Trials, tricks and transparency: how disclosure rules affect clinical knowledge

Scandals of selective reporting of clinical trial results by pharmaceutical firms have underlined the need for more transparency in clinical trials. We provide a theoretical framework which reproduces incentives for selective reporting and yields three key implications concerning regulation. First, a compulsory clinical trial registry complemented through a voluntary clinical trial results database can implement full transparency (the existence of all trials as well as their results is known). Second, full transparency comes at a price. It has a deterrence effect on the incentives to conduct clinical trials, as it reduces the firms'gains from trials. Third, in principle, a voluntary clinical trial results database without a compulsory registry is a superior regulatory tool; but we provide some qualified support for additional compulsory registries when medical decision-makers cannot anticipate correctly the drug companies' decisions whether to conduct trials. Keywords: pharmaceutical firms, strategic information transmission, clinical trials, registries, results databases, scientific knowledge JEL classification: D72, I18, L15

A note on Spatial Autocorrelation at a Local Level

In this paper we analyze the existence of spatial autocorrelation at a local level in Catalonia using variables such as urbanisation economies, population density, human capital and firm entries. From a static approach, our results show that spatial autocorrelation is weak and diminishes as the distance between municipalities increases. From a dynamic approach, however, spatial autocorrelation increased over the period we analysed. These results are important from a policy point of view, since it is essential to know how economic activities are spatially concentrated or disseminated. Key words: spatial autocorrelation, municipalities. JEL classification: R110, R120

The Determinants of Entry are not Independent of Start-up Size: Some evidence from Spanish manufacturing

In this paper we explore the determinants of firm start-up size of Spanish manufacturing industries. The industries' barriers to entry affect the ability of potential entrants to enter the markets and the size range at which they decide to enter. In order to examine the relationships between barriers to entry and size we applied the quantile regression techniques. Our results indicate that the variables that characterize the structure of the market, the variables that are related to the behaviour of the incumbent firms and the rate of growth of the industries generate different barriers depending on the initial size of the entrants. Keywords: Entry, regression quantiles, start-up size. JEL classification: L110, L600

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Firm Size and Short-Term Dynamics in Aggregate Entry and Exit

Much of the research on industry dynamics focuses on the interdependence between the sectorial rates of entry and exit. This paper argues that the size of firms and the reaction-adjustment period are important conditions missed in this literature. I illustrate the effects of this omission using data from the Spanish manufacturing industries between 1994 and 2001. Estimates from systems of equations models provide evidence of a conical revolving door phenomenon and of partial adjustments in the replacement-displacement of large firms. KEYWORDS: aggregation, industry dynamics, panel data, symmetry, simultaneity. JEL CLASSIFICATION: C33, C52, L60, L11

Economic impacts of alternative water policy scenarios in the Spanish production system: an input-output analysis

The objective of this paper is to analyse the economic impacts of alternative water policies implemented in the Spanish production system. The methodology uses two versions of the input-output price model: a competitive formulation and a mark-up formulation. The input-output framework evaluates the impact of water policy measures on production prices, consumption prices, intermediate water demand and private welfare. Our results show that a tax on the water used by sectors considerably reduces the intermediate water demand, and increases the production and consumption prices. On the other hand, according to Jevons' paradox, an improvement in technical efficiency, which leads to a reduction in the water requirements of all sectors and an increase in water production, increases the amount of water consumed. The combination of a tax on water and improved technical efficiency takes the pressure off prices and significantly reduces intermediate water demand. JEL Classification: C67 ; D57 ; Q25. Keywords: Production prices; Consumption prices; Water uses; Water policy; Water taxation.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

A Multisectorial model of prices: the SAM approach

Social Accounting Matrices (SAM) are normally used to analyse the income generation process. They are also useful, however, for analysing the cost transmission and price formation mechanisms. For price contributions, Roland-Holst and Sancho (1995) used the SAM structure to analyse the price and cost linkages through a representation of the interdependence between activities, households and factors. This paper is a further analysis of the cost transmission mechanisms, in which I add the capital account to the endogenous components of the Roland-Holst and Sancho approach. By doing this I reflect the responses of prices to the exogenous shocks in savings and investment. I also present an additive decomposition of the global price effects into categories of interdependence that isolates the impact on price levels of shocks in the capital account. I use a 1994 Social Accounting Matrix to make an empirical application of the Catalan economy. Keywords: social accounting matrix, cost linkages, price transmission, capital account. JEL Classification: C63, C69, D59.

