Efficient bidding with externalities

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals.

Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes

In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.

Mergers, investment decisions and internal organisation

We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms' internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to more efficiency and may even lead to efficiency losses. These mergers lead to lower total welfare, suggesting that a regulator should be careful in assuming that possible efficiency gains of a merger will be effiectively realised. Moreover, the paper offers a possible explanation for merger failures.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

Settlement in tax evasion prosecution

It is often argued that even if optimal ex-post, settlement dilutes deterrence ex-ante. We analyze the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex-ante, to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex-ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that provide statistical information about the taxpayers' true tax liability. The more informative the signal, the larger the additional expected evenue raised by the tax authority when using settlement as a policy tool.

Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random

We analyze a model where firms chose a production technology which, together with some random event, determines the final emission level. We consider the coexistence of two alternative technologies: a "clean" technology, and a "dirty" technology. The environmental regulation is based on taxes over reported emissions, and on penalties over unreported emissions. We show that the optimal inspection policy is a cut-off strategy, for several scenarios concerning the observability of the adoption of the clean technology and the cost of adopting it. We also show that the optimal inspection policy induces the firm to adopt the clean technology if the adoption cost is not too high, but the cost levels for which the firm adopts it depend on the scenario.

Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance

Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental regulation is based on standards and the enforcement agency audits the firm with a certain probability. We then compare total emissions when environmental regulation is based on different instruments: standards, taxes, and tradable permits. We show that when compliance is an issue, environmental taxes are superior to the other instruments. We also analyze the (static) efficiency of the solution.

Financial incentives in academia: research versus development

This paper investigates the effects of monetary rewards on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable to obtain innovative ideas. We analyse how the legal environment affects the allocation of researcher's time between research and development. Although technology transfer objectives reduce the time spent in research, they might also induce researchers to conduct research that is more basic in nature, contrary to what the skewing problem would presage. We also show that our results hold even if development delays publication.

Modelización de la evolución del depósito proteico en ganado porcino en el período de engorde. Efecto del régimen alimentario, sexo y condiciones ambientalessobre la eficiencia y producción de residuos

Las aptitudes genéticas de los genotipos porcinos actuales han cambiado considerablemente durante los últimos años. La eficiencia en la capacidad para el depósito de carne magra ha aumentado considerablemente. Los aportes alimentarios deben por lo tanto adaptarse a las necesidades nutricionales de dichos animales. El potencial productivo de los animales varía en función de condicionantes genéticos ( tipo genético), fisiológicos ( sexo), ambientales ( Tª, densidad), nutricionales ( composición de las dietas y tipos de dietas), sanitarios ,etc. Sus características productivas, y sus necesidades nutricionales, evolucionan con el tiempo ( edad y/o peso ) de forma no lineal , existiendo óptimos biológico-técnicos variables en cada sistema de producción ( granja-mercado) que determinan unos máximos márgenes económicos ( y/o ambientales). Dentro de cada línea es necesario considerar el efecto sexo . Las necesidades de un macho, una hembra o un castrado son muy distintas. Las necesidades nutricionales de los animales dependen también del peso y/o edad del cerdo de engorde. La alimentación debe variar tanto en cantidad como en calidad a lo largo del engorde usando programas de alimentación por fases. Esta técnica es especialmente interesante desde el punto de vista medioambiental ya que permite la reducción de la excreción de nitrógeno y fósforo contribuyendo a la reducción de residuos por Kg. de carne.

Efectos del gen halotano sobre el bienestar animal, la calidad de carne y la productividad en porcinos

El Centro de Tecnología de la Carne fue responsable de tres de los objetivos fundamentales de este proyecto. Los experimentos consistieron en el sacrificio de dos lotes de cerdos que se diferenciaban en su genotipo halotano y en la línea paterna, que fueron sometidos a distintos tratamientos ante-mortem (transporte y espera largos versus transporte y espera cortos). En el primer lote, se compararon animales libres del gen con heterocigotos que procedían de una línea paterna Pietrain o una línea híbrida Large White x Pietrain. En el segundo lote, se comparó la descendencia heterocigota (Nn) de un macho Pietrain positivo al halotano (nn) con la descendencia libre del gen (NN) de dos machos Pietrain también libres del gen. Las hembras utilizadas en ambos lotes fueron las mismas, todas ellas libres del gen halotano

Modelización de la evolución del depósito proteico en ganado porcino en el período de engorde. Efecto del régimen alimentario, sexo y condiciones ambientalessobre la eficiencia y producción de residuos

Las aptitudes genéticas de los genotipos porcinos actuales han cambiado considerablemente durante los últimos años. La eficiencia en la capacidad para el depósito de carne magra ha aumentado considerablemente. Los aportes alimentarios deben por lo tanto adaptarse a las necesidades nutricionales de dichos animales. El potencial productivo de los animales varía en función de condicionantes genéticos ( tipo genético), fisiológicos ( sexo), ambientales ( Tª, densidad), nutricionales ( composición de las dietas y tipos de dietas), sanitarios ,etc. Sus características productivas, y sus necesidades nutricionales, evolucionan con el tiempo ( edad y/o peso ) de forma no lineal , existiendo óptimos biológico-técnicos variables en cada sistema de producción ( granja-mercado) que determinan unos máximos márgenes económicos ( y/o ambientales). Dentro de cada línea es necesario considerar el efecto sexo . Las necesidades de un macho, una hembra o un castrado son muy distintas. Las necesidades nutricionales de los animales dependen también del peso y/o edad del cerdo de engorde. La alimentación debe variar tanto en cantidad como en calidad a lo largo del engorde usando programas de alimentación por fases. Esta técnica es especialmente interesante desde el punto de vista medioambiental ya que permite la reducción de la excreción de nitrógeno y fósforo contribuyendo a la reducción de residuos por Kg. de carne.

Dividends and weighted values in games with externalities

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.

Incentives in university technology transfers

There are two main ways in which the knowledge created in universities has been transferred to firms: licensing agreements and the creation of spin-offs. In this paper, we describe the main steps in the transfer of university innovations, the main incentive issues that appear in this process, and the contractual solutions proposed to address them.