Valuation of defaultable bonds and debt restructuring

In this paper we develop a contingent valuation model for zero-coupon bonds with default. In order to emphasize the role of maturity time and place of the lender’s claim in the hierarchy of debt of a firm, we consider a firm that issues two bonds with different maturities and different seniorage. The model allows us to analyze the implications of both debt renegotiation and capital structure of a firm on the prices of bonds. We obtain that renegotiation brings about a significant change in the bond prices and that the effect is dispersed through different channels: increasing the value of the firm, reallocating payments, and avoiding costly liquidation. Moreover, the presence of two creditors leads to qualitatively different implications for pricing, while emphasizing the importance of bond covenants and renegotiation of the entire debt.

On the asymptotic expansion of the colored Jones polynomial for torus knots

In the asymptotic expansion of the hyperbolic specification of the colored Jones polynomial of torus knots, we identify different geometric contributions, in particular Chern-Simons invariant and Reidemeister torsion.

Emulador del Microcontrolador : Texas Instruments MSP430

Implementació d'un emulador del microcontrolador MSP430 de Texas Instruments. S'implementa l'emulació no només de la CPU, sinó també d'una part dels mòduls i els perifèrics integrats en el microcontrolador.

Insuring California earthquakes and the role for catastrophe bonds

The 1994 Northridge earthquake sent ripples to insurance conpanieseverywhere. This was one in a series of natural disasters such asHurricane Andrew which together with the problems in Lloyd's of Londonhave insurance companies running for cover. This paper presents a calibration of the U.S. economy in a model with financial markets forinsurance derivatives that suggests the U.S. economy can deal with thedamage of natural catastrophe far better than one might think.

Banks, government bonds, and default: what do the data say?

We use data from Bankscope to analyze the holdings of public bonds by over 18,000 banks located in 185 countries and the role of these bonds in 18 sovereign debt crises over the period 1998-2012. We find that: (i) banks hold a sizeable share of their assets in government bonds (about 9% on average), particularly in less financially developed countries; (ii) during sovereign crises, banks on average increase their bondholdings by 1% of their assets, but this increase is concentrated among larger and more profitable banks, and; (iii) the correlation between a bank's holdings of public bonds and its future loans is positive in normal times, but turns negative during defaults. A 10% increase in bank bond-holdings during default is associated with a 3.2% reduction in future loans, and bonds bought in normal times account for 75% of this effect. Our results are consistent with the view that there is a liquidity benefit for banks to hold public bonds in normal times, which is critical for understanding bank fragility during sovereign crises.