Locations and Relocations:Modelling, Determinants, and Interrelations

Empirical studies on industrial location do not typically distinguish between new and relocated establishments. This paper addresses this shortcoming using data on the frequency of these events in municipalities of the same economic-administrative region. This enables us to test not only for differences in their determinants but also for interrelations between start-ups and relocations. Estimates from count regression models for cross-section and panel data show that, although partial effects differ, common patterns arise in “institutional” and “neoclassical” explanatory factors. Also, start-ups and relocations are positive but asymmetrically related. JEL classification: C25, R30, R10. Keywords: cities, count data models, industrial location

Business Cycle Regimes in CEECs Production: A Threshold SURE Approach

We use a threshold seemingly unrelated regressions specification to assess whether the Central and East European countries (CEECs) are synchronized in their business cycles to the Euro-area. This specification is useful in two ways: First, it takes into account the common institutional factors and the similarities across CEECs in their process of economic transition. Second, it captures business cycle asymmetries by allowing for the presence of two distinct regimes for the CEECs. As the CEECs are strongly affected by the Euro-area these regimes may be associated with Euro-area expansions and contractions. We discuss representation, estimation by maximum likelihood and inference. The methodology is illustrated by using monthly industrial production in 8 CEECs. The results show that apart from Lithuania the rest of the CEECs experience “normal” growth when the Euro-area contracts and “high” growth when the Euro-area expands. Given that the CEECs are “catching up” with the Euro-area this result shows that most CEECs seem synchronized to the Euro-area cycle. Keywords: Threshold SURE; asymmetry; business cycles; CEECs. JEL classification: C33; C50; E32.

A nonlinear threshold model for the dependence of extremes of stationary sequences

One of the main implications of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is that expected future returns on financial assets are not predictable if investors are risk neutral. In this paper we argue that financial time series offer more information than that this hypothesis seems to supply. In particular we postulate that runs of very large returns can be predictable for small time periods. In order to prove this we propose a TAR(3,1)-GARCH(1,1) model that is able to describe two different types of extreme events: a first type generated by large uncertainty regimes where runs of extremes are not predictable and a second type where extremes come from isolated dread/joy events. This model is new in the literature in nonlinear processes. Its novelty resides on two features of the model that make it different from previous TAR methodologies. The regimes are motivated by the occurrence of extreme values and the threshold variable is defined by the shock affecting the process in the preceding period. In this way this model is able to uncover dependence and clustering of extremes in high as well as in low volatility periods. This model is tested with data from General Motors stocks prices corresponding to two crises that had a substantial impact in financial markets worldwide; the Black Monday of October 1987 and September 11th, 2001. By analyzing the periods around these crises we find evidence of statistical significance of our model and thereby of predictability of extremes for September 11th but not for Black Monday. These findings support the hypotheses of a big negative event producing runs of negative returns in the first case, and of the burst of a worldwide stock market bubble in the second example. JEL classification: C12; C15; C22; C51 Keywords and Phrases: asymmetries, crises, extreme values, hypothesis testing, leverage effect, nonlinearities, threshold models

Market effects of foreign exchange coordinated intervention

In this article we develop a theoretical microstructure model of coordinated central bank intervention based on asymmetric information. We study the economic implications of coordination on some measures of market quality and show that the model predicts higher volatility and more significant exchange rate changes when central banks coordinate compared to when they intervene unilaterally. Both these predictions are in line with empirical evidence. Keywords: coordinated foreign exchange intervention, market microstructure. JEL Classification: D82, E58, F31, G14

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

Foundations for contest success functions

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the "type" of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function. JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances).

The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible

Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).