A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting

This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in the future. Legislators may therefore approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that benefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust; but institutional arrangements (such as entitlements) can reduce the agenda setter's power by reducing his discretion to reward and punish legislators, and rules (such as sequential voting) can increase a legislator's ability to resist exploitation. Keywords: Legislative bargaining, distributive politics, agenda-setting, proposal power. JEL C72, D72, D78.

External sources of innovation and industry-university interaction:evidence from Spanish firms

This paper is about the firm innovation process and the cooperation of the innovative firms with other firms and public institutions. A special attention is paid to the cooperation with universities. We use the Technological Innovation Survey (TIS) from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Spain) in order to obtain data for 4,159 innovative firms. Our results show that firm's cooperation activities are closely linked to the characteristics of the industry and the firm as well as to the origin of public funds for R&D activities. Key words: Innovation, universities, Spanish economy. JEL code: O31, I20, L60

A Characterization of single-peaked preferences

We identify in this paper two conditions that characterize the domain of single-peaked preferences on the line in the following sense: a preference profile satisfies these two properties if and only if there exists a linear order $L$ over the set of alternatives such that these preferences are single-peaked with respect L. The first property states that for any subset of alternatives the set of alternatives considered as the worst by all agents cannot contains more than 2 elements. The second property states that two agents cannot disagree on the relative ranking of two alternatives with respect to a third alternative but agree on the (relative) ranking of a fourth one. Classification-JEL: D71, C78

An axiomatic characterization of the strong constrained egalitarian solution

In this paper we axiomatize the strong constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray, 1991) over the class of weak superadditive games using constrained egalitarianism, order-consistency, and converse order-consistency. JEL classification: C71, C78. Keywords: Cooperative TU-game, strong constrained egalitarian solution, axiomatization.

Signalling and Productivity Effects of Overeducation: Is It Really a Waste of Resources?

Overeducation raises concerns that governments may be overinvesting in education. To inform the debate, this paper studies the impact of overeducation on productivity. We advance the literature by considering that returns to overeducation may be due both to productivity and signalling effects. To disentangle both effects, we apply Wolpin’s (1977) methodology and compare the rates of return of screened (employed) and unscreened (selfemployed) workers. To overcome well-known endogeneity problems due to unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate a panel with individual and employment-status fixed effects. Our results show that signalling effects are relevant and that overeducation does not carry a productivity penalty. Keywords: Overeducation, signalling model, human capital model, unobserved heterogeneity. JEL classification: I20, J24, J31.

Generalized three-sided assignment markets: consistency and the core

A class of three-sided markets (and games) is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we analyze the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff To this end, we introduce the derived market (and game) and relate it to the Davis and Maschler (1965) reduced game. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. These markets may have an empty core, but we define a balanced subclass, where the worth of each triplet is defined as the addition of the worths of the pairs it contains. Keywords: Multi-sided assignment market, Consistency, Core, Nucleolus. JEL Classification: C71, C78

Do Schools Discriminate Against Homosexual Parents? Evidence from an Internet Field Experiment

The recognition of homosexual rights is a controversial issue in many countries. Spain was the third country in the world (after Netherlands and Belgium) to introduce a law recognizing homosexual marriage and adoption of children. In this paper, we examine for the first time whether schools are more hesitant to give feedback to homosexual parents during children's pre-registration period in Spain. In order to do that, we designed an internet field experiment to be conducted in schools. We created three types of fictitious couples; one heterosexual, one male homosexual and one female homosexual, and send emails to schools making sexual orientation explicit. Our results show that men homosexual couples had a significant lower probability to receive and answer than heterosexual couples (22.5 percentage points less). No statistically significant differences in the response rate were found between female homosexual and heterosexual couples. This result suggests that male homosexual couples might be penalized because of the lack of a maternal figure. Keywords: Discrimination, field experiment, schools, homosexual rights. JEL codes: H41, I20, K36

