Gross capital flows: Dynamics and crises

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreign and domestic agents,dubbed gross capital flows, over the business cycle and during financial crises. We show thatgross capital flows are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. Whenforeigners invest in a country, domestic agents invest abroad, and vice versa. Gross capital flowsare also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners invest more domestically and domesticagents invest more abroad. During crises, total gross flows collapse and there is a retrenchmentin both inflows by foreigners and outflows by domestic agents. These patterns hold for differenttypes of capital flows and crises. This evidence sheds light on the sources of fluctuations drivingcapital flows and helps discriminate among existing theories. Our findings seem consistent withcrises affecting domestic and foreign agents asymmetrically, as would be the case under thepresence of sovereign risk or asymmetric information.

Financial Crises and International Portfolio Dynamics

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents, especially during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. This is because when foreigners invest in a country domestic agents tend to invest abroad and vice versa. Gross capital flows are also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners tend to bring in more capital and domestic agents tend to invest more abroad. During crises, there is retrenchment, i.e. a reduction in capital inflows by foreigners and an increase in capital inflows by domestic agents. This is especially true during severe crises and during systemic crises. The evidence can shed light on the nature of shocks driving international capital flows. It seems to favor shocks that affect foreigners and domestic agents asymmetrically -e.g. sovereign risk and asymmetric information- over productivity shocks.

Discrete devaluations and multiple equilibria in a first generation model of currency crises

The first generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that, in the absence of very large triggering shocks, currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations. This paper shows that these features of first generation models are not robust to the inclusion of private information. In particular, this paper analyzes a generalization of the Krugman-Flood-Garber (KFG) model, which relaxes the assumption that all consumers are perfectly informed about the level of fundamentals. In this environment, the KFG equilibrium of zero devaluation is only one of many possible equilibria. In all the other equilibria, the lack of perfect information delays the attack on the currency past the point at which the shadow exchange rate equals the peg, giving rise to unpredictable and discrete devaluations.

Crises and growth: A re-evaluation

We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generateborrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, wherethe nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.

Financial liberalization, bank crises and growth: Assessing the links

This paper studies the effects of financial liberalization and banking crises on growth. It shows that financial liberalization spurs on average economic growth. Banking crises are harmful for growth, but to a lesser extent in countries with open financial systems and good institutions. The positive effect of financial liberalization is robust to different definitions. While the removal of capital account restrictions is effective by increasing financial depth, equity market liberalization affects growth directly. The empirical analysis is performed through GMM dynamic panel data estimations on a panel of 90 countries observed in the period 1975-1999.

Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages ofeconomic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.

Systemic crises and growth

In this paper, we document the fact that countries that have experienced occasional financial crises have on average grown faster than countries with stable financial conditions. We measure the incidence of crisis with the skewness of credit growth, and find that it has a robust negative effect on GDP growth. This link coexists with the negative link between variance and growth typically found in the literature. To explain the link between crises and growth we present a model where weak institutions lead to severe financial constraints and low growth. Financial liberalization policies that facilitaterisk-taking increase leverage and investment. This leads to higher growth, but also toa greater incidence of crises. Conditions are established under which the costs of crises are outweighed by the benefits of higher growth.

On the timing of balance of payments crises: Disaggregated information and interest rate policy

This paper proposes a dynamic framework to study the timing of balance of paymentscrises. The model incorporates two main ingredients: (i) investors have private information; (ii)investors interact in a dynamic setting, weighing the high returns on domestic assets against the incentives to pull out before the devaluation. The model shows that the presence of disaggregated information delays the onset of BOP crises, giving rise to discrete devaluations. It also shows that high interest rates can be eective in delaying and possibly avoiding the abandonment of the peg. The optimal policy is to raise interest rates sharply as fundamentals become very weak. However, this policy is time inconsistent, suggesting a role for commitment devices such as currency boards or IMF pressure.

An eclectic third generation model of financial and exchange rate crises

[cat] En aquest treball es presenta un model eclèctic que sistematitza la dinàmica de les crisis que s’autoconfimen, usant els principals aspectes de les tres tipologies dels models de crisis canviàries de tercera generació, amb la finalitat de descriure els fets que precipiten la renúncia al manteniment d’una paritat fixada. Les contribucions més notables són les implicacions per a la política econòmica, així com la pèrdua del paper del tipus de canvi com instrument d’ajust macroeconòmic, quan els efectes de balanç són una possibilitat real.

