Investigating independent language learning in classroom-based EFL Learners

La recerca efectuada sobre les estratègies d’aprenentatge de llengües ha demostrat que els aprenents que utilitzen estratègies metacognitives (planificació, revisió i avaluació) desenvolupen estratègies cognitives més eficaces (Anderson, 2002). Aquest article descriu les activitats que 43 estudiants de llengua estrangera de la Universitat de Vic van emprendre de forma independent i dedueix les estratègies metacognitives que van utilitzar sense cap formació prèvia en estratègies. Els estudiants van completar un dossier on expressaven les necessitats d’aprenentatge, la planificació i supervisió de les activitats i finalment l’avaluació de l’aprenentatge que havien portat a terme de manera independent fora de les hores lectives. La primera fase de l’anàlisi de les dades revela que, tot i que els estudiants foren capaços d’expressar les necessitats d’aprenentatge en general, la formulació d’objectius i la supervisió de les activitats fou escassa. La discussió gira entorn de la formació dels estudiants de llengües estrangeres en estratègies metacognitives i la integració de l’aprenentatge autònom dins el currículum docent.

The Determinants of Entry are not Independent of Start-up Size: Some evidence from Spanish manufacturing

In this paper we explore the determinants of firm start-up size of Spanish manufacturing industries. The industries' barriers to entry affect the ability of potential entrants to enter the markets and the size range at which they decide to enter. In order to examine the relationships between barriers to entry and size we applied the quantile regression techniques. Our results indicate that the variables that characterize the structure of the market, the variables that are related to the behaviour of the incumbent firms and the rate of growth of the industries generate different barriers depending on the initial size of the entrants. Keywords: Entry, regression quantiles, start-up size. JEL classification: L110, L600

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

Contractive probability metrics and asymptotic behavior of dissipative kinetic equations

The present notes are intended to present a detailed review of the existing results in dissipative kinetic theory which make use of the contraction properties of two main families of probability metrics: optimal mass transport and Fourier-based metrics. The first part of the notes is devoted to a self-consistent summary and presentation of the properties of both probability metrics, including new aspects on the relationships between them and other metrics of wide use in probability theory. These results are of independent interest with potential use in other contexts in Partial Differential Equations and Probability Theory. The second part of the notes makes a different presentation of the asymptotic behavior of Inelastic Maxwell Models than the one presented in the literature and it shows a new example of application: particle's bath heating. We show how starting from the contraction properties in probability metrics, one can deduce the existence, uniqueness and asymptotic stability in classical spaces. A global strategy with this aim is set up and applied in two dissipative models.

Why the EU does not Have an Independent Competition Agency: French Interests and Transaction Costs in Early European Integration

A major achievement of new institutionalism in economics and political science is the formalisation of the idea that certain policies are more efficient when administered by a politically independent organisation. Based on this insight, several policy actors and scholars criticise the European Community for relying too much on a multi-task, collegial, and politicised organisation, the European Commission. This raises important questions, some constitutional (who should be able to change the corresponding procedural rules?) and some political-economic (is Europe truly committed to free and competitive markets?). Though acknowledging the relevance of legal and normative arguments, this paper contributes to the debate with a positive political-scientific perspective. Based on the view that institutional equilibria raise the question of equilibrium institutions, it shows that collegiality was (a) an equilibrium institution during the Paris negotiations of 1950-51; and (b) an institutional equilibrium for the following 50 years. The conclusion points to some recent changes in the way that European competition policy is implemented, and discusses how these affect the “constitutional” principle of collegial European governance.

Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the

Glocalization as a generic entrepreneurial strategy

Nobody would deny that we today live in a globalized world. Our digitalized living daily revises our worldwide mindmaps. Thanks to free trade and travel our material and social worlds have become global as well. This radical sociocultural change has since the last decade been preached all over the world with public institutions and business-interest organizations as megaphones. Since those carrying the globalization message mainly represent nations or super-nations such as the EU, the viewpoints of lower-level actors such as regions, localities, firms and individual citizens have seldom been considered. Paternalistically (super-)national bodies have instructured its subjects, not the least the many small firms that populate the (private) economy, what action to take. The basic message is: submit to the global forces – local is not beautiful any longer.

On Strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness

We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.

Strategy-proof social choice

This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2, Edited by K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura

Aprender investigando. Una experiencia formativa en el ámbito de la enfermería = Research teaching processes used as a methodological strategy in the education of healthcare professionals

Este trabajo tiene como propósito presentar y valorar, desde la perspectiva del alumnado participante, un proyecto de investigación-formación puesto en marcha durante el curso 2003-2004 en la elaboración del trabajo de tesina, fin de carrera, en la Escuela de Enfermería de Vitoria, dentro del programa de Licenciatura Europea de Enfermería. Constituye el punto de partida de un proyecto a largo plazo, iniciado con la intención de desarrollar principios teóricos y procedimientos prácticos que nos permitan sistematizar procesos formativos que, centrados en la investigación, articulen la teoría y la práctica e integren una perspectiva comunicativa y cooperativa.

Lessons of peace in Aceh: administrative decentralization and political freedom as a strategy of pacification in Aceh

This working paper shows the evolution of the Aceh conflict until its peaceful resolution in 2005. The key factors in the success of this peace process have been the confluence of several factors related to the internal and external dynamics of the country, including the new political leadership, the decreasing role of the military power, the international support and the meeting of the objectives of both groups, and so on. The end of the conflict in Aceh shows that the administrative decentralization and the promotion of the political participation of the main actors involved have made possible the development of a solid alternative to the arms strategy of conflict resolution used for years in Indonesia.

Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results

We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of them and whose ranges consist of two alternatives, in terms of two types of basic properties.

Innovation or Imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms' R&D strategy choice

This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a firm's optimal R&D strategy choice. In this paper a firm's R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firms. characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. In the theoretical model this yields three types of equilibria in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms'equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. These results are supported by empirical evidence for German .rms from manufacturing and services sectors. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C35, D43, L13, L22, O31. Keywords: Innovation; imitation; spillovers; product differentiation; market competition; intellectual property rights protection.

Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?

A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of definition. For the same reason, different conditions may be equivalent for functions defined on some domains, while different in other cases. Understanding the role of domains is therefore a crucial issue in mechanism design. We illustrate this point by analyzing the role of different conditions that are always related, but not always equivalent to strategy-proofness. We define two very natural conditions that are necessary for strategy-proofness: monotonicity and reshuffling invariance. We remark that they are not always sufficient. Then, we identify a domain condition, called intertwinedness, that ensures the equivalence between our two conditions and that of strategy-proofness. We prove that some important domains are intertwined: those of single-peaked preferences, both with public and private goods, and also those arising in simple models of house allocation. We prove that other necessary conditions for strategy-proofness also become equivalent to ours when applied to functions defined on intertwined domains, even if they are not equivalent in general. We also study the relationship between our domain restrictions and others that appear in the literature, proving that we are indeed introducing a novel proposal.