The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Price rivalry in airline markets: A study of a successful strategy of a network carrier against a low-cost carrier

Competition in airline markets may be tough. In this context, network carriers have two alternative strategies to compete with low-cost carriers. First, they may establish a low-cost subsidiary. Second, they may try to reduce costs using the main brand. This paper examines a successful strategy of the first type implemented by Iberia in the Spanish domestic market. Our analysis of data and the estimation of a pricing equation show that Iberia has been able to charge lower prices than rivals with its low-cost subsidiary. The pricing policy of the Spanish network carrier has been particularly aggressive in less dense routes and shorter routes.

Olympic Games as showcase

In the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, besides the country-versus-country typical showdown in the backdrop of Olympics, and the economic and political impulses for the host city, there was a third factor complicating the celebration: rivalry between the Catalan hosts and the Spanish state. By guiding the development of and eventual Olympic projection of national identity, Catalan and Spanish politicians hoped to create a resounding rallying point around which they could unite disparate individuals. The text is made up of: an introduction, five paragraphs on the different political perspective, conclusions, a commentary on the tallying of score and a note section with bibliographical references.

Escuela de gestión social Creciendo Juntos

Reflexió i recopilació de les experiències viscudes i dels aprenentatges adquirits durant les pràctiques realitzades a la comunitat educativa “Creciendo Juntos” a Moreno, dintre de la província de Buenos Aires, a l’Argentina

Multimarket contact externalities: the effect of rival's multimarket contacts on focal firm performance

Given that firms develop their activities in a network of multiple players, interfirm rivalry is not only a matter of direct competitors, but also of indirect competition. In spite of this, the literature on competitive dynamics tends to focus on analyzing rivalry as an exclusive function of the competitive relationship between a focal firm and its direct rivals. In this article, we extend competitive dynamics literature by considering how focal firms are affected by the relationships of their rivals with third-party firms. Specifically, we study the effect that the multimarket contacts of rivals produces on the performance of the focal firm. Additionally, we incorporate the idea that there are different strategic options for operating in an industry that affect the intensity of multimarket contact externalities. Our results show that multimarket contact among firms causes externalities that indirectly affect firms that are not directly involved in this competitive relationship. We find that multimarket contact externalities differ between and within strategic groups.

Valoració de la capacitat de salt i sincronització temporal intergrupal en la Gimnàstica Estètica de Grup

La Gimnàstica Estètica de Grup (GEG) és un esport emergent del qual no existeix gairebé cap treball de camp i/o publicació. En relació al codi de puntuació d’aquesta modalitat, tant les capacitats de salt com la unitat de moviment del cos i la sincronització entre els membres del conjunt, tenen un pes molt important en la puntuació del valor tècnic i de l’execució. En aquest estudi s’ha realitzat la mesura, avaluació i comparació de les manifestacions de la força explosiva, elàstica i reactiva d’un grup de gimnàstica d’estètica d’alt nivell al principi i al final del període competitiu, mitjançant la bateria de tests de salts verticals de Bosco, concretament SJ, CMJ, CMJas i RJ (15” CMJas). També s’ha analitzat la sincronització i/o coordinació temporal intergrupal d’execució de les dificultats tècniques de salt de les coreografies competitives, al llarg del període competitiu d’un conjunt de gimnàstica estètica d’alt nivell, tenint en compte la sincronització en començar la dificultat i en acabar-la. Els resultats obtinguts demostren que la manifestació de força elàsticoexplosiva en CMJ ha disminuït un 0,46 % i la força explosiva SJ (sense reutilització d'energia elàstica ni aprofitament del reflex miotàtic) ha augmentat un 4,63 %. Durant el període competitiu del conjunt sènior de gimnàstica estètica del Club Muntanyenc Sant Cugat, la influència dels braços en la capacitat de salt ha augmentat un 1,32% i la potència anaeròbica alàctica un 4,76%. Tot i que en la majoria de tests, els resultats han estat positius, no es considera que la mostra hagi assolit una millora significativa, atès que no ha superat el 10% proposat en començar l’estudi, i els valors obtinguts són totalment inestables. S’ha vist que en un mateix test el % de pèrdues i de guanys ha estat molt variat, de manera que no es pot establir una relació de millora de la capacitat de salt en funció de l’entrenament. Pel que fa a la sincronització temporal intergrupal, ha millorat entre un 37,50% (sincronització temps inicial) i un 50,00% (sincronització temps final) en relació a les dificultats tècniques. Fet que és relaciona directament amb l’automatització de mecanismes d’execució al llarg de la temporada competitiva. Tot i així no s’ha igualat o superat la millora d’un 70% proposada per les hipòtesis inicials de l’estudi.

Determinants of Broadband Access: Is Platform Competition always the Key Variable to Success?

Previous studies have identified the rivalry among technological platforms as one of the main driving forces of broadband services penetration. This paper draws on data from the Spanish market between 2005 and 2011 to estimate the main determinants of broadband prices. Controlling for broadband tariffs features and network variables, we examine the impact of the different modes of competition on prices. We find that inter-platform competition has no significant effects over prices, while intra-platform competition is a key driver of the prices charged in the broadband market. Our analysis suggests that the impact of different types of competition on prices is critically affected by the levels of development of the broadband market achieved by the considered country