Joint Ventures en China

El present Treball de Fi de Carrera tracta dur a terme un estudi sobre els projectes de col.laboració inter-empresarial. Fruit d'aquest fenomen de diversificació d'àmbit societari, sorgeix la joint venture com un sistema d'internacionalització en el món empresarial. Per analitzar les peculiaritats d'aquesta figura contractual ens centrarem en l'anàlisi de la seva implantació i desenvolupament al país del drac que desperta, investigant sobre les repercussions des del prisma de la ciència jurídica en la convergència de Dret Societari Internacional i dels contractes. Així mateix, es farà referència als aspectes econòmics, i polítics presents a la Xina, així com de l'objecte i de l'existència i transcendència de la joint venture per a l'economia internacional.

Domestic and International Research Joint Ventures: The Effect of Collusion

We analyze the effect of research joint ventures (RJVs) on consumer welfare in an international context when collusion can occur. The main novelty of our analysis is to study the differentiated effect of domestic and international RJVs. The recent literature shows that RJVs with collusion harm consumers. However, our results introduce a qualifi cation to this statement: international RJVs with collusion might be bene ficial for consumers when internationalization costs are high. The EU and US competition policy advises against RJVs that facilitate collusion on the grounds of their expected negative effects. Our results suggest that antitrust authorities should distinguish between domestic and international RJVs and, in certain cases, be more benevolent with international RJVs. Keywords: collusion; domestic research joint venture; international research joint venture JEL Classi fication Numbers: K21, L24, L44, O32

Research joint ventures in an international economy

D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to studyalternative configurations of research agreements in a two--country integratedworld economy. Under unambiguous conditions on spillovers we show that:1) Allowing national firms to cooperate in R\&D confers them an advantageover foreign rivals, an effect similar to R\&D subsidies. 2) In a policygame, each government would allow national cooperative agreements. 3) Contraryto other trade policies which lead to a ``prisoners' dilemma'' result,welfare in both countries increases when they both allow R\&D cooperation.4) Welfare is even higher if a generalized (international) coalition isformed.

Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information

When to allow Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) or not is an importantinstrument in the development of an optimal R&D policy. Theregulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant informationto regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there existappropriability problems between the firms is one such variable thatis private information to the firms in the industry. In a duopolysetting we analyze the characteristics of a second-best R&D policywhere the government can either allow RJVs or not and give lump-sumsubsidies to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy withoutsubsidies will either block some welfare improving RJVs or allow somewelfare reducing ones. With lump-sum subsidies, the second-best policytrades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasingRJVs or blocking welfare increasing ones.

The Cost of ownership in the governance of interfirm collaborations

This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.

La Imatge fidel de les unions temporals d'empreses UTE

En l’article es fa una revisió actual de les unions temporals d’empreses (UTE), per tal de veure si la informació comptable que presenten és fidedigne. En primer lloc, es defineix la unió temporal d’empreses, i es detalla l’origen històric, les característiques i els objectius de l’UTE. Seguidament es presenta la regulació comptable i fiscal que afecta a les UTE, i es detalla el que pauta l’adaptació del Pla general comptable de les empreses constructores en relació amb les UTE i la problemàtica derivada de les operacions en empreses d’aquest sector que tantes UTE realitzen. També es ressalta en l’article la responsabilitat de l’UTE i les Normes comptables internacionals relacionades amb les UTE. Finalment es presenten els resultats d’una anàlisi d’estats financers de trenta empreses constructores que habitualment realitzen UTE, per comprovar el seguiment que fan de l’adaptació sectorial del Pla general comptable de les empreses constructores i la informació que donen de les UTE. L’última part de l’article fa referència a les conclusions, i és en aquesta part on s’apunta que la informació comptable de les UTE ha de millorar notablement, ja que actualment és una informació poc transparent, insuficient i dispersa.

China y la globalización del mercado automovilístico : efectos sobre las empresas catalanas de componentes

Estudi centrat en el sector de components d'algunes empreses catalanes que tendeixen a buscar inversions en els països asiàtics com a mesura d'adaptació al nou ordre, mitjançant la seva unió amb empreses locals del país destinació conegudes com joint-ventures.

The organization of research corporations and researcher ability

This paper analyzes the formation of Research Corporations as an alternative governance structure for performing R&D compared to pursuing in-house R&D projects. Research Corporations are privatefor-profit research centers that bring together several firms with similar research goals. In a Research Corporation formal authority over the choice of projects is jointly exercised by the top management of the member firms. A private for-profit organization cannot commit not to interfere with the project choice of the researchers. However, increasing the number of member firms of the Research Corporation reduces the incentive of member firms to meddle with the research projects of researchers because exercising formal authority over the choice of research projects is a public good. The Research Corporation thus offers researchers greater autonomy than a single firm pursuing an identical research program in its in-house R&D department. This attracts higher ability researchers to the Research Corporation compared to the internal R&D department. The paper uses the theoretical model to analyze the organization of the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC). The facts of this case confirm the existence of a tension between control over the choice of research projects and the ability of researchers that the organization is able to attract or hold onto.

Influence activity and the organization of research and development

The organizational design of research and development conditions theincentives of the researchers of the research project. In particular,the organizational form determines the allocation of effort of theresearcher between time spent on research and time spent lobbying management. Researchers prefer to spend their time on research. However,the researchers only get utility from performing research if theproject is approved for its full duration. Spending time lobbyingmanagement for the continuation of the researcher s project increasesthe probability that the management observes a favorable signal aboutthe project. Organizing a research joint venture increases theflexibility of the organizational form with respect to the continuationdecision. For low correlation between the signals of the partners aboutthe expected profitability of the project, we find that the organizationof a research joint venture reduces influence activity by the researchersand increases expected profits of the partners. For high correlationbetween the signals, internal research projects lower influence activityby the researchers. We try to relate the correlation of the partnerssignals to the characteristics of basic research versus more appliedresearch projects, and find that the model is consistent with theobservation that research joint ventures seem involved in more basicresearch projects compared to internal R&D departments, whichconcentrate on more applied research.

Strategic alliances. How to make them succeed

Mitjançant aquest treball hem analitzat com en aquest temps en què la internacionalització és un fet necessari i les empreses volen globalitzar, aquestes decideixen unir-se per tal d'aconseguir. Aquí analitzem els diferents tipus d'unió possible centrant-nos més específicament en les aliances estratègiques però veient també les adquisicions. Primer analitzem quan és més convenient aliar-se amb una empresa o adquirir-la. Això ho portarem a terme mitjançant el desenvolupament d'una sèrie d'elements a tenir en compte. Un cop vist això, analitzem els principals motius pels quals les empreses decideixen aliar-se, entre els quals destaquen l'obtenció de coneixement i recursos. A més analitzem les diferents variants d'aliança estratègica com són les llicències, franquícies, contractes de recerca i desenvolupament, Joint Ventures, etc. i quan és més convenient desenvolupar una o una altra. En aquest treball, ja que com veurem les aliances tendeixen a fracassar ja que les empreses no les implementen correctament o no dediquen el temps suficient a analitzar l'entorn i les condicions per veure quina estratègia li convé més a l'empresa, analitzarem els elements necessaris per fer-les funcionar i els factors claus d'èxit d'aquestes aliances com ara l'experiència, la reputació, la confiança, els objectius clars, el Know-how, la cultura ... A més en aquest treball analitzem el cas de l'aliança estratègica sorgida entre Disney i Pixar el 1991. Aquest anàlisi el duem a terme tenint en compte els factors que Dyer et. al. esmentà en el seu estudi. Aquest anàlisi el realitzem amb l'objectiu de conèixer si l'aliança realitzada per ambdues empreses va ser una estratègia encertada o si per contra deurien haver dut a terme una altra estratègia, la qual els hauria aportat més beneficis.

Choosing hybrid organizations for local services delivery : An empirical analysis of partial privatization

The empirical literature about factors explaining local government delivery choices has traditionally focused the attention on the public or private production dilemma. However, hybrid organizational forms such as mixed public-private firms are increasingly used in several European countries. This paper makes use of survey data from Spanish municipalities to examine motivations of local governments for engaging in hybrid organizational forms. Data refer to two very relevant local services: water distribution and solid waste collection. The empirical analysis indicates that the use of mixed firms emerge as a type of pragmatically based ‘third way’ between pure public and pure private production. Indeed, local governments make use of mixed firms when cost considerations (scale economies, transaction costs and soon), financial constraints and private interests exert contradictory pressures. On the contrary, political and ideological factors do not play any significant role on the local government decision of engaging or not in joint ventures with private partners.