Globalization and wage inequality in South and East Asia, and Latin America: A gender approach

In this paper we analyse the reasons behind the evolution of the gender gap and wage inequality in South and East Asian and Latin American countries. Health human capital improvements, the exposure to free market openness and equal treatment enforcement laws seem to be the main exogenous variables affecting women s economic condition. During the second globalization era (in the years 1975-2000) different combinations of these variables in South East Asian and Latin American countries have had as a result the diminution of the gender gap. The main exception to this rule according to our data is China where economic reforms have been simultaneous to the increase of gender differences and inequality between men and women.This result has further normative consequences for the measure of economic inequality. Theimprovement of women s condition has as a result the diminution of the dispersion of wages.Therefore in most of the countries analysed the consequence of the diminution of the gender gapduring the second global era is the decrease of wage inequality both measured with Gini and Theil indexes.

The Political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Tax reforms and inequality: theoretical and empirical implications

In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between inequality and growth in a two-sector non-scale model. With non-scale models, the longrun equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological parameters and it is independent of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact does not imply that fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It indeed has important effects on the different levels of key economic variables such as per capita stock of capital and output. Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate across steady states, the bases for economic growth may be different.The model has three essential features. First, we explicitly model skill accumulation, second, we introduce government finance into the production function, and we introduce an income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980¿s and 1990¿s in the US. The fact that the non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it to replicate the distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. The results derived in this paper attract attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model does not only fit the US data well for the long-run (Jones, 1995b) but also that it possesses unique abilities in explaining short term fluctuations of the economy. It is shown that during transition the response of the relative simulated wage to changes in the tax code is rather non-monotonic, quite in accordance to the US inequality pattern in the 1980¿s and early 1990¿s.More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. So, after a tax decrease the skill premium follows a lower trajectory than the one it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we are able to reduce inequality for several periods after the fiscal shock. On the contrary, following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the trajectory carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. Consequently, a tax increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy

Tax reforms and inequality: theoretical and empirical implications

In this paper we examine the effect of tax policy on the relationship between inequality and growth in a two-sector non-scale model. With non-scale models, the longrun equilibrium growth rate is determined by technological parameters and it is independent of macroeconomic policy instruments. However, this fact does not imply that fiscal policy is unimportant for long-run economic performance. It indeed has important effects on the different levels of key economic variables such as per capita stock of capital and output. Hence, although the economy grows at the same rate across steady states, the bases for economic growth may be different.The model has three essential features. First, we explicitly model skill accumulation, second, we introduce government finance into the production function, and we introduce an income tax to mirror the fiscal events of the 1980¿s and 1990¿s in the US. The fact that the non-scale model is associated with higher order dynamics enables it to replicate the distinctly non-linear nature of inequality in the US with relative ease. The results derived in this paper attract attention to the fact that the non-scale growth model does not only fit the US data well for the long-run (Jones, 1995b) but also that it possesses unique abilities in explaining short term fluctuations of the economy. It is shown that during transition the response of the relative simulated wage to changes in the tax code is rather non-monotonic, quite in accordance to the US inequality pattern in the 1980¿s and early 1990¿s.More specifically, we have analyzed in detail the dynamics following the simulation of an isolated tax decrease and an isolated tax increase. So, after a tax decrease the skill premium follows a lower trajectory than the one it would follow without a tax decrease. Hence we are able to reduce inequality for several periods after the fiscal shock. On the contrary, following a tax increase, the evolution of the skill premium remains above the trajectory carried on by the skill premium under a situation with no tax increase. Consequently, a tax increase would imply a higher level of inequality in the economy

Financial reforms and capital flows: Insights from general equilibrium

As a result of debt enforcement problems, many high-productivity firms in emergingeconomies are unable to pledge enough future profits to their creditors and this constrains thefinancing they can raise. Many have argued that, by relaxing these credit constraints, reformsthat strengthen enforcement institutions would increase capital flows to emerging economies. Thisargument is based on a partial equilibrium intuition though, which does not take into account theorigin of any additional resources that flow to high-productivity firms after the reforms. We showthat some of these resources do not come from abroad, but instead from domestic low-productivityfirms that are driven out of business as a result of the reforms. Indeed, the resources released bythese low-productivity firms could exceed those absorbed by high-productivity ones so that capitalflows to emerging economies might actually decrease following successful reforms. This resultprovides a new perspective on some recent patterns of capital flows in industrial and emergingeconomies.

Economic and legal analysis of mandatory non-recourse mortgages with applications to Spain

“The liquidity crisis of the Spanish banks is largely due to the lack of confidence of foreign investors and, therefore, the changes that occur in the legislation should not affect the credibility, stability, legal certainty, predictability that markets expect”.Sergio Nasarre (2011)In the current situation of economic crisis, many people have found they can no longer pay back the mortgage loans that were granted to them in order to purchase a dwelling. It is for this reason that, in light of the economic, political and social problems this poses, our paper studies the state of the Spanish real-estate system and of foreclosure, paying special attention to the solution that has been proposed recently as the best option for debtors that cannot make their mort-gage payments: non-recourse mortgaging. We analyze this proposal from legal and economic perspectives in order to fully understand the effects that this change could imply. At the same time, this paper will also examine several alternatives we believe would ameliorate the situation of mortgage-holders, among them legal reforms, mortgage insurance, and non-recourse mortgaging itself.

Ecological and Economic Impacts within the Environmental Input-Output Framework

The environmental input-output approach reveals the channels through which the environmental burdens of production activities are transmitted throughout the economy. This paper uses the input-output framework and analyses the changes in Spanish emission multipliers during the period 1995-2000. By decomposing the global changes in multipliers into different components, it is possible to evaluate separately the economic and ecological impacts captured by the environmental input-output model. Specifically, in this study we distinguish between the effects on multipliers caused by changes in emission coefficients (the ecological impacts) and the effects on multipliers caused by changes in technical coefficients (the economic impacts). Our results show a significant improvement in the ecological impacts of production activities, which contributed negatively to changes in emission multipliers. They also show a deterioration in the economic impacts, which contributed positively to changes in emission multipliers. Together, these two effects lead to a small reduction in global multipliers during the period of analysis. Our results also show significant differences in the individual behaviour of different sectors in terms of their contribution to multiplier changes. Since there are considerable differences in the way individual sectors affect the changes in emission levels, and in the intensity of these effects, this means that the final effects will basically depend on the activity considered. Keywords: emission multipliers, multipliers' changes, ecological impacts, economic impacts.

An ordinal shapley value for economic environments (Revised version)

We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

On dictatorship, economic development and stability

This paper aims to account for varying economic performances and political stability under dictatorship. We argue that economic welfare and social order are the contemporary relevant factors of political regimes' stability. Societies with low natural level of social order tend to tolerate predatory behavior from dictators in exchange of a provision of civil peace. The fear of anarchy may explain why populations are locked in the worst dictatorships. In contrast, in societies enjoying a relative natural civil peace, dictatorship is less likely to be predatory because low economic welfare may destabilize it.

Sequencing lifeline repairs after an earthquake: an economic approach

Recoveries after recent earthquakes in the U.S. and Japan have shown that large welfare gains can be achieved by reshaping current emergency plans as incentive-compatible contracts. We apply tools from the mechanisms design literature to show ways to integrate economic incentives into the management of natural disasters and discuss issues related to the application to seismic event recovery. The focus is on restoring lifeline services such as the water, gas, transportation, and electric power networks. We put forward decisional procedures that an uninformed planner could employ to set repair priorities and help to coordinate lifeline firms in the post-earthquake reconstruction.