Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetarypolicy in a general equilibrium model of securities marketsand banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing theaggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.

Relationship and transaction lending in a crisis

We study how relationship lending and transaction lending varyover the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationshipbanks gather information on their borrowers, which allows them toprovide loans for profitable firms during a crisis. Due to the servicesthey provide, operating costs of relationship-banks are higher thanthose of transaction-banks. In our model, where relationship-bankscompete with transaction-banks, a key result is that relationship-banks charge a higher intermediation spread in normal times, butoffer continuation-lending at more favorable terms than transactionbanks to profitable firms in a crisis. Using detailed credit registerinformation for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers'default, we are able to study how relationship and transaction-banksresponded to the crisis and we test existing theories of relationshipbanking. Our empirical analysis confirms the basic prediction of themodel that relationship banks charged a higher spread before the crisis, offered more favorable continuation-lending terms in response tothe crisis, and suffered fewer defaults, thus confirming the informational advantage of relationship banking.

The Effect of relationship lending on firm performance

We examine how relationship lending affects firm performance using a panel dataset of about 70,000 small and medium Spanish firms in the period 1993-2004. We model firm performance jointly with the firm's choice of the number of bank relationships. Controlling for firm fixed effects and using instrumental variables for the decision on the number of bank relationships, we find that firms maintaining exclusive bank relationships have lower profitability. The result is consistent with the view that banks appropriate most of the value generated through close relationships with its borrowers as long as they do not face competition from other lenders.

Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

Is there Descriminatory Mortgage Pricing against Immigrants in the Spanish Lending Market?

In this paper, we investigate whether evidence of discriminatory treatment against immigrants in the Spanish mortgage market exists. More specifically, we test whether, ceteris paribus, immigrant borrowers tend to be charged with higher interest rates on their mortgages than their Spanish born counterparts. To do so, we use a unique dataset on granted mortgages that contains information not only regarding the conditions of the loan but also the socio-economic characteristics of the mortgagors. We observe that immigrants are systematically charged with higher interest rates. We apply the well known Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to measure the extent to which this disparate treatment of lenders in mortgage pricing against immigrants is due to discrimination. Our results indicate that approximately two thirds of the gap in the interest rate between Spanish born and immigrant borrowers can be attributed to discriminatory treatment. Key words: Immigration, discrimination, mortgage pricing, housing market. JEL codes: R21, G21, J14

Applications of stochastic analysis in finance and statistical inference

First: A continuous-time version of Kyle's model (Kyle 1985), known as the Back's model (Back 1992), of asset pricing with asymmetric information, is studied. A larger class of price processes and of noise traders' processes are studied. The price process, as in Kyle's model, is allowed to depend on the path of the market order. The process of the noise traders' is an inhomogeneous Lévy process. Solutions are found by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. With the insider being risk-neutral, the price pressure is constant, and there is no equilibirium in the presence of jumps. If the insider is risk-averse, there is no equilibirium in the presence of either jumps or drifts. Also, it is analised when the release time is unknown. A general relation is established between the problem of finding an equilibrium and of enlargement of filtrations. Random announcement time is random is also considered. In such a case the market is not fully efficient and there exists equilibrium if the sensitivity of prices with respect to the global demand is time decreasing according with the distribution of the random time. Second: Power variations. it is considered, the asymptotic behavior of the power variation of processes of the form _integral_0^t u(s-)dS(s), where S_ is an alpha-stable process with index of stability 0&alpha&2 and the integral is an Itô integral. Stable convergence of corresponding fluctuations is established. These results provide statistical tools to infer the process u from discrete observations. Third: A bond market is studied where short rates r(t) evolve as an integral of g(t-s)sigma(s) with respect to W(ds), where g and sigma are deterministic and W is the stochastic Wiener measure. Processes of this type are particular cases of ambit processes. These processes are in general not of the semimartingale kind.

Prime Property Institutions for a Subprime Era: Exploring Innovative Models of Residential Development and Finance

This paper breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and in other types of public financing schemes, this paper suggests extending institutional and financial strategies such as timeand place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Alongside a for-profit shared equity scheme that would be led by local governments, we also outline a private market shared equity model, one of bootstrapping home buying with purchase options.

Institutions, Public Debt and Foreign Finance

We study the role of domestic financial institutions in sustaining capital flows to the private and public sector of a country whose government can default on its debt. As in recent public debt crises, in our model public defaults weaken banks' balance sheets, disrupting domestic financial markets. This effect leads to a novel complementarity between private capital inflows and public borrowing, where the former sustain the latter by boosting the government's cost of default. Our key message is that, by shaping the direction of private capital flows, financial institutions determine whether financial integration improves or reduces government discipline. We explore the implications of this complementarity for financial liberalization and debt-financed bailouts of banks. We present some evidence consistent with complementarity.

