Media, investors and bubbles

We analysed the specific case of how information in the financial press influences economic bubbles. We found considerable flaws in the information market due to several factors: demand, the predominance of what are termed “irrational investors” (herding), and supply, which has the problem that the sources of information are biasedand feeds. A financial bubble is a deviation between real value of a financial asset and its persistent market price in time, which also has a speculative origin fed back by the illusion of the owners of these financial values, who will take benefits because of the future prices, which must be higher than the previous ones. The economical information in the media is submitting three problems. First of all, it is information generated by companies. In second place, the information circuit is fed back. A problem of informative independence becomes created, particularly serious in the case of the banks, which are very were as creditors. And in a third place, some informative biases are manifested for the companies of regulated sectors which are starring the economical information in the media.

Bombolles financeres i confusió informativa. Relació entre la informació econòmica als mitjans de comunicació i la presa de decisions d’inversió

La Teoria Econòmica està construïda sobre la hipòtesis de racionalitat dels agents econòmics. La racionalitat de l’homo economicus consisteix en què maximitza la seva utilitat tractant d’obtenir els majors beneficis amb el menor esforç, si bé l’aplicació d’aquesta hipòtesi a l’ésser humà no és plena ja que la seva motivació no sempreés biològica i de vegades actua empès per aspectes culturals difícils d’associar a un benefici1. Tanmateix, la hipòtesi de racionalitat s’ha considerat una bona representació dels aspectes essencials del comportamenteconòmic de l’ésser humà. El problema es presenta quan la Teoria Econòmica no és capaç d’explicar ni resoldre satisfactòriament problemes tan rellevants com les bombolles especulatives i la causa d’aquesta mancança s’atribueix a una construcció inadequada d’aquesta Teoria...

Exploratory Factor Analysis of the contents and styles of irrational thoughts assessed by "The Attitudes and Beliefs Inventory"

The factor structure of a back translated Spanish version (Lega, Caballo and Ellis, 2002) of the Attitudes and Beliefs Inventory (ABI) (Burgess, 1990) is analyzed in a sample of 250 university students.The Spanish version of the ABI is a 48-items self-report inventory using a 5-point Likert scale that assesses rational and irrational attitudes and beliefs. 24-items cover two dimensions of irrationality: a) areas of content (3 subscales), and b) styles of thinking (4 subscales).An Exploratory Factor Analysis (Parallel Analysis with Unweighted Least Squares method and Promin rotation) was performed with the FACTOR 9.20 software (Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando, 2013).The results reproduced the main four styles of irrational thinking in relation with the three specific contents of irrational beliefs. However, two factors showed a complex configuration with important cross-loadings of different items in content and style. More analyses are needed to review the specific content and style of such items.

Exploratory Factor Analysis of the contents and styles of irrational thoughts assessed by "The Attitudes and Beliefs Inventory"

The factor structure of a back translated Spanish version (Lega, Caballo and Ellis, 2002) of the Attitudes and Beliefs Inventory (ABI) (Burgess, 1990) is analyzed in a sample of 250 university students.The Spanish version of the ABI is a 48-items self-report inventory using a 5-point Likert scale that assesses rational and irrational attitudes and beliefs. 24-items cover two dimensions of irrationality: a) areas of content (3 subscales), and b) styles of thinking (4 subscales).An Exploratory Factor Analysis (Parallel Analysis with Unweighted Least Squares method and Promin rotation) was performed with the FACTOR 9.20 software (Lorenzo-Seva and Ferrando, 2013).The results reproduced the main four styles of irrational thinking in relation with the three specific contents of irrational beliefs. However, two factors showed a complex configuration with important cross-loadings of different items in content and style. More analyses are needed to review the specific content and style of such items.

Single period Markowitz portfolio selection, performance gauging and duality: a variation on Luenberger's shortage function

Markowitz portfolio theory (1952) has induced research into the efficiency of portfolio management. This paper studies existing nonparametric efficiency measurement approaches for single period portfolio selection from a theoretical perspective and generalises currently used efficiency measures into the full mean-variance space. Therefore, we introduce the efficiency improvement possibility function (a variation on the shortage function), study its axiomatic properties in the context of Markowitz efficient frontier, and establish a link to the indirect mean-variance utility function. This framework allows distinguishing between portfolio efficiency and allocative efficiency. Furthermore, it permits retrieving information about the revealed risk aversion of investors. The efficiency improvement possibility function thus provides a more general framework for gauging the efficiency of portfolio management using nonparametric frontier envelopment methods based on quadratic optimisation.

