Factors influencing the evolution of e-commerce : an empirical analysis in a developed market economy

Peer-reviewed

Judges' cognition and market order

We argue that during the crystallization of common and civil law in the 19th century, the optimal degree of discretion in judicial rulemaking, albeit influenced by the comparative advantages of both legislative and judicial rulemaking, was mainly determined by the anti-market biases of the judiciary. The different degrees of judicial discretion adopted in both legal traditions were thus optimally adapted to different circumstances, mainly rooted in the unique, market-friendly, evolutionary transition enjoyed by English common law as opposed to the revolutionary environment of the civil law. On the Continent, constraining judicial discretion was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing a market economy. The ongoing debasement of pro-market fundamentals in both branches of the Western legal system is explained from this perspective as a consequence of increased perceptions of exogenous risks and changes in the political system, which favored the adoption of sharing solutions and removed the cognitive advantage of parliaments and political leaders.

Market institutions and judicial rulemaking

Assuming that the degree of discretion granted to judges was the main distinguishing feature between common and civil law until the 19th century, we argue that constraining judicial discretion was instrumental in protecting freedom of contract and developing the market order in civil law. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the history of Western law. In England, a unique institutional balance between the Crown and the Parliament guaranteed private property and prompted the gradual evolution towards a legal framework that facilitated market relationships, a process that was supported by the English judiciary. On the Continent, however, legal constraints on the market were suppressed in a top-down fashion by the founders of the liberal state, often against the will of the incumbent judiciary. Constraining judicial discretion there was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing the legal order of the market economy. In line with this evidence, our selection hypothesis casts doubts on the normative interpretation of empirical results that proclaim the superiority of one legal system over another, disregarding the local conditions and institutional interdependencies on which each legal system was grounded.

Globalization and Europeanization: Analysing Change

The main motivation for exploring the relationship between globalization and Europeanization is the understanding of the importance of exogenous factors for policy change at the domestic level. Can we distinguish the impact of Europeanization to that of globalization? What is the relationship between globalization and Europeanization and what can we learn about the impact of the two phenomena upon political institutions, public policies, identities and values of EU member-states? Can we distinguish the traces of globalization to those of Europeanization upon the domestic level? The paper draws upon International Relations and International Political Economy theories of globalization as well as upon the Europeanization literature. Both phenomena are multi-dimensional and in order to assess their impact and their relationship three dimensions are explored: political institutions, public policies and values and identities. It is concluded that the two phenomena are interwoven and that there is no antithetical relationship between them. Their core is similar, based on the values of neo-liberalism, representative democracy and open market economy.

Las defensas morales del mercado

El mercado, como cualquier otro sistema de organización de la vida colectiva, es susceptible de evaluación moral. En las páginas que siguen se examinan las dos vías de fundamentación más comunes y se muestran sus limitaciones. La primera presenta al mercado como un sistema social necesario. Lo cual se puede hacer por dos caminos: a) mostrando su superioridad desde cualquier criterio de evaluación, su superioridad incondicional; b) mostrando su carácter necesario, esto es, desprovisto de moralidad. La segunda vía pretende que el mercado es el único sistema compatible con valores morales generalmente aceptados.

Interrelation among Economic Growth, Income Inequality, and Fiscal Performance: Evidence from Anglo-Saxon Countries

The interrelation among economic growth, income inequality, and fiscal performance is very complex. The paper provides the analysis of the interrelations among these variables jointly by the structural VAR methodology, examining also transmission channels among them. This approach allows exploring dynamic interactions among them and feedback effects on each other. The empirical analysis is implemented for the Anglo-Saxon countries, the UK, the USA, and Canada. We find that income inequality has negative effect on economic growth in the case of the UK. The effect is positive in the cases of the USA and Canada. The increase in income inequality worsens fiscal performance for all the countries

One-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands

We consider one-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands and prove that the associated game is buyers-submodular. Therefore the core is non-empty and it has a lattice structure which contains the allocation where every buyer receives his marginal contribution. We prove that in this kind of market, every pairwise-stable outcome is associated to a competitive equilibrium and viceversa. We study conditions under which the buyers-optimal and the seller-optimal core allocations are competitive equilibrium payoff vectors. Moreover, we characterize the markets for which the core coincidences with the set of competitive equilibria payoff vectors. When agents behave strategically, we introduce a procedure that implements the buyers-optimal core allocation as the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.

Interactions between product and labour market reforms

Labour market reforms face very often opposition from the employed workers, because it normally reduces their wages. Also product market regulations are regularly biased towards too much benefitting the firms. As a result there remain many frictions in both the labour and product markets that hinder an optimal functioning of the economy. These issues have recently received a lot of attention in the economics literature and scholars have been looking for politically viable reforms in both markets. However, despite its potential importance, there has been done virtually no research on the interaction between reforms in product and labour markets. We find that when combining reforms, the opposition for reforms decreases considerably. This is because there exist complementarities and the gains in total welfare can be more evenly distributed over the interest groups. Moreover, the interaction of reforms offers a way out for the so-called 'sclerosis' effect.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

The Commons and anti-commons problems in the tourism economy

Countries specialised in tourism tend to face two problems with contradictory effects: the commons and the anti-commons, which lead to tourism over- and under-production, respectively. This paper develops a two-period model to analyse the joint effects of both problems on a small and remote tourism economy. Congestion and the complementariness between foreign transport and local tourism services are key features in this type of markets. As a result, direct selling and the presence of foreign tour-operators emerge as possible market arrangements with different implications in terms of welfare and public intervention. Four main results are obtained. First, in the direct selling situation the optimal policy depends on the relative importance of the problems. Second, the existence of tour-operators always leads to tourism over-production. Third, the presence of a single tour-operator does not solve the congestion problem. Lastly, the switch from several tour-operators to a single one is welfare reducing.

A New open economy macroeconomic model with endogenous portfolio diversification and firms entry

This paper provides a new benchmark for the analysis of the international diversi…cation puzzle in a tractable new open economy macroeconomic model. Building on Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and Heathcote and Perri (2009), this model speci…es an equilibrium model of perfect risk sharing in incomplete markets, with endogenous portfolios and number of varieties. Equity home bias may not be a puzzle but a perfectly optimal allocation for hedging risk. In contrast to previous work, the model shows that: (i) optimal international portfolio diversi…cation is driven by home bias in capital goods, independently of home bias in consumption, and by the share of income accruing to labour. The model explains reasonably well the recent patterns of portfolio allocations in developed economies; and (ii) optimal portfolio shares are independent of market dynamics.

Informality and overeducation in the labor market of a developing country

In this paper, we explore the connection between labor market segmentation in two sectors, a modern protected formal sector and a traditional- unprotected-informal sector, and overeducation in a developing country. Informality is thought to have negative consequences, primarily through poorer working conditions, lack of social security, as well as low levels of productivity throughout the economy. This paper considers an aspect that has not been previously addressed, namely the fact that informality might also affect the way workers match their actual education with that required performing their job. We use micro-data from Colombia to test the relationship between overeducation and informality. Empirical results suggest that, once the endogeneity of employment choice has been accounted for, formal male workers are less likely to be overeducated. Interestingly, the propensity of being overeducated among women does not seem to be closely related to the employment choice.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Assessing the Political Viability of Labour Market Reform: The Case of Employment Protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. The support for employment protection will then depend on the value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. We highlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers' bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more precisely its rate of creative destruction.