The Politics of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Argentina

The search for political determinants of intergovernmental fiscal relations has shaped much of the recent literature on the economic viability of federalism. This study assesses the explanatory power of two competing views about intergovernmental transfers; one emphasizing the traditional neoclassical approach to federal-subnational fiscal relations and the other suggesting that transfers are contingent on the political fortunes and current political vulnerability of each level of government. The author tests these models using data from Argentina, a federation exhibiting one of the most decentralised fiscal systems in the world and severe imbalances in the territorial distribution of legislative and economic resources. It is shown that overrespresented provinces ruled by governors who belong to opposition parties can bring into play their political overrepresentation to attract shares of federal transfers beyond social welfare criteria and to shield themselves from unwanted reforms to increase fiscal co-responsibilty. This finding suggests that decision makers in federal countries must pay close heed to the need to synchronize institutional reforms and fiscal adjustment.

Aggregate shocks or vertical tax interdependence? Evidende from gasoline and cigarettes

[cat] Besley i Rosen -1998- van ser els primers autors en estimar empíricament la rellevància de les externalitats impositives verticals. Aquests autors varen fer-ho per al cas dels impostos sobre la benzina i el tabac, en concret, per al cas dels EEUU. Ara bé, no varen tenir en compte les diferències en el nivell de vida entre Estats: àrees amb un nivell elevat paguen menys en termes reals que àrees amb un nivell de vida baix, doncs l'impost unitari sobre la benzina o sobre el tabac no difereix d'acord amb l'Estat on l'impost s'aplica. En conseqüència, proposem que la competència impositiva vertical sigui estimada deflactant totes les variables monetàries utilitzant l'anomenat "House Price Index (HPI)", el qual està disponible al nivell dels Estats. Això genera una variable impositiva federal expressada en termes reals i que presenta variació entre Estats. Aquesta estratègia empírica ens permet diferenciar entre la interdependència vertical entre els tipus impositius federals i els estatals de shocks agregats al llarg del temps, utilitzant dades per als EEUU durant el període 1975 a 2006 per a benzina i tabac. Trobem una nivell significatiu de competència impositiva horitzontal, la qual és més elevada en el cas del tabac, però en cap cas reacció impositiva vertical. Els resultats són robustos al període analitzat.

Aggregate shocks or vertical tax interdependence? Evidende from gasoline and cigarettes

[cat] Besley i Rosen -1998- van ser els primers autors en estimar empíricament la rellevància de les externalitats impositives verticals. Aquests autors varen fer-ho per al cas dels impostos sobre la benzina i el tabac, en concret, per al cas dels EEUU. Ara bé, no varen tenir en compte les diferències en el nivell de vida entre Estats: àrees amb un nivell elevat paguen menys en termes reals que àrees amb un nivell de vida baix, doncs l'impost unitari sobre la benzina o sobre el tabac no difereix d'acord amb l'Estat on l'impost s'aplica. En conseqüència, proposem que la competència impositiva vertical sigui estimada deflactant totes les variables monetàries utilitzant l'anomenat "House Price Index (HPI)", el qual està disponible al nivell dels Estats. Això genera una variable impositiva federal expressada en termes reals i que presenta variació entre Estats. Aquesta estratègia empírica ens permet diferenciar entre la interdependència vertical entre els tipus impositius federals i els estatals de shocks agregats al llarg del temps, utilitzant dades per als EEUU durant el període 1975 a 2006 per a benzina i tabac. Trobem una nivell significatiu de competència impositiva horitzontal, la qual és més elevada en el cas del tabac, però en cap cas reacció impositiva vertical. Els resultats són robustos al període analitzat.

Evaluating the effects of decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain

[cat] Diversos arguments derivats de la teoria del federalisme fiscal suggereixen que la descentralització pot portar a majors nivells d’eficiència en la provisió de béns i serveis publics. L’objectiu d’aquest estudi és contrastar aquesta hipòtesi mitjançant l’avaluació dels efectes de la descentralització sobre els resultats educatius a Espanya. Els resultats educatius es mesuren d’acord amb la taxa de supervivència, que es defineix com el nombre d’estudiants que es matricula en educació secundària no obligatòria en relació als alumnes matriculats a l’últim curs d’educació obligatòria durant l’any acadèmic anterior.