Corporate governance in banking: the role of board of directors

We test hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors for a sample of large international commercial banks. We find an inverted U shaped relation between bank performance and board size that justifies a large board and imposes an efficient limit to the board’s size; a positive relation between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance; and a proactive role in board meetings. Our results show that bank boards’ composition and functioning are related to directors’ incentives to monitor and advise management. All these relations hold after we control for bank business, institutional differences, size, market power in the banking industry, bank ownership and investors’ legal protection.

Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

A nonlinear threshold model for the dependence of extremes of stationary sequences

One of the main implications of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is that expected future returns on financial assets are not predictable if investors are risk neutral. In this paper we argue that financial time series offer more information than that this hypothesis seems to supply. In particular we postulate that runs of very large returns can be predictable for small time periods. In order to prove this we propose a TAR(3,1)-GARCH(1,1) model that is able to describe two different types of extreme events: a first type generated by large uncertainty regimes where runs of extremes are not predictable and a second type where extremes come from isolated dread/joy events. This model is new in the literature in nonlinear processes. Its novelty resides on two features of the model that make it different from previous TAR methodologies. The regimes are motivated by the occurrence of extreme values and the threshold variable is defined by the shock affecting the process in the preceding period. In this way this model is able to uncover dependence and clustering of extremes in high as well as in low volatility periods. This model is tested with data from General Motors stocks prices corresponding to two crises that had a substantial impact in financial markets worldwide; the Black Monday of October 1987 and September 11th, 2001. By analyzing the periods around these crises we find evidence of statistical significance of our model and thereby of predictability of extremes for September 11th but not for Black Monday. These findings support the hypotheses of a big negative event producing runs of negative returns in the first case, and of the burst of a worldwide stock market bubble in the second example. JEL classification: C12; C15; C22; C51 Keywords and Phrases: asymmetries, crises, extreme values, hypothesis testing, leverage effect, nonlinearities, threshold models

Comparison of recent toll road concession transactions in the United States and France

Recent concessions in France and in the US have resulted in a dramatic difference in the valuation placed on the toll roads; the price paid by the investors in France was twelve times current cash flow whereas investors paid sixty times current cash flow for the U.S. toll roads. In this paper we explore two questions: What accounts for the difference in these multiples, and what are the implications with respect to the public interest. Our analysis illustrates how structural and procedural decisions made by the public owner affect the concession price. Further, the terms of the concession have direct consequences that are enjoyed or borne by the various stakeholders of the toll road.

Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

Did the cooperative start life as a Joint-Stock company? business law and cooperatives in Spain, 1869–1931

Studies of Spanish cooperatives date their spread from the Law on Agrarian Syndicates of 1906. But the first legislative appearance of cooperatives is an 1869 measure that permitted general incorporation for lending companies. The 1931 general law on cooperatives, which was the first act permitting the formation of cooperatives in any activity, reflects the gradual disappearance of the cooperative’s "business" characteristics. In this paper we trace the Spanish cooperative’s legal roots in business law and its connections to broader questions of the freedom of association, the formation of joint-stock enterprises, and the liability of investors in business and cooperative entities. Our account underscores the similarities of the organizational problems approach by cooperatives and business firms, while at the same time respecting the distinctive purposes cooperatives served.

Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust. JEL Classification: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Rational expectations equilibrium, asymmetric information, risk exposure, hedging, supply information, information acquisition.

Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.

Financial Crises and International Portfolio Dynamics

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents, especially during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. This is because when foreigners invest in a country domestic agents tend to invest abroad and vice versa. Gross capital flows are also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners tend to bring in more capital and domestic agents tend to invest more abroad. During crises, there is retrenchment, i.e. a reduction in capital inflows by foreigners and an increase in capital inflows by domestic agents. This is especially true during severe crises and during systemic crises. The evidence can shed light on the nature of shocks driving international capital flows. It seems to favor shocks that affect foreigners and domestic agents asymmetrically -e.g. sovereign risk and asymmetric information- over productivity shocks.

Portfolio choice and the effects of liquidity

This paper shows how to introduce liquidity into the well known mean-variance framework of portfolio selection. Either by estimating mean-variance liquidity constrained frontiers or directly estimating optimal portfolios for alternative levels of risk aversion and preference for liquidity, we obtain strong effects of liquidity on optimal portfolio selection. In particular, portfolio performance, measured by the Sharpe ratio relative to the tangency portfolio, varies significantly with liquidity. Moreover, although mean-variance performance becomes clearly worse, the levels of liquidity onoptimal portfolios obtained when there is a positive preference for liquidity are much lower than on those optimal portfolios where investors show no sign of preference for liquidity.