The CFSP/ESDP, Parliamentary Accountability, and the ´Future of Europe´ Convention debate

This paper examines the importance that the current Convention on the Future of Europe is giving (or not) to the question of democratic accountability in European foreign and defence policy. As all European Union (EU) member states are parliamentary democracies1, and as there is a European Parliament (EP) which also covers CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy2) matters, I will concentrate on parliamentary accountability rather than democratic accountability more widely defined. Where appropriate, I will also refer to the work of other transnational parliamentary bodies such as the North Atlantic Assembly or NAA (NATO´s Parliamentary Assembly) or the Western European Union (WEU) Parliamentary Assembly3. The article will consist of three sections. First, I will briefly put the question under study within its wider context (section 1). Then, I will examine the current level of parliamentary accountability in CFSP and defence matters (section 2). Finally, I will consider the current Convention debate and assess how much attention is being given to the question of accountability in foreign and defence policies (section 3). This study basically argues that, once again, there is very little interest in an issue that should be considered as vital for the future democratic development of a European foreign and defence policy. It is important to note however that this paper does not cover the wider debate about how to democratise and make the EU more transparent and closer to its citizens. It concentrates on its Second Pillar because its claim is that very little if any attention is being given to this question

Estimating parliamentary composition through electoral polls

Any electoral system has an electoral formula that converts voteproportions into parliamentary seats. Pre-electoral polls usually focuson estimating vote proportions and then applying the electoral formulato give a forecast of the parliament's composition. We here describe theproblems arising from this approach: there is always a bias in theforecast. We study the origin of the bias and some methods to evaluateand to reduce it. We propose some rules to compute the sample sizerequired for a given forecast accuracy. We show by Monte Carlo simulationthe performance of the proposed methods using data from Spanish electionsin last years. We also propose graphical methods to visualize how electoralformulae and parliamentary forecasts work (or fail).