Evaluating the effects of decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain

[cat] Diversos arguments derivats de la teoria del federalisme fiscal suggereixen que la descentralització pot portar a majors nivells d’eficiència en la provisió de béns i serveis publics. L’objectiu d’aquest estudi és contrastar aquesta hipòtesi mitjançant l’avaluació dels efectes de la descentralització sobre els resultats educatius a Espanya. Els resultats educatius es mesuren d’acord amb la taxa de supervivència, que es defineix com el nombre d’estudiants que es matricula en educació secundària no obligatòria en relació als alumnes matriculats a l’últim curs d’educació obligatòria durant l’any acadèmic anterior.

Intergovernmental Transfers and Elementary Education: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Brazil

Whether providing additional resources to local communities leads to improved public services and better outcomes more generally, given existing management capacity and incentive and accountability structures, is an unresolved yet important question for public policy. This paper uses a regression-discontinuity design to evaluate the effect of unrestricted fiscal transfers on local spending (including on education), schooling and learning in Brazil. Results show that transfers increase local public spending almost one for one with no evidence of crowding out own revenue or other revenue sources. Extra per capita transfers of 1000 Reais lead to about 0.42 additional years of elementary schooling and student literacy rates increase by about 5.6 percentage points on average. Part of this effect arises through higher teacher-student ratios in municipal elementary school systems. Results also suggest that additional resources have stronger effects in more rural and less developed parts of Brazil.

Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?

In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.

The private and fiscal returns to schooling and the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education: a general framework and some results for the EU

This paper develops a comprehensive framework for the quantitative analysis of the private and fiscal returns to schooling and of the effect of public policies on private incentives to invest in education. This framework is applied to 14 member states of the European Union. For each of these countries, we construct estimates of the private return to an additional year of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the effects of education on wages and employment probabilities after allowing for academic failure rates, the direct and opportunity costs of schooling, and the impact of personal taxes, social security contributions and unemployment and pension benefits on net incomes. We also construct a set of effective tax and subsidy rates that measure the effects of different public policies on the private returns to education, and measures of the fiscal returns to schooling that capture the long-term effects of a marginal increase in attainment on public finances under c

On games corresponding to sequencing situations with precedence relations

In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. It is shown that these sequencing games are convex.

Unemployment, growth and fiscal policy: new insights on the hysteresis hypothesis

We develop a growth model with unemployment due to imperfections in the labor market. In this model, wage inertia and balanced budget rules cause a complementarity between capital and employment capable of explaining the existence of multiple equilibrium paths. Hysteresis is viewed as the result of a selection between these diferent equilibrium paths. We use this model to argue that, in contrast to the US, those fiscal policies followed by most of the European countries after the shocks of the 1970’s may have played a central role in generating hysteresis.

Would Fiscal Authorities in the EMU prefer to coordinate?

This article studies whether fiscal authorities would prefer to operate like in the current EMU or to coordinate according to the theoretical literature. The EMU approach will lead to higher volatility of interest rates, output, inflation and average budget deficits, but the SGP deficit target will be breached less often. Keywords: fiscal policy coordination, monetary union, Stability and Growth Pact. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0

Personal relations and their effect on behavior in an organizational setting: an experimental study

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.

The Total fiscal cost of indirect taxation: an approximation using Catalonia's recent input-output table

In this note we quantify to what extent indirect taxation influences and distorts prices. To do so we use the networked accounting structure of the most recent input-output table of Catalonia, an autonomous region of Spain, to model price formation. The role of indirect taxation is considered both from a classical value perspective and a more neoclassical flavoured one. We show that they would yield equivalent results under some basic premises. The neoclassical perspective, however, offers a bit more flexibility to distinguish among different tax figures and hence provide a clearer disaggregate picture of how an indirect tax ends up affecting, and by how much, the cost structure.

Sport and international relations (1913-1939): the 1936 Popular Olympiad

This document includes the results of the research undertaken by the authors on the attempts to organise a Popular Olympiad in Barcelona in 1936.