90 resultados para Land value taxation.
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
Resumo:
The objective of this paper is to estimate a petrol consumption function for Spain and to evaluate the redistributive effects of petrol taxation. We use micro data from the Spanish Household Budget Survey of 1990/91 and model petrol consumption taking into account the effect that income changes may have on car ownership levels, as well as the differences that exist between expenditure and consumption. Our results show the importance that household structure, place of residence and income have on petrol consumption. We are able to compute income elasticities of petrol expenditure, both conditional and unconditional on the level of car ownership. Non-conditional elasticities, while always very close to unit values, are lower for higher income households and for those living in rural areas or small cities. When car ownership levels are taken into account, conditional elasticities are obtained that are around one half the value of the non- conditional ones, being fairly stable across income categories and city sizes. As regards the redistributive effects of petrol taxation, we observe that for the lowest income deciles the share of petrol expenditure increases with income, and thus the tax can be regarded as progressive. However, after a certain income level the tax proves to be regressive.
Resumo:
In this note we quantify to what extent indirect taxation influences and distorts prices. To do so we use the networked accounting structure of the most recent input-output table of Catalonia, an autonomous region of Spain, to model price formation. The role of indirect taxation is considered both from a classical value perspective and a more neoclassical flavoured one. We show that they would yield equivalent results under some basic premises. The neoclassical perspective, however, offers a bit more flexibility to distinguish among different tax figures and hence provide a clearer disaggregate picture of how an indirect tax ends up affecting, and by how much, the cost structure.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the choice of the socially optimal titling systemassuming rational individual choices about recording, assurance andregistration decisions. It focuses on the enforcement of propertyrights on land under private titling and the two existing publictitling systems, recording and registration. When the reduction in theexpected costs of eviction compensates the higher cost of initialregistration, it is more efficient to introduce a registration systemrather than a recording system. The development of private "titleassurance" improves the standing of recording as compared toregistration. This improvement depends, however, on the efficiency ofthe assurance technology and, also, on corrective taxation that isneeded to align individual optimization, which disregards the transferelement in eviction, with social objectives.
Resumo:
In this paper we try to analyze the role of fiscal policy in fostering a higher participation of the different production factors in the human capital production sector in the long-run. Introducing a tax on physical capital and differentiating both a tax on raw labor wage and a tax on skills or human capital we also attempt to present a way to influence inequality as measured by the skill premium, thus trying to relate the increase in human capital with the decrease in income inequality. We will do that in the context of a non-scale growth model.The model here is capable to alter the shares of private factors devoted to each of the two production sectors, final output and human capital, and affect inequality in a different way according to the different tax changes. The simulation results derived in the paper show how a human capital (skills) tax cut, which could be interpreted as a reduction in progressivity, ends up increasing both the shares of labor and physical capital devoted to the production of knowledge and decreasing inequality. Moreover, a raw labor wage tax decrease, which could also be interpreted as an increase in the progressivity of the system, increases the share of labor devoted to the production of final output and increases inequality. Finally, a physical capital tax decrease reduces the share of physical capital devoted to the production of knowledge and allows for a lower inequality value. Nevertheless, none of the various types of taxes ends up changing the share of human capital in the knowledge production, which will deserve our future attention
Resumo:
In this paper we try to analyze the role of fiscal policy in fostering a higher participation of the different production factors in the human capital production sector in the long-run. Introducing a tax on physical capital and differentiating both a tax on raw labor wage and a tax on skills or human capital we also attempt to present a way to influence inequality as measured by the skill premium, thus trying to relate the increase in human capital with the decrease in income inequality. We will do that in the context of a non-scale growth model.The model here is capable to alter the shares of private factors devoted to each of the two production sectors, final output and human capital, and affect inequality in a different way according to the different tax changes. The simulation results derived in the paper show how a human capital (skills) tax cut, which could be interpreted as a reduction in progressivity, ends up increasing both the shares of labor and physical capital devoted to the production of knowledge and decreasing inequality. Moreover, a raw labor wage tax decrease, which could also be interpreted as an increase in the progressivity of the system, increases the share of labor devoted to the production of final output and increases inequality. Finally, a physical capital tax decrease reduces the share of physical capital devoted to the production of knowledge and allows for a lower inequality value. Nevertheless, none of the various types of taxes ends up changing the share of human capital in the knowledge production, which will deserve our future attention
