La Comissió Jurídica Assessora i l'autonomia de Catalunya durant la Segona República: la creació del sistema polític i institucional d'autogovern

[cat] La tesi que es defensa en aquest article és la posició de centralitat que va tenir la Comissió Jurídica Assessora durant el període de la Generalitat republicana en la creació i la configuració del sistema polític i institucional d'autogovern a Catalunya. Per a demostrar aquesta tesi s'analitzen els avantprojectes de llei que va elaborar durant aquest període la Comissió Jurídica Assessora: la Constitució o Estatut interior, la Llei municipal, el Tribunal de Cassació de Catalunya i els recursos en les vies governativa i contenciosa administrativa. L'anàlisi d'aquests avantprojectes posa en relleu com durant aquest període es van forjar les institucions d'autogovern, es van posar les bases de la democràcia i de l'autonomia local, com també es va crear una jurisdicció contenciosa administrativa pròpia. L'avantprojecte de llei de recursos en les vies governativa i contenciosa administrativa serà un precedent rellevant, però oblidat, de les lleis estatals sobre procediment administratiu i jurisdicció contenciosa administrativa. En definitiva, el sistema polític i institucional català que hi ha en l'actualitat no podria entendre's sense els antecedents de la Generalitat republicana que, recollint la legitimació històrica de les institucions medievals, van saber configurar les bases d'un sistema adaptat a les necessitats de la societat contemporània.

Capital cities of federations. On the way to analysing the normative base of their asymmetrical status

Federal Capitals often have special statutes. Compared with member states, they often enjoy a lower degree of self-government and a lesser share in the governing of the federation. Why do actors choose such devices, and how can they be justified in a liberal democracy? Surprisingly, the burgeoning literature on asymmetric federalism (to which our research group has contributed significantly) has overlooked this important feature of a de iure asymmetry, perhaps because political theory up to now has concentrated on cases of multicultural and plurinational federations. However, comparative literature is also rare. This paper is the first step to filling in this gap by comparing some federal capitals. The Federal District model (Washington) is compared to capitals organized as member-states (Berlin and Brussels), and capitals that are cities belonging to a single member state (Ottawa in Ontario). The different features of de iure asymmetry will thereby be highlighted. Some light will be shed on the possible motives, reasons and justifications for the choice of each respective status. The paper opens the door to further research on such status questions by analysing public and parliamentary debates, for example. It paves the way for more thorough research. Sicne the author has been awarded a grant by the Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics, this research will be carried out soon.

Recognition and political accommodation: from regionalism to secessionism. The Catalan case

Having lived through a bloody civil war in the 1930s followed by four decades of General Franco’s dictatorship, the Spanish state carried out a transition to a democratic system at the end of the 1970s. The 1978 Constitution was the legal outcome of this transition process. Among other things, it established a territorial model – the so-called “Estado de las Autonomías” (State of Autonomous Communities) – which was designed to satisfy the historical demands for recognition and self-government of, above all, the citizens and institutions of Catalonia and the Basque Country .In recent years support for independence has increased in Catalonia. Different indicators show that pro-independence demands are endorsed by a majority of its citizens, as well as by most of the political parties and organizations that represent its civil society. This is a new phenomenon. Those in favour of independence had been in the minority throughout the 20th century. Nowadays, however, demands of a pro-autonomy and pro-federalist nature, which until recently had been dominant, have gradually lost public support in favour of demands for self-determination and secession. This paper analyses the massive increase in support for secession in Catalonia during the early years of the 21st century. After describing the different theories of secession in plurinational liberal democracies (section 1), we analyse Catalonia’s political evolution over the past decade focusing on the shortcomings with regard to constitutional recognition and accommodation displayed by the Spanish political system. The latter have been exacerbated by the reform process of Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy (2006) and the subsequent judgement of Spain’s Constitutional Court regarding the aforementioned Statute (2010) (section 2). Finally, we present our conclusions by linking the Catalan case with theories of secession applied to plurinational contexts

Efficiency and quality in local government management: the case of Spanish local authorities

This study analyses efficiency levels in Spanish local governments and their determining factors through the application of DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) methodology. It aims to find out to what extent inefficiency arises from external factors beyond the control of the entity, or on the other hand, how much it is due to inadequate management of productive resources. The results show that on the whole, there is still a wide margin within which managers could increase local government efficiency levels, although it is revealed that a great deal of inefficiency is due to exogenous factors. It is specifically found that the size of the entity, per capita tax revenue, the per capita grants or the amount of commercial activity are some of the factors determining local government inefficiency.

