La insuficiència cardíaca i la qualitat de vida: aplicació del qüestionari “Minnesota Living With Heart Failure” a l’àmbit d’atenció primària

Conèixer la qualitat de vida (QV) mitjançant el qüestionari Minnesota Living With Heart Failure Questionnaire (MLWHFQ) en una població afecta d’insuficiència cardíaca atesa al nivell d’atenció primària mitjançant un estudi descriptiu transversal i observacional. La major part dels pacients són dones d’edat avançada amb disfunció diastòlica, d’etiologia hipertensiva. L’aplicació del MLWHFQ ha presentat puntuacions baixes. S’ha trobat significació estadística amb la classe funcional i el nombre d’ingressos en l’últim any, en malalts amb malaltia pulmonar obstructiva crònica i insuficiència renal crònica. No s’ha trobat correlació significativa amb la fracció d’ejecció, el tractament, ni amb la causa de la insuficiència cardíaca.

La biblioteca difusa de nou: alineant la biblioteca com a actiu estratègic

Aquest article es proposa estudiar els evidents canvis de rols en la comunitat de la biblioteca de recerca, amb estudis de cas il·lustratius de les Biblioteques de la University of Minnesota.

The Disadvantage of winning an election

This paper analyzes the problem that an incumbent faces during the legislature when deciding how to react to popular initiatives or policy proposals coming from different sources. We argue that this potential source of electoral disadvantage that the incumbent obtains after being elected can jeopardize the reelection possibilities of the incumbent. We analyze the decision of the incumbent when facing reelection and we characterize the conditions under which the advantages that the incumbent obtains can overcome the disadvantages. Finally, we use the results of this analysis to discuss some implications of the use of mechanisms of direct democracy like referenda and popular assemblies on electoral competition.

Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies

This paper addresses the puzzle of why legislation, even highly inefficient legislation, may pass with overwhelming majorities. We model a egislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by romising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because a ote in favor maintains the chance for membership in the minimum winning coalition in the future. The model thus generates situations in which egislators approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that enefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust: some institutional arrangements, such as super-majority rules or sequential voting, imit but do not eliminate the agenda setter's power to exploit the legislature, and other institutions such as secret voting do not limit his power.

Forecasting and turning point predictions in a Bayesian panel VAR model

We provide methods for forecasting variables and predicting turning points in panel Bayesian VARs. We specify a flexible model which accounts for both interdependencies in the cross section and time variations in the parameters. Posterior distributions for the parameters are obtained for a particular type of diffuse, for Minnesota-type and for hierarchical priors. Formulas for multistep, multiunit point and average forecasts are provided. An application to the problem of forecasting the growth rate of output and of predicting turning points in the G-7 illustrates the approach. A comparison with alternative forecasting methods is also provided.

The informational value of incumbency

This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage without recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters information about governing politicians not available from challengers. Because there are many reasons for high reelection rates different from incumbency status, we propose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection success. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage and ideological and selection biases. An important implication of our analysis is that the literature linking incumbency and legislature irresponsibility most likely provides an overestimation of the latter.