Resumo:
Cultivation of black truffle, Tuber melanosporum Vitt., has become an important agricultural alternative in rural Mediterranean regions due to its success in relatively harsh conditions, its high market value and diminishing production in natural areas. In addition, truffle cultivation requires relatively low agricultural inputs, promotes reforestation and economic restoration of rural lands and land-use stability. However, there remain major issues regarding the management practices to ensure successful black truffle production. We therefore conducted an experiment to evaluate 3 levels of irrigation based on monthly water deficit and the effects of currently applied weed control systems and fertilization. Treatment effects were evaluated by examining the mycorrhizal status of out-planted 1-yr-old Quercus ilex L. seedlings and seedling growth parameters after 18 months in 3 distinct experimental truffle plantations located in the foothills of the Spanish Pyrenees. We found that replacing one-half of the water deficit of the driest month (moderate irrigation) promoted the proliferation of T. melanosporum mycorrhizae, while high irrigation reduced fine root production and truffle mycorrhizae. Glyphosate weed control improved seedling survival by up to 16% over control seedlings without jeopardizing truffle mycorrhizae in the first year. Fertilization did not improve seedling growth or influence its mycorrhizal status. We describe the persistent relationship between this ectomycorrhizal fungus and Q. ilex by quantifying old and new mycorrhizae and we discuss the ecological implications of the symbiosis.
Resumo:
Does shareholder value orientation lead to shareholder value creation? This article proposes methods to quantify both, shareholder value orientation and shareholder value creation. Through the application of these models it is possible to quantify both dimensions and examine statistically in how far shareholder value orientation explains shareholder value creation. The scoring model developed in this paper allows quantifying the orientation of managers towards the objective to maximize wealth of shareholders. The method evaluates information that comes from the companies and scores the value orientation in a scale from 0 to 10 points. Analytically the variable value orientation is operationalized expressing it as the general attitude of managers toward the objective of value creation, investment policy and behavior, flexibility and further eight value drivers. The value creation model works with market data such as stock prices and dividend payments. Both methods where applied to a sample of 38 blue chip companies: 32 firms belonged to the share index IBEX 35 on July 1st, 1999, one company represents the “new economy” listed in the Spanish New Market as per July 1st, 2001, and 5 European multinational groups formed part of the EuroStoxx 50 index also on July 1st, 2001. The research period comprised the financial years 1998, 1999, and 2000. A regression analysis showed that between 15.9% and 23.4% of shareholder value creation can be explained by shareholder value orientation.
Resumo:
We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.
Resumo:
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.
Resumo:
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix of concessions ``measuring'' the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone in an agent's initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.
Resumo:
We present a model in which an individual's sentiments towards others are determined endogenously on the basis of how they perform relative to the societal average. This, in turn, affects the individual's own behavior and hence other agents' sentiments toward her. We focus on stationary patterns of utility interdependence. To demonstrate the effects of such endogeneity, we consider an example of a production economy with redistributive taxation. There are two types of stationary equilibria: one in which all agents conform to the societal norm, into two or three groups. The main conclusion is that the tax structure, in that it affects behavior which in turn affects sentiments, plays a crucial role in determining which type of equilibrium occurs and its characteristics as well as the extent of altruism and social cohesion in society.
Resumo:
The goal of this paper is to develop a model of financial intermediation analyze the impact of various forms of taxation. The model considers in a unified framework various functions of banks: monitoring, transaction services and asset transformation. Particular attention is devoted to conditions for separability between deposits and loans. The analysis focuses on: (i) competition between banks and alternative financial arrangements (investment funds and organized security markets), (ii) regulation, and (iii) bank's monopoly power and risk taking behavior.
Resumo:
We analyze the dynamic behavior and the welfare properties of the equilibrium path of a growth model where both habits and consumption externalities affect the utility of consumers. We discuss the effects of flat rate income taxes and characterize the optimal income taxation policy. We show that, when consumption externalities and habit adjusted consumption are not perfect substitutes, a counter-cyclical income tax rate allows the competitive equilibrium to replicate the efficient path. Our analysis highlights the crucial role played by complementarities between externalities and habits in order to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium.