Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment

We experimentally investigate in the laboratory two prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools. We study how individual behavior is influenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our main results show that (a) the Gale-Shapley mechanism is more robust to changes in cardinal preferences than the Boston mechanism independently of whether individuals can submit a complete or only a restricted ranking of the schools and (b) subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion are more likely to play "safer" strategies under the Gale-Shapley but not under the Boston mechanism. Both results have important implications for the efficiency and the stability of the mechanisms.

Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyzewhether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions dependon the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment thesecond player responds to the first player s observed actionwhile in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action foreach and every possible first player move, without firstobserving this move. Our analysis centers on the degree towhich subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniaryrewards, as a response to others actions. Our results show nodifference in behavior between the two treatments. We also findevidence of the stability of subjects preferences with respectto their behavior over time and to the consistency of theirchoices as first and second mover.

Revealed preference and indifferent selection

It is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice behavior in a way that is robust to indifferent selection (i.e., the agent is indifferent between two alternatives but, nevertheless, is only observed selecting one of them). More precisely, a suggestion by Savage (1954) to reveal indifferent selection by considering small monetary perturbations of alternatives is formalized and generalized to a purely topological framework: references over an arbitrary topological space can be uniquely derived from observed behavior under the assumptions that they are continuous and nonsatiated and that a strictly preferred alternative is always chosen, and indifferent selection is then characterized by discontinuity in choice behavior. Two particular cases are then analyzed: monotonic preferences over a partially ordered set, and preferences representable by a continuous pseudo-utility function.

Eliciting consumers preferences using stated preference discrete choice models: Contingent ranking versus choice experiment

The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to carry out a theoreticalreview of the most recent stated preference techniques used foreliciting consumers preferences and, secondly, to compare the empiricalresults of two dierent stated preference discrete choice approaches.They dier in the measurement scale for the dependent variable and,therefore, in the estimation method, despite both using a multinomiallogit. One of the approaches uses a complete ranking of full-profiles(contingent ranking), that is, individuals must rank a set ofalternatives from the most to the least preferred, and the other usesa first-choice rule in which individuals must select the most preferredoption from a choice set (choice experiment). From the results werealize how important the measurement scale for the dependent variablebecomes and, to what extent, procedure invariance is satisfied.

National Identity and the Preference for State Opting-Out in the Basque Country

We argue that preferences for secession are the expression of a common unobserved mechanisms determining national identity. This paper examines the hypothesis of independence of both preferences for secession (independent Euskadi) and Basque national identity in the light of Akerloff and Kranton (2000). We deal with psychological determinants of individuals' national identity formation as well as those that influence the propensity of individuals to support the secession of their perceived ¿imagined community¿ or nation.. We undertake econometric survey analysis for the Basque Country using a bivariate probit model and publicly available data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research. Our results provide robust evidence of a common determination of national identity and political preferences for the secession of the Basque Country consistently with Akerloff and Kranton model.

National Identity and the Preference for State Opting-Out in the Basque Country

We argue that preferences for secession are the expression of a common unobserved mechanisms determining national identity. This paper examines the hypothesis of independence of both preferences for secession (independent Euskadi) and Basque national identity in the light of Akerloff and Kranton (2000). We deal with psychological determinants of individuals' national identity formation as well as those that influence the propensity of individuals to support the secession of their perceived ¿imagined community¿ or nation.. We undertake econometric survey analysis for the Basque Country using a bivariate probit model and publicly available data from the Spanish Centre for Sociological Research. Our results provide robust evidence of a common determination of national identity and political preferences for the secession of the Basque Country consistently with Akerloff and Kranton model.

The effect of age at the first mating and herd size on the lifetime productivity of sows

The effect of age at the first mating and herd size were evaluated in the reference Spanish Databank (BDporc) of 37 698 sows born between 1991 and 1995 and with individual lifetime records. The data included dates of births at entrance and culling, first mating, repetitive mating and conception, first farrowing and weaning records. Individual records were validated before the analysis by screening them through a tolerance “filter” in order to eliminate the extreme values from the analysis. The total database of the sows was classified in 7 classes according to age at the first mating (< 210, 210–220, 221–230, 231–240, 241–250, 251–270, and > 270 days) and in 6 classes of herd size (< 200, 200–300, 301–400, 401–600, 601–800, and > 800 sows). The total number of litters and number of weaned piglets obtained from each sow during the lifetime production were significantly (P < 0.05) greater for gilts between 221 and 240 d of age at the first mating. There was a significant (P < 0.001) effect of the herd size on the reproductive performance of the sow, and the best performance was obtained with herds with 401 to 600 sows compared to < 200 or > 800 sow-herds. Furthermore, a significant (P < 0.001) interaction between age at the first mating and herd size was detected and can be associated with a particular pattern for the herd size class 401–600 sows with the best performances obtained for the sows first mated at less than 200 days. For the other herd sizes, the results indicated that sows mated for the first time at the right age, 221–240 days, are more productive, both in the number and size of the parities throughout lifetime production.

