It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)

This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties what can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multiparty systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.

Immigration policy with partisan parties

This paper analyzes the political economy of immigration when the salient electoralissue is the level of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditurein immigration control. We consider that immigration affects voters? welfarethrough economic and non economic factors. We model political competition `a laWittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. Atequilibrium, parties propose different levels of immigration, located to the left and tothe right of the median voter?s ideal point, and combine skilled and unskilled workersamong their constituencies. Numerical simulations provide the levels of immigrationproposed by the two parties and the composition of parties? constituencies as we varythe efficacy of immigration control and the intensity of immigration aversion.

Robustness of entanglement

In the quest to completely describe entanglement in the general case of a finite number of parties sharing a physical system of finite-dimensional Hilbert space an entanglement magnitude is introduced for its pure and mixed states: robustness. It corresponds to the minimal amount of mixing with locally prepared states which washes out all entanglement. It quantifies in a sense the endurance of entanglement against noise and jamming. Its properties are studied comprehensively. Analytical expressions for the robustness are given for pure states of two-party systems, and analytical bounds for mixed states of two-party systems. Specific results are obtained mainly for the qubit-qubit system (qubit denotes quantum bit). As by-products local pseudomixtures are generalized, a lower bound for the relative volume of separable states is deduced, and arguments for considering convexity a necessary condition of any entanglement measure are put forward.

The Catalan countries project (1931-1939)

In the evolution of Catalan nationalism, as much politician as cultural, the period of II Spanish Republic (1931-1939) was essential. The obtaining of the Statute of Autonomy (1931-1932) supposed the beginning of a stage of expansion in multiple aspects. One of them were the contacts with the Catalanists nuclei of the rest of the cultural space of Catalan language in which, at that time, it would begin to call Catalan Countries (Balearic Islands, Valencian Country, Andorra, Rosselló, to l'Alguer). On Those Collaborations between cultural organizations, political and particular parties Catalonia always will be the model to follow. The Increasing connections will be visualized on press, as well as on cultural celebrations, policy of parties and Constituent Courts. This evolution will be cut by the Franco victory in the Civil War in 1939.

Estudio e implementación de una autoridad de certificación distribuida

Aquest projecte presenta, en primer lloc, un estudi dels protocols de generació de claus criptogràfiques i autoritats de certificació distribuïdes més destacables desenvolupades fins a l'actualitat. Posteriorment, implementem un protocol, que toleri les errades, de generació distribuïda de claus RSA sense servidor de confiança, orientat a xarxes ad-hoc. El protocol necessita la participació conjunta de n nodes per generar un mòdul RSA (N = pq), un exponent d'encriptació públic i les particions de l'exponent privat d, seguint un esquema llindar (t, n).

Primaries the unifying force

We present a formal model of intra-party politics to explain candidate selection within parties. We think of parties as heterogeneous groups of individuals who aim to implement a set of policies but who differ in their priorities. When party heterogeneity is too large, parties are in danger of splitting into smaller yet more homogeneous groups. In this context we argue that primaries can have a unifying role if the party elite cannot commit to policy concessions. Our model shows how alignment in the preferred policies of various factions within a party, the relative weight of each of these factions and the electoral system interact to create incentives for the adoption of primary elections. We discuss the existing empirical literature in the light of our theoretical predictions to provide a new, structured perspective on the adoption of primary elections.

Political Competition in Hard Times

This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.

Policy Making in Divided Government. A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline.

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Policy making in divided government. A pivotal actors model with party discipline

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition

We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economicperformance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies,and shows the compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates. Together, these results give rise to the formation ofpolitical parties, as infinetely-lived agents with a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy positions. We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer satisfied.