Devolution dynamics of Spanish local government

Over the last few years, ther has been a devolutionary tendency in many developed and developing countries. In this article we propose a methodology to decompose whether the benefits in terms of effciency derived from transfers of powers from higher to municipal levels of government "the "economic dividend" of devolution) might increase over time. This methodology is based on linear programming approaches for effciency measurement. We provide anapplication to Spanish municipalities, which have had to adapt to both the European Stability and Growth Pact as well as to domestic regulation seeking local governments balanced budget. Results indicate that efficiency gains from enhaced decentralization have increased over time. However, the way through which these gains accrue differs across municipalities -in some cases technical change is the main component, whereas in others catching up dominates.

The dynamic adjustment of local government budgets : Does Spain behave differently?

[spa] El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar si los municipios españoles se ajustan en presencia de un shock presupuestario y (si es así) qué elementos del presupuesto son los que realizan el ajuste. La metodología utilizada para contestar estas preguntas es un mecanismo de corrección del error, VECM, que estimamos con un panel de datos de los municipios españoles durante el período 1988-2006. Nuestros resultados confirman que, en primer lugar, los municipios se ajustan en presencia de un shock fiscal (es decir, el déficit es estacionario en el largo plazo). En segundo lugar, obtenemos que cuando el shock afecta a los ingresos el ajuste lo soporta principalmente el municipio reduciendo el gasto, las transferencias tienen un papel muy reducido en este proceso de ajuste. Por el contrario, cuando el shock afecta al gasto, el ajuste es compartido en términos similares entre el municipio – incrementado los impuestos – y los gobiernos de niveles superiores – incrementando las transferencias. Estos resultados sugieren que la viabilidad de las finanzas pública locales es factible con diferentes entornos institucionales.

The dynamic adjustment of local government budgets : Does Spain behave differently?

[spa] El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar si los municipios españoles se ajustan en presencia de un shock presupuestario y (si es así) qué elementos del presupuesto son los que realizan el ajuste. La metodología utilizada para contestar estas preguntas es un mecanismo de corrección del error, VECM, que estimamos con un panel de datos de los municipios españoles durante el período 1988-2006. Nuestros resultados confirman que, en primer lugar, los municipios se ajustan en presencia de un shock fiscal (es decir, el déficit es estacionario en el largo plazo). En segundo lugar, obtenemos que cuando el shock afecta a los ingresos el ajuste lo soporta principalmente el municipio reduciendo el gasto, las transferencias tienen un papel muy reducido en este proceso de ajuste. Por el contrario, cuando el shock afecta al gasto, el ajuste es compartido en términos similares entre el municipio – incrementado los impuestos – y los gobiernos de niveles superiores – incrementando las transferencias. Estos resultados sugieren que la viabilidad de las finanzas pública locales es factible con diferentes entornos institucionales.

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

The Institutional, Economic and Social Determinants of Local Government Transparency

Interest in public accountability and government transparency is increasing worldwide. The literature on the determinants of transparency is evolving but is still in its early stages. So far, it has typically focused on national or regional governments while neglecting the local government level. This paper builds on the scarce knowledge available in order to examine the economic, social, and institutional determinants of local government transparency in Spain. We draw on a 2010 survey and the transparency indexes constructed by the NGO Transparency International (Spain) in order to move beyond the fiscal transparency addressed in previous work. In so doing, we broaden the analysis of transparency to the corporate, social, fiscal, contracting, and planning activities of governments. Our results on overall transparency indicate that large municipalities and left-wing local government leaders are associated with better transparency indexes; while the worst results are presented by provincial capitals, cities where tourist activity is particularly important and local governments that enjoy an absolute majority. The analysis of other transparency categories generally shows the consistent impact of these determinants and the need to consider a wider set of variables to capture their effect.

Fiscal sustainability across government tiers

This paper analyses how fiscal adjustment comes about when both central and sub-national governments are involved in consolidation. We test sustainability of public debt with a fiscal rule for both the federal and regional government. Results for the German Länder show that lower tier governments bear a relatively smaller part of the burden of debt consolidation, if they consolidate at all. Most of the fiscal adjustment occurs via central government debt. In contrast, both the US federal and state levels contribute to consolidation of public finances.

