Exponentially small splitting of separatrices in the perturbed McMillan map

The McMillan map is a one-parameter family of integrable symplectic maps of the plane, for which the origin is a hyperbolic fixed point with a homoclinic loop, with small Lyapunov exponent when the parameter is small. We consider a perturbation of the McMillan map for which we show that the loop breaks in two invariant curves which are exponentially close one to the other and which intersect transversely along two primary homoclinic orbits. We compute the asymptotic expansion of several quantities related to the splitting, namely the Lazutkin invariant and the area of the lobe between two consecutive primary homoclinic points. Complex matching techniques are in the core of this work. The coefficients involved in the expansion have a resurgent origin, as shown in [MSS08].

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Conjugacy of piecewise linear Lorenz map that expand on average

For piecewise linear Lorenz map that expand on average, we show that it admits a dichotomy: it is either periodic renormalizable or prime. As a result, such a map is conjugate to a ß-transformation.

Resurgence of inner solutions for perturbations of the McMillan map

A sequence of “inner equations” attached to certain perturbations of the McMillan map was considered in [MSS09], their solutions were used in that article to measure an exponentially small separatrix splitting. We prove here all the results relative to these equations which are necessary to complete the proof of the main result of [MSS09]. The present work relies on ideas from resurgence theory: we describe the formal solutions, study the analyticity of their Borel transforms and use ´Ecalle’s alien derivations to measure the discrepancy between different Borel-Laplace sums.

Creació automàtica de gràfics estadístics a partir de dades de soroll d’Europa amb tecnologies Open Source en el visor Noise Map Viewer de l’ETC-LUSI

El projecte ha consistit en la creació de gràfics estadístics de soroll d’Europa de forma automàtica amb tecnologies Open Source dins el visor Noise Map Viewer per Europa de l’ETC-LUSI. La llibreria utilitzada per fer aquest procés ha estat JFreeChart i el llenguatge de programació utilitzat ha estat Java (programació orientada a objectes) dins l’entorn de desenvolupament integrat Eclipse. La base de dades utilitzada ha estat PostgreSQL. Com a servidors s’han fet servir Apache (servidor HTTP) i Tomcat (servidor contenidor d’aplicacions). Un cop acabat el procés s’ha integrat dins de MapFish canviant el codi JavaScript corresponent de la web original.

Diseño, Desarrollo e Implementación de una aplicación WEB-MAP para la visualización y consulta de los proyectos ejecutados por AudingIntraesa

Consiste en el desarrollo de una aplicación WEB-MAP para la visualización y consulta de los proyectos ejecutados por AudingIntraesa. La tecnología utilizada fue MySQL como sistema de gestión de bases de datos, HTTP Apache como servidor web y Adobe Flex como entorno de desarrollo. Se creó una base de datos. Se diseñó una interfaz de usuario intuitiva, eficiente y atractiva. Se desarrollaron rutinas en AS3 para dotar de funcionalidades a la aplicación. Incluyen la consulta y actualización en tiempo de ejecución, descarga de ficheros externos, la fácil navegación por el mapa con capacidades de zoom, pan, cambio de mapas.

Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all men are weakly harmed. We show that our results do not appropriately generalize to the many-to-one college admissions model.

Hierarchical conditional random fields for parts based models matching

A parts based model is a parametrization of an object class using a collection of landmarks following the object structure. The matching of parts based models is one of the problems where pairwise Conditional Random Fields have been successfully applied. The main reason of their effectiveness is tractable inference and learning due to the simplicity of involved graphs, usually trees. However, these models do not consider possible patterns of statistics among sets of landmarks, and thus they sufffer from using too myopic information. To overcome this limitation, we propoese a novel structure based on a hierarchical Conditional Random Fields, which we explain in the first part of this memory. We build a hierarchy of combinations of landmarks, where matching is performed taking into account the whole hierarchy. To preserve tractable inference we effectively sample the label set. We test our method on facial feature selection and human pose estimation on two challenging datasets: Buffy and MultiPIE. In the second part of this memory, we present a novel approach to multiple kernel combination that relies on stacked classification. This method can be used to evaluate the landmarks of the parts-based model approach. Our method is based on combining responses of a set of independent classifiers for each individual kernel. Unlike earlier approaches that linearly combine kernel responses, our approach uses them as inputs to another set of classifiers. We will show that we outperform state-of-the-art methods on most of the standard benchmark datasets.