Study of the effect of oral health on physical condition of professional soccer players of the Football Club Barcelona

Objectives: The objective of this study was to evaluate the oral health status of professional soccer players of F.C. Barcelona and its relation to the incidence of sport lesions. Methods: Thirty professional soccer players were consecutively evaluated in the seasons 2003/4, 2004/5 and 2005/6. A research protocol to assess their oral health was developed. DMFT, Quigley & Hein plaque index (PI), Löe & Silness gingival index (GI), World Health Organization malocclusion index, Ramfjord teeth probing pocket depth (PPD), TMJ examination and history of dental trauma were recorded. All physical injuries sustained by players during the season were documented from F.C. Barcelona medical services. Results: Mean DMFT score was 5.7 (SD 4.1), Quigley & Hein plaque index score was 2.3 (SD 1.1), Löe & Silness gingival index was 1.1 (SD 0.8), and periodontal pocket depth was 1.9 mm (SD 0.3). Pearson"s analysis showed a significant correlation between PI and GI (p<0.01). Nine players (30%) presented bruxism - the same proportion of those with severe malocclusion. Seven (23.3%) players had suffered uncomplicated crown fractures. The mean incidence of physical injuries was 8 (SD 3.4) per player. PI and PPD showed a statistically significant correlation to muscle injuries (p<0.05). Conclusions: Soccer players, despite intensive medical follow-up, have significant oral health problems such as untreated caries, gingivitis or malocclusion, and suffer dental trauma as a result of sports activities. Their physical condition could also be associated to oral health

Fums desiguals. Comentari a la STSJC, Sala Civil i Penal, 31.3.2008 (MP: Ma. Eugènia Alegret Burgués)

L'objecte del plet són els requisits necessaris per a la instal·lació d¿una xemeneia per a l'evacuació dels fums del local situat en els baixos d'un edifici en règim de propietat horitzontal. La matèria no és nova, però la STSJC de 31 de març de 2008 suposa un canvi de criteri jurisprudencial en relació amb la STSJC de 15 de gener de 2005, que la Sala ha de justificar per evitar la infracció del principi d¿igualtat en l¿aplicació de la llei.

Welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice

Two main school choice mechanisms have attracted the attention in the literature: Boston and deferred acceptance (DA). The question arises on the ex-ante welfareimplications when the game is played by participants that vary in terms of their strategicsophistication. Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2011) have shown that the chances ofnaive participants getting into a good school are higher under the Boston mechanism thanunder DA, and some naive participants are actually better off. In this note we show thatthese results can be extended to show that, under the veil of ignorance, i.e. students not yetknowing their utility values, all naive students may prefer to adopt the Boston mechanism.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Responsabilidad civil y daños a los propios bienes. Comentario a las SSTS, 1a, 29.10.2008 (RJ 2008\5801; MP: Román García Varela) y 22.12.2008 (RJ 2009\162; MP: Juan Antonio Xiol Ríos)

En 2008 y en dos ocasiones, la Sala Primera del Tribunal Supremo ha resuelto la cuestión relativa a si el propietario de una finca, la cual había contaminado como consecuencia del desarrollo de su actividad industrial y había vendido ocultando esta circunstancia, es responsable extracontractualmente frente al tercer adquirente por los daños económicos sufridos. En la primera Sentencia, de 29.10.2008, el Tribunal Supremo condena al contaminador por responsabilidad extracontractual. En la segunda, de 22.12.2008, el Tribunal Supremo absuelve a éste de la responsabilidad extracontracual porqué los daños fueron causados a una finca propia.