A measure of rationality and welfare

There is evidence showing that individual behavior often deviates fromthe classical principle of maximization. This evidence raises at least two importantquestions: (i) how severe the deviations are and (ii) which method is the best forextracting relevant information from choice behavior for the purposes of welfare analysis.In this paper we address these two questions by identifying from a foundationalanalysis a new measure of the rationality of individuals that enables the analysis ofindividual welfare in potentially inconsistent subjects, all based on standard revealedpreference data. We call such measure minimal index.

Contractive metrics for a Boltzmann equation for granular gases: diffusive equilibriaThe Patterson-Sullivan embedding and minimal volume entropy for outer space

We quantify the long-time behavior of a system of (partially) inelastic particles in a stochastic thermostat by means of the contractivity of a suitable metric in the set of probability measures. Existence, uniqueness, boundedness of moments and regularity of a steady state are derived from this basic property. The solutions of the kinetic model are proved to converge exponentially as t→ ∞ to this diffusive equilibrium in this distance metrizing the weak convergence of measures. Then, we prove a uniform bound in time on Sobolev norms of the solution, provided the initial data has a finite norm in the corresponding Sobolev space. These results are then combined, using interpolation inequalities, to obtain exponential convergence to the diffusive equilibrium in the strong L¹-norm, as well as various Sobolev norms.

The Patterson-Sullivan embedding and minimal volume entropy for outer space

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Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints

In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.

Minimal truncations of supersingular p-divisible groups

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Minimal lenght elements of Thompson's groups F(p)

We describe a method for determining the minimal length of elements in the generalized Thompson's groups F(p). We compute the length of an element by constructing a tree pair diagram for the element, classifying the nodes of the tree and summing associated weights from the pairs of node classifications. We use this method to effectively find minimal length representatives of an element.

El desastre quotidià i la disciplina repressora, respostes a la geometria minimal

La proposta de tesi pren com a punt de partida les respostes artístiques i teòriques dutes a terme a partir dels anys seixanta contra un context de coneixement tradicional fonamentalment racionalista, que segueix la tradició lògica de la modernitat i que troba el seu reflex i aplicació social en l’ordre espaial i per extensió, en la geometria. Un cop descrites les nocions que d’aquesta modernitat han estat aplicades a l’art dels anys 50 i 60, es mostra com les crítiques de determinats filòsofs i artistes han anat conformant un corpus teòric i artístic que ha implicat un intent d’enderrocament d’aquest sistema tradicional de coneixement, interpretació, lectura i atorgament de sentit a les obres artístiques. Aquests són: M.Foucault, J.Derrida, R. Smithson, R. Serra, R. Morris, Mona Hatoum, Imi Knoebel o Tacita Dean, entre d’altres. Seguidament es presenta un anàlisi més profund i detallat d’aquelles respostes artístiques més paradigmàtiques, tant al sistema de pensament tradicional com a l’ordre espaial que aquest conseqüentment implica. Aquestes crítiques s’organitzen en dues parts antagòniques: l’una és “L’adveniment del caos”, i l’altra és la “Crítica de l’ordre”. Els artistes són: L. Bourgeois, E.Hesse, A.Mendieta i P.Halley. En una tercera part, es descriu com aquest inici deconstructor del paradigma de coneixement tradicional iniciat als anys seixanta es desenvolupa durant els següents vint anys tenint en aquest cas com a fonament teòric les crítiques de R.Krauss, J. Baudrillard, P.Virilio, i com artistes els arquitectes P. Eienmann i F. Gehri, entre d’altres. La conclusió fonamental d’aquests apartats intenta posar de manifest la subversió o infracció de la geometria com a contenidora dels conceptes de la modernitat: raó i ordre moral. Finalment, en una quarta part s’inclou el propi projecte artístic que representa l’experimentació i praxi de les conclusions teòriques d’aquesta tesi.

Green vs. Lempert functions: a minimal example

The Lempert function for a set of poles in a domain of Cn at a point z is obtained by taking a certain infimum over all analytic disks going through the poles and the point z, and majorizes the corresponding multi-pole pluricomplex Green function. Coman proved that both coincide in the case of sets of two poles in the unit ball. We give an example of a set of three poles in the unit ball where this equality fails.

A note on Luttens’ Minimal rights based solidarity

Following the approach developed by Luttens (2010), we consider a model where individuals with di fferent levels of skills exert di fferent levels of e ffor. Speci fically, we propose a redistribution mechanism based on a lower bound on what every individual deserves: the so-called minimal rights (O'Neill (1982)). Our re finement of Luttens' mechanism ensures at the same time minimal rights based solidarity, participation (non-negativity) and claims feasibility. Keywords: Redistribution mechanism, Minimal rights, Solidarity, Participation, Claims feasibility. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

Regions of rationality: Maps for bounded agents

An important problem in descriptive and prescriptive research in decision making is to identify regions of rationality, i.e., the areas for which heuristics are and are not effective. To map the contours of such regions, we derive probabilities that heuristics identify the best of m alternatives (m > 2) characterized by k attributes or cues (k > 1). The heuristics include a single variable (lexicographic), variations of elimination-by-aspects, equal weighting, hybrids of the preceding, and models exploiting dominance. We use twenty simulated and four empirical datasets for illustration. We further provide an overview by regressing heuristic performance on factors characterizing environments. Overall, sensible heuristics generally yield similar choices in many environments. However, selection of the appropriate heuristic can be important in some regions (e.g., if there is low inter-correlation among attributes/cues). Since our work assumes a hit or miss decision criterion, we conclude by outlining extensions for exploring the effects of different loss functions.

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. Wereplace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probability p or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a kind of correlated equilibrium satisfying certain p-belief constraints, and that it varies continuously in the parameters p and, for p sufficiently close to one,with high probability is supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend the analysis to characterizing rational expectations of interimtypes, to games of incomplete information, as well as to the case of non-common priors.

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Economic rationality and ethical behavior

This paper argues that economic rationality and ethical behavior cannotbe reduced one to the other, casting doubts on the validity of formulaslike 'profit is ethical' or 'ethics pays'. In order to express ethicaldilemmas as opposing economic interest with ethical concerns, we proposea model of rational behavior that combines these two irreducible dimensions in an open but not arbitrary manner. Behaviors that are neither ethicalnor profitable are considered irrational (non-arbitrariness). However,behaviors that are profitable but unethical, and behaviors that are ethicalbut not profitable, are all treated as rational (openness). Combiningethical concerns with economic interest, ethical business is in turn anoptimal form of rationality between venality and sacrifice.Because every one prefers to communicate that he acts ethically, ethicalbusiness remains ambiguous until some economic interest is actuallysacrificed. We argue however that ethical business has an interest indemonstrating its consistency between communication and behavior by atransparent attitude. On the other hand, venal behaviors must remainconfidential to hide the corresponding lack of consistency. Thisdiscursive approach based on transparency and confidentiality helpsto further distinguish between ethical and unethical business behaviors.

Money and prices in models of bounded rationality in high inflation economies

This paper studies the short run correlation of inflation and money growth. We study whether a model of learning can do better than a model of rational expectations, we focus our study on countries of high inflation. We take the money process as an exogenous variable, estimated from the data through a switching regime process. We findthat the rational expectations model and the model of learning both offer very good explanations for the joint behavior of money and prices.