Cultural self-identification(s) and personal social networks among first and second-generation immigrants

L’estudi examina les relacions entre (1) les xarxes socials personals de la població immigrant resident a Barcelona i (2) les seves identitats culturals múltiples. L’objectiu principal de l’estudi és entendre com el contingut i l’estructura de les relacions socials dels immigrants facilita o dificulta (1) tenir un sentiment de pertinença a les noves cultures d’acollida, la catalana i la espanyola, i (2) la integració d’aquestes noves identitats socioculturals amb la seva identitat d’origen en una nova identitat bicultural cohesiva. El nostre plantejament inicial era que els immigrants amb xarxes socials més diverses des del punt de vista de la seva composició cultural tindrien més recursos socials i experiències cognitives més diverses , factors que afavoreixen les identificacions múltiples i la participació cívica. Els resultats de l’estudi mostren que el grau d’identificació dels participants amb la seva cultura ètnica o d’origen és força alt i, en certa mesura, més alt en comparació amb les cultures d’acollida ( catalana, cívica i espanyola). Tanmateix, el vincle dels participants amb les cultures d’acollida (p. ex., la cultura catalana) és prou rellevant per a indicar una orientació bicultural (catalana i ètnica). Les anàlisis de correlacions revelen que sentir-se català no impedeix sentir-se part de la comunitat etnocultural d’origen. A més, existeix una interrelació entre l'orientació cultural catalana i la identificació amb les comunitats cíviques locals. De la mateixa manera, tenir competències en llengua catalana no va en detriment de les competències en llengua castellana. Les anàlisis també mostren que factors com l’orientació cultural catalana, l’ús del català i la identificació amb la cultura catalana tenen una correlació positiva amb el grau de chohesio de la indentitat bicultural, afavoreixen el benestar psicològic i disminueixen l’estrès aculturatiu. L’anàlisi de les xarxes socials mostra que la identificació amb la cultura catalana, l’orientació cultural catalana i la integració de la identitat són factors clau per tenir xarxes socials més diverses des del punt de vista ètnic i lingüístic, amb menys membres del col•lectiu d’origen, i amb subgrups o “cliques” culturalment més heterogenis. La identificació espanyola també prediu, en mesura més reduïda, la diversitat de les xarxes. Els nostres resultats contribueixen a la recerca actual i les teories sobre interculturalitat i identitat cultural.

Government Spending and Re-election

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent political parties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our research design exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around several population cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We find that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a 20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentage points in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. We also find positive effects of the government spending on education outcomes and earnings, which we interpret as indirect evidence of public service improvements. Together, our results provide evidence that electoral rewards encourage incumbents to spend part of additional revenues on public services valued by voters, a finding in line with agency models of electoral accountability.

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Does direct democracy reduce the size of government? New evidence from historical data, 1890-2000

Using historical data for all Swiss cantons from 1890 to 2000, we estimate the causal effect of direct democracy on government spending. The main innovation in this paper is that we use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity of institutions. We find that the budget referendum and lower costs to launch a voter initiative are effective tools in reducing canton level spending. However, we find no evidence that the budget referendum results in more decentralized government or a larger local government. Our instrumental variable estimates suggest that a mandatory budget referendum reduces the size of canton spending between 13 and 19 percent. A 1 percent lower signature requirement for the initiative reduces canton spending by up to 2 percent.

Fiscal decentralization policies and sub-national government debt in evolving federations

As part of a process of democratization, many countries spanning Europe, Latin Amertica, Africa, and Asia are reorganizing their governments bydevolving fiscal responsibility and authority to newly empowered regionaland local governments. Although decentralization in each country proceedsdifferently, a common element tends to be an initially heavy relianceon central government grants to fund regional spending. We develop atheoretical model of regional borrowing decisions in which the incentivesfor regional borrowing depend crucially on how the regions expect thefederal system of finance to evolve. We examine the implications of themodel using data on Spanish regions for the period 1984-1995 and findevidence that regions may be borrowing inefficiently in response toincentives imbedded in the Spanish system of fiscal decentralization.