Courtship and mating behaviour of the Mediterranean corn borer, Sesamia nonagrioides (Lepidoptera: Noctuidae)

Se describe la secuencia de cortejo y apareamiento de machos y hembras de Sesamia nonagrioides (Lefèbvre) en el laboratorio. Esta secuencia no varió en presencia o ausencia de plantas de maíz. Se estudió la capacidad de atracción de un sexo sobre el otro atando el individuo de un sexo y dejando libre al complementario. La secuencia de cortejo y apareo de las hembras atadas fue la misma que la de las no atadas, pero los machos atados permanecieron absolutamente inactivos. La edad de los adultos (1 día versus 2 días) no afectó al porcentaje de apareamiento. Se encontraron diferencias en la hora del inicio de la llamada de las hembras y en la edad de las hembras en la primera llamada entre la población estudiada y lo descrito para una población griega, diferencias que podrían estar relacionadas con el origen geográfico. Se discute el papel de los penachos abdominales de los machos en el vuelo de cortejo, rechazándose que estimulen el comportamiento de llamada de las hembras o que las atraigan. Cuando no se aplicaron feromonas, el porcentaje de apareamiento en el laboratorio o en el campo no varió cuando aumentó la densidad de la población. Sin embargo, en los campos en que se aplicó confusión sexual, el porcentaje de apareamiento aumentó al aumentar la densidad de adultos. En la discusión se aportan algunas consecuencias para la investigación de la composición de las feromonas y su uso para el seguimiento de plagas y el control mediante confusión sexual.

Comparison of lures loaded with codlemone and pear ester for capturing codling moths, Cydia pomonella, in apple and pear orchards using mating disruption

Studies were conducted in apple, Malus domestica Borkhausen and pear, Pyrus communis L. (Rosales: Rosaceae), orchards to evaluate the attractiveness of grey halobutyl septa loaded with 1 (L2) and 10 (Mega) mg of codlemone, 8E,10E-dodecadien-1-ol, 3 mg of pear ester, ethyl (E,Z)- 2,4-decadienoate (DA2313), and 3 mg of pear ester plus 3 mg of codlemone (Combo) to adult codling moth, Cydia pomonella (L.) (Lepidoptera: Tortricidae). All studies were conducted in orchards treated with pheromone mating disruption. All four lures were tested on diamond-shaped sticky traps placed in 60 plots of apple and 40 plots of pears in 2003/04, and in 62 plots of apples and 30 of pears in 2004-05. Combo lures attracted significantly more moths (males + females) than all the others in both years. Comparisons among flights showed significant differences mainly for flight 1 and 2, but not always for flight 3. Mega lures provided no significant improvement compared with L2 lures during both seasons regarding the total number of moths. Combo and DA2313 lures attracted fewer females than males during the whole season. For most sample dates, more virgin than mated females were attracted to Combo lures, except during the third flight, and the overall ratio was 60:40, although the difference was not statistically significant. We conclude that the Combo lures are better indicators of codling moth activity in pheromone treated orchards, regardless of pest population level, when compared with similar lures containing codlemone or pear ester alone.

Group preference structures in AHP–group decision making

This paper presents a procedure that allows us to determine the preference structures(PS) associated to each of the different groups of actors that can be identified in a groupdecision making problem with a large number of individuals. To that end, it makesuse of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980) as the technique to solvediscrete multicriteria decision making problems. This technique permits the resolutionof multicriteria, multienvironment and multiactor problems in which subjective aspectsand uncertainty have been incorporated into the model, constructing ratio scales correspondingto the priorities relative to the elements being compared, normalised in adistributive manner (wi = 1). On the basis of the individuals’ priorities we identifydifferent clusters for the decision makers and, for each of these, the associated preferencestructure using, to that end, tools analogous to those of Multidimensional Scaling.The resulting PS will be employed to extract knowledge for the subsequent negotiationprocesses and, should it be necessary, to determine the relative importance of thealternatives being compared using anyone of the existing procedures

A Characterization of single-peaked preferences

We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences on the line in the following sense: a preference profile satisfies these two properties if and only if there exists a linear order $L$ over the set of alternatives such that these preferences are single-peaked with respect L. The first property states that for any subset of alternatives the set of alternatives considered as the worst by all agents cannot contains more than 2 elements. The second property states that two agents cannot disagree on the relative ranking of two alternatives with respect to a third alternative but agree on the (relative) ranking of a fourth one. Classification-JEL: D71, C78

Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.