jordan

My interest in higher education and citizenship in the Middle East at large and in Jordan in particular is fostered by some of the reflections Eickelman proposed (1992). Being a quite recent phenomenon, intimately linked with the more general topic of state formation it seemed to me more suitable to study it in a little country with a recent history (a field study left almost unexplored until now as far as Jordan is concerned, to the best of my knowledge, since Antoun 1994 focuses on the migration as a quest for higher education). The process of state formation in Jordan is quite studied. I thus intended to study the higher education policies as an attempt both to create a national citizenry and more recently as a way of controlling the more problematic part of the population (youth, which constitutes more than the double of the population. See UNDP and Ministry of Planning 2000). How do the young students enter the university system, and in which way does this system work? How is this system designed, in order to retain social control of the students (since they are usually perceived to be a factor of social and political instability, as in Iran or in Egypt)? Is there any significant difference between different faculties? And if so, why? My conclusions at this stage are that the university system is an integral part of the survival of the regime. The system works quite well, and Jordan has one of the best educational position in the region. Yet there are important distinctions to be made: the access to the better faculties is socially selective while the less valued faculties are left to the poorer and less wealthy youth. This results in a different treatment of the students and of the courses that I analysed. In the better faculties the teaching standards are quite high, and the relationship between professors and students is almost on a same-level base, while in the less privileged faculties the opposite is true. Thus we can observe a concrete politics of divide et impera intended to split the youth in two. For the more privileged there are some freedoms, both within and outside classes, designed I guess at forging them as autonomous individuals. On the opposite the less privileged are kept under tight control, even if also these students are a privileged category among youth at large.

Dimensions of national culture and the accounting environment -The Spanish case-

Gray (1988) has put forward a hypothesis on how a national accountingenvironment might reflect the cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980, 1983). A number of studies have tested Gray's hypothesis, including one by Pourjalali and Meek (1995) which identified a match between changes in cultural dimensions and the accounting environment in Iran following the revolution. In this paper we replicate this work in the context of Spain following the death of Franco in 1975 and the emergence of a democratic constitution in 1978. Specifically, we: 1) Consider Gray's hypothesis built on Hofstede's cultural dimensions and review some empirical tests of the hypotheses.2) Building on the work of Hofstede and Gray, we: put forward some hypotheses on how we would expect cultural dimensions to change in Spain with the transition to democracy.3) Review developments in accounting in Spain following the transition to democracy, in order to identify how well these fit with our hypotheses.

Cultural relativism in the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council

This Working Paper aims to offer an up-to-date list of cultural relativist players and arguments with respect to human rights, constituted by China, Viet Nam, Myanmar, Iran, Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, Malaysia and Cuba. This working paper argues that Indonesia, Iraq, Colombia and Mexico are not in the same cultural relativist group of states maintained by renowned scholars, notably Cristina Cerna and Dianne Otto. As such, apart from this form of cultural relativism based on the respect for the self-determination of indigenous peoples and communities, this working paper exposes two different categories of radical cultural relativism based on revolutionary discourse and/or radical Islamism, as well as targets the credibility on the latter two based on the information facilitated by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (HRC) Universal Periodic Review (UPR).