Adjustment to Target Capital, Finance, and Growth

Does financial development result in capital being reallocated more rapidly to industries where it is most productive? We argue that if this was the case, financially developed countries should see faster growth in industries with investment opportunities due to global demand and productivity shifts. Testing this cross-industry cross-country growth implication requires proxies for (latent) global industry investment opportunities. We show that tests relying only on data from specific (benchmark) countries may yield spurious evidence for or against the hypothesis. We therefore develop an alternative approach that combines benchmark-country proxies with a proxy that does not reflect opportunities specific to a country or level of financial development. Our empirical results yield clear support for the capital reallocation hypothesis.

Interbank market integration under asymmetric information

We argue that the main barrier to an integrated international interbankmarket is the existence of asymmetric information between differentcountries, which may prevail in spite of monetary integration or successfulcurrency pegging. In order to address this issue, we study the scope forinternational interbank market integration with unsecured lending whencross-country information is noisy. We find not only that an equilibriumwith integrated markets need not always exist, but also that when it does,the integrated equilibrium may coexist with one of interbank marketsegmentation. Therefore, market deregulation, per se, does not guaranteethe emergence of an integrated interbank market. The effect of a repo marketwhich, a priori, was supposed to improve efficiency happens to be morecomplex: it reduces interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentationequilibrium, but\ it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium, sincethe repo market will attract the best borrowers. The introduction of othertransnational institutional arrangements, such as multinational banking,correspondent banking and the existence of "too-big-to-fail" banks mayreduce cross country interest spreads and provide more insurance againstcountry wide liquidity shocks. Still, multinational banking, as theintroduction of repos, may threaten the integrated interbank marketequilibrium.

A model of shadow banking

We present a model of shadow banking in which financial intermediaries originate and trade loans, assemble these loans into diversified portfolios, and then finance these portfolios externally with riskless debt. In this model: i) outside investor wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, ii) intermediary assets and leverage move together as in Adrian and Shin (2010), and iii) intermediaries increase their exposure to systematic risk as they reduce their idiosyncratic risk through diversification, as in Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2010). Under rational expectations, the shadow banking system is stable and improves welfare. When investors and intermediaries neglect tail risks, however, the expansion of risky lending and the concentration of risks in the intermediaries create financial fragility and fluctuations in liquidity over time.

Malliavin calculus in finance

This article is an introduction to Malliavin Calculus for practitioners.We treat one specific application to the calculation of greeks in Finance.We consider also the kernel density method to compute greeks and anextension of the Vega index called the local vega index.

A dilution cost approach to financial intermediation and securities markets

This paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance,with asymmetric information and no taxes, where equity issues, Bankdebt and Bond financing may all co-exist in equilibrium. The paperemphasizes the relationship Banking aspect of financial intermediation:firms turn to banks as a source of investment mainly because banks aregood at helping them through times of financial distress. The debtrestructuring service that banks may offer, however, is costly. Therefore,the firms which do not expect to be financially distressed prefer toobtain a cheaper market source of funding through bond or equity issues.This explains why bank lending and bond financing may co-exist inequilibrium. The reason why firms or banks also issue equity in our modelis simply to avoid bankruptcy. Banks have the additional motive that theyneed to satisfy minimum capital adequacy requeriments. Several types ofequilibria are possible, one of which has all the main characteristics ofa "credit crunch". This multiplicity implies that the channels of monetarypolicy may depend on the type of equilibrium that prevails, leadingsometimes to support a "credit view" and other times the classical "moneyview".

Trade credit: Suppliers as debt collectors and insurance providers

There are two fundamental puzzles about trade credit: why does it appearto be so expensive,and why do input suppliers engage in the business oflending money? This paper addresses and answers both questions analysingthe interaction between the financial and the industrial aspects of thesupplier-customer relationship. It examines how, in a context of limitedenforceability of contracts, suppliers may have a comparative advantageover banks in lending to their customers because they hold the extrathreat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods. Suppliers may alsoact as lenders of last resort, providing insurance against liquidityshocks that may endanger the survival of their customers. The relativelyhigh implicit interest rates of trade credit result from the existenceof default and insurance premia. The implications of the model areexamined empirically using parametric and nonparametric techniques on apanel of UK firms.