Sincere Lobby Formation

This paper analyzes endogenous lobbying over a unidimensional policy issue. Individuals differ in policy preferences and decide either to join one of two opposite interest lobbies or not to take part in lobbying activities. Once formed, lobbies make contributions to the incumbent government in exchange for a policy favor as in a common-agency model. A "sincere-lobby-formation" condition for equilibrium is introduced: an individual joins a lobby if their gain from the policy change that this lobby might achieve exceeds a contribution fee. Thus, an equilibrium occurs only if no lobby member would prefer their lobby to cease to exist. I show the existence of an equilibrium with two organized lobbies. Individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to join lobbying activities. I fi…nd that lobbying somewhat moderates the government's preferences, i.e., it shifts the …final policy in favor of individuals who are initially disadvantaged by the government's pro- or anti-policy preferred position. Under a utilitarian government, however, lobbying does not affect the fi…nal policy, and political competition results in a socially optimal outcome. JEL classi…cation: D72. Keywords: Sincere lobby formation; common agency; endogenous lobbying.

A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting

In this paper, I provide a formal justi…cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi…fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.

A Model of Party Discipline in a Congress

This paper studies party discipline in a congress within a political agency framework with retrospective voting. Party discipline serves as an incentive device to induce office- motivated congress members to perform in line with the party leadership's objective of controlling both the executive and the legislative branches of government. I show fi…rst that the same party is more likely to control both branches of government (i.e., uni…ed government) the stronger the party discipline in the congress is. Second, the leader of the governing party imposes more party discipline under uni…ed government than does the opposition leader under divided government. Moreover, the incumbents' aggregate performance increases with party discipline, so a representative voter becomes better off. JEL classi…cation: D72. Keywords: Party discipline; Political agency; Retrospective voting; Office-motivated politicians.

Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics

This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively moderate …rst-best level of cronyism within a …firm. The institutional framework of the public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political appointments (such that the subordinate's reappointment is conditioned on the chief's re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme case. JEL classifi…cation: D72, D73, D86. Keywords: Cronyism; Meritocracy; Manager; Bureaucrat; Politician.

Political Competition in Hard Times

This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.

Lobbying as a Guard against Extremism

This paper analyzes endogenous lobbying over a unidimensional policy issue. Individuals differ in policy preferences and decide either to join one of two opposite interest lobbies or not to take part in lobbying activities. Once formed, lobbies make contributions to the incumbent government in exchange for a policy favor as in a common-agency model. An equilibrium occurs only if no lobby member would prefer his lobby to cease to exist. I show the existence of an equilibrium with two organized lobbies. Individuals with more extreme preferences are more likely to join lobbying activities. Therefore, the lobbyists are rather extremists than moderates. However, the competition between those extreme lobbies results in a more moderate policy outcome relative to that initially preferred by the pro- or anti-policy government. Lobbies therefore guard against extremism, while acting as moderators of the government's preferences. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: common agency; endogenous lobbying; extremism.

A short motif in Drosophila SECIS Binding Protein 2 provides differential binding affinity to SECIS RNA hairpins

Selenoproteins contain the amino acid selenocysteine which is encoded by a UGA Sec codon. Recoding UGA Sec requires a complex mechanism, comprising the cis-acting SECIS RNA hairpin in the 3′UTR of selenoprotein mRNAs, and trans-acting factors. Among these, the SECIS Binding Protein 2 (SBP2) is central to the mechanism. SBP2 has been so far functionally characterized only in rats and humans. In this work, we report the characterization of the Drosophila melanogaster SBP2 (dSBP2). Despite its shorter length, it retained the same selenoprotein synthesis-promoting capabilities as the mammalian counterpart. However, a major difference resides in the SECIS recognition pattern: while human SBP2 (hSBP2) binds the distinct form 1 and 2 SECIS RNAs with similar affinities, dSBP2 exhibits high affinity toward form 2 only. In addition, we report the identification of a K (lysine)-rich domain in all SBP2s, essential for SECIS and 60S ribosomal subunit binding, differing from the well-characterized L7Ae RNA-binding domain. Swapping only five amino acids between dSBP2 and hSBP2 in the K-rich domain conferred reversed SECIS-binding properties to the proteins, thus unveiling an important sequence for form 1 binding.

Aplicaciones educativas de la teoría vygotskiana. El programa 'Key to learning' = Applications of vigotsky's theory to education. The 'Key to learning' proggram

En ciencias de la educación, las últimas décadas han estado marcadas por un interés en las ideas de Lev S. Vygotski. De hecho, a partir de esas ideas se han propuesto varias aplicaciones educativas. Una de ellas es el “Key to learning”. El artículo propone una visión general de este programa educativo desarrollado a partir de algunos trabajos e ideas de autores rusos contemporáneos. Primero, desarrollamos algunas ideas en torno a la noción de zona de desarrollo próximo (ZpD). Después, sugerimos la teoría de las habilidades de aprendizaje. En este sentido, el objetivo principal de “Key to learning” es mejorar las habilidades de aprendizaje cognitivas, comunicativas y directivas de niños de entre 3 a 7 años de edad. Para este propósito son creadas 12 unidades curriculares que componen el programa. Para concluir se enfatiza la creación de zonas de desarrollo próximo estructuradas como parte de un sistema de enseñanza y aprendizaje que vincula la actividad, la asistencia y la agencia