A note on Spatial Autocorrelation at a Local Level

In this paper we analyze the existence of spatial autocorrelation at a local level in Catalonia using variables such as urbanisation economies, population density, human capital and firm entries. From a static approach, our results show that spatial autocorrelation is weak and diminishes as the distance between municipalities increases. From a dynamic approach, however, spatial autocorrelation increased over the period we analysed. These results are important from a policy point of view, since it is essential to know how economic activities are spatially concentrated or disseminated. Key words: spatial autocorrelation, municipalities. JEL classification: R110, R120

Firm Size and Geographical Aggregation: An Empirical Appraisal in Industrial Location

This paper assesses empirically the importance of size discrimination and disaggregate data for deciding where to locate a start-up concern. We compare three econometric specifications using Catalan data: a multinomial logit with 4 and 41 alternatives (provinces and comarques, respectively) in which firm size is the main covariate; a conditional logit with 4 and 41 alternatives including attributes of the sites as well as size-site interactions; and a Poisson model on the comarques and the full spatial choice set (942 municipalities) with site-specific variables. Our results suggest that if these two issues are ignored, conclusions may be misleading. We provide evidence that large and small firms behave differently and conclude that Catalan firms tend to choose between comarques rather than between municipalities. Moreover, labour-intensive firms seem more likely to be located in the city of Barcelona. Keywords: Catalonia, industrial location, multinomial response model. JEL: C250, E30, R00, R12

Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?

In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.

The Determinants of Entry are not Independent of Start-up Size: Some evidence from Spanish manufacturing

In this paper we explore the determinants of firm start-up size of Spanish manufacturing industries. The industries' barriers to entry affect the ability of potential entrants to enter the markets and the size range at which they decide to enter. In order to examine the relationships between barriers to entry and size we applied the quantile regression techniques. Our results indicate that the variables that characterize the structure of the market, the variables that are related to the behaviour of the incumbent firms and the rate of growth of the industries generate different barriers depending on the initial size of the entrants. Keywords: Entry, regression quantiles, start-up size. JEL classification: L110, L600

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

A territorial approach to firm entry: The effect of city size

This paper concerns the effects of territorial factors on the processes involved in the creation of manufacturing firms in Spanish cities. Most contributions have focused on regional factors rather than urban ones. Here we assume that it is possible to identify certain urban factors that attract new firms. We use data for the entry of firms in Spanish manufacturing industries between 1994 and 2002. This paper contributes to the existing literature on market entry. Key words: cities, regions, firm entry and Spanish economy. JEL: R0, R12, L60

Firm Size and Short-Term Dynamics in Aggregate Entry and Exit

Much of the research on industry dynamics focuses on the interdependence between the sectorial rates of entry and exit. This paper argues that the size of firms and the reaction-adjustment period are important conditions missed in this literature. I illustrate the effects of this omission using data from the Spanish manufacturing industries between 1994 and 2001. Estimates from systems of equations models provide evidence of a conical revolving door phenomenon and of partial adjustments in the replacement-displacement of large firms. KEYWORDS: aggregation, industry dynamics, panel data, symmetry, simultaneity. JEL CLASSIFICATION: C33, C52, L60, L11

Economic impacts of alternative water policy scenarios in the Spanish production system: an input-output analysis

The objective of this paper is to analyse the economic impacts of alternative water policies implemented in the Spanish production system. The methodology uses two versions of the input-output price model: a competitive formulation and a mark-up formulation. The input-output framework evaluates the impact of water policy measures on production prices, consumption prices, intermediate water demand and private welfare. Our results show that a tax on the water used by sectors considerably reduces the intermediate water demand, and increases the production and consumption prices. On the other hand, according to Jevons' paradox, an improvement in technical efficiency, which leads to a reduction in the water requirements of all sectors and an increase in water production, increases the amount of water consumed. The combination of a tax on water and improved technical efficiency takes the pressure off prices and significantly reduces intermediate water demand. JEL Classification: C67 ; D57 ; Q25. Keywords: Production prices; Consumption prices; Water uses; Water policy; Water taxation.