A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

On the number of K3,3-minor-free and maximal K3,3-minor-free graphs

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Maximal C*-algebras of quotients and injective envelopes of C*-algebras

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New estimates for the maximal singular integral

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A characterization of two weight norm inequalities for maximal singular integrals

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Maximal operators and differentiation theorems for sparse sets

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Two weight inequalities for maximal truncations of dyadic Calderón-Zygmund operators

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Counterexamples to some pointwise estimates of the maximal Cauchy transform in terms of the Cauchy transform

Motivated by the work of Mateu, Orobitg, Pérez and Verdera, who proved inequalities of the form $T_*f\lesssim M(Tf)$ or $T_*f\lesssim M^2(Tf)$ for certain singular integral operators $T$, such as the Hilbert or the Beurling transforms, we study the possibility of establishing this type of control for the Cauchy transform along a Lipschitz graph. We show that this is not possible in general, and we give a partial positive result when the graph is substituted by a Jordan curve.

Implementació de la cerca d'un subgraf comú maximal a dos grafs mitjançant colles

La memòria que ací es presenta s'emmarca dins de l'àrea de teoria de grafs. En concret es treballa la implementació d'un algorisme per trobar el subgraf comú maximal (SCM) de dos grafs mitjançant la cerca de colles maximals (CM). L'aportació principal del projecte consisteix en, donats dos grafs qualsevol, trobar el seu graf associat per tal de poder cercar la seva colla maximal (CM). I així, utilitzant funcions existents en el llenguatge de programació, poder trobar el seu subgraf comú maximal (SCM), necessari per calcular la distància entre grafs i així determinar quan d'isomorfs són.

The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core

In this paper, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten, 1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta-Ray, 1991). Both results are based on a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. Keywords: Cooperative game, equity core, equal division core, Lorenz domination. JEL classification: C71

Hierachy-based methodology for producing educational contents with maximal reutilization

Computer based training or distance education are facing dramatic changes withthe advent of standardization efforts, some of them concentrating in maximal reuse.This is of paramount importance for a sustainable -cost affordable- production ofeducational materials. Reuse in itself should not be a goal, though, since manymethodological aspects might be lost. In this paper we propose two contentproduction approaches for the InterMediActor platform under a competence-basedmethodology: either a bottom-up approach where content is designed from scratchor a top-down methodology where existing material can be gradually adapted tofulfil requisites to be used with maximal flexibility into InterMediActor.

Probabilistic maximal covering location-allocation models with constrained waiting time or queue length for congested systems

When dealing with the design of service networks, such as healthand EMS services, banking or distributed ticket selling services, thelocation of service centers has a strong influence on the congestion ateach of them, and consequently, on the quality of service. In this paper,several models are presented to consider service congestion. The firstmodel addresses the issue of the location of the least number of single--servercenters such that all the population is served within a standard distance,and nobody stands in line for a time longer than a given time--limit, or withmore than a predetermined number of other clients. We then formulateseveral maximal coverage models, with one or more servers per service center.A new heuristic is developed to solve the models and tested in a 30--nodesnetwork.

The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.