An eclectic third generation model of financial and exchange rate crises

[cat] En aquest treball es presenta un model eclèctic que sistematitza la dinàmica de les crisis que s’autoconfimen, usant els principals aspectes de les tres tipologies dels models de crisis canviàries de tercera generació, amb la finalitat de descriure els fets que precipiten la renúncia al manteniment d’una paritat fixada. Les contribucions més notables són les implicacions per a la política econòmica, així com la pèrdua del paper del tipus de canvi com instrument d’ajust macroeconòmic, quan els efectes de balanç són una possibilitat real.

Sovereigns and banks in the euro area : a tale of two crises

This study attempts to identify and trace inter-linkages between sovereign and banking risk in the euro area. To this end, we use an indicator of banking risk in each country based on the Contingent Claim Analysis literature, and 10-year government yield spreads over Germany as a measure of sovereign risk. We apply a dynamic approach to testing for Granger causality between the two measures of risk in 10 euro area countries, allowing us to check for contagion in the form of a significant and abrupt increase in short-run causal linkages. The empirical results indicate that episodes of contagion vary considerably in both directions over time and within the different EMU countries. Significantly, we find that causal linkages tend to strengthen particularly at the time of major financial crises. The empirical evidence suggests the presence of contagion, mainly from banks to sovereigns.

Financial integration, productivity and capital accumulation

Understanding the mechanism through which financial globalization affects economic performance is crucial for evaluating the costs and benefits of opening financial markets. This paper is a first attempt at disentangling the effects of financial integration on the two main determinants of economic performance: productivity (TFP) and investments. I provide empirical evidence from a sample of 93 countries observed between 1975 and 1999. The results suggest that financial integration has a positive direct effect on productivity, while it spurs capital accumulation only with some delay and indirectly, since capital follows the rise in productivity. I control for indirect effects of financial globalization through banking crises. Such episodes depress both investments and TFP, though they are triggered by financial integration only to a minor extent.

Learning from Shocks and the Decision to Open

Two claims pervade the literature on the political economy of market reforms: that economic crises cause reforms; and that crises matter because they bring into question the validity of the economic model held to be responsible for them. Economic crises are said to spur a process of learning that is conducive to the abandonment of failing models and to the adoption of successful models. But although these claims have become the conventional wisdom, they have been hardly tested empirically due to the lack of agreement on what constitutes a crisis and to difficulties in measuring learning from them. I propose a model of rational learning from experience and apply it to the decision to open the economy. Using data from 1964 through 1990, I show that learning from the 1982 debt crisis was relevant to the first wave of adoption of an export promotion strategy, but learning was conditional on the high variability of economic outcomes in countries that opened up to trade. Learning was also symbolic in that the sheer number of other countries that liberalized was a more important driver of others’ decisions to follow suit.

Pork Value Chains: A Comparison of Catalonia, Spain and Manitoba, Canada

The purpose of this paper is to provide a comparative analysis of pork value chains in Catalonia, Spain and Manitoba, Canada. Intensive hog production models were implemented in Catalonia in the 1960s as a result of agriculture crises and fostered by feedstuffs factories. The expansion of the hog sector in Manitoba is more recent (in the 1990s) and brought about in large part by the opening of the Maple Leaf Meats processing plant in Brandon, Manitoba. This plant is capable of processing 90,000 hogs per week. Both hog production models ‐ the ‘older’ one in Catalonia (Spain) and the ‘newer’ in Manitoba‐ have been, until recently, examples of success. Inventories and production have been increasing substantially and both regions have proven to have great export potential. Recently, however, tensions have been developing with the hog production models of both regions, particularly as they relate to environmental concerns. The purpose of the paper is to compare the value chains with respect to their origins (e.g. supply a growing demand for pork, ensure farm profitability) and present states (e.g. environmental concerns, profitability). Keywords: pork value chain, hog farms, agri‐food studies. JEL: Q10, Q13, O57

Determinants of Spanish firms' life cycle and job

This paper examines the role of human capital, individual entrepreneurial traits and the business environment on firms' life cycle and on job creation in Spain. For this purpose, we have constructed a pseudo-panel, by using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey over the period 2001-2008. We have found that the creation, maturity and survival of firms were aided by the availability of bank credit and the large immigration inflows that Spain received over this period. However, of these two factors, only bank credit had a positive effect on the creation of jobs and on improving expectations of job expansion. The relatively high levels of youth unemployment experienced even before the crises of 2008 hurt the firm's chances of maturity and survival. The results also suggested that the gender gap in entrepreneurial activities had narrowed. In relative terms, women with higher levels of education were more likely to create mature firms than men. Based on the empirical findings and those of related literature, the paper offers policy recommendations to foster a sustainable entrepreneurial sector capable of contributing to the recovery of the Spanish economy.