Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

A Game to Promote Understanding about UCD Methods and Process

The User-centered design (UCD) game is a tool forhuman-computer interaction practitioners to demonstrate the key user-centered design methodsand how they interrelate in the design process in an interactive and participatory manner. The target audiences are departments and institutions unfamiliar with UCD but whose work is related to the definition, creation, and update of a product or service.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Towards an emotion-driven interactive music system: ridging the gaps between affect, physiology and sound generation

Report for the scientific sojourn at the Stanford University from January until June 2007. Music is well known for affecting human emotional states, yet the relationship between specific musical parameters and emotional responses is still not clear. With the advent of new human-computer interaction (HCI) technologies, it is now possible to derive emotion-related information from physiological data and use it as an input to interactive music systems. Providing such implicit musical HCI will be highly relevant for a number of applications including music therapy, diagnosis, nteractive gaming, and physiologically-based musical instruments. A key question in such physiology-based compositions is how sound synthesis parameters can be mapped to emotional states of valence and arousal. We used both verbal and heart rate responses to evaluate the affective power of five musical parameters. Our results show that a significant correlation exists between heart rate and the subjective evaluation of well-defined musical parameters. Brightness and loudness showed to be arousing parameters on subjective scale while harmonicity and even partial attenuation factor resulted in heart rate changes typically associated to valence. This demonstrates that a rational approach to designing emotion-driven music systems for our public installations and music therapy applications is possible.

Disseny d'un Battle Chess 3D (2)

Aquesta memòria descriu el projecte de final de carrera anomenat "Disseny d’un Battle Chess 3D (2)", que tracta de la creació, modelat i animació de peces per a un joc d’escacs en 3 dimensions amb certes temàtiques, i que posteriorment s’integren amb el projecte "Disseny d’un Battle Chess 3D (1)" per a formar un joc interactiu d’escacs en un applet de Java. Es descriuen les eines utilitzades, les fases de creació, tècniques simbòliques, mètodes més emprats, proves sotmeses, limitacions, i finalment s’arriba una conclusió de treball aconseguit.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Open Chess Game Analyzer

Aquest document detalla la feina que s'ha dut a terme per desenvolupar el projecte Open Chess Game Analyzer. La finalitat del mateix és desenvolupar un aplicatiu lliure que sigui capaç d'analitzar partides d'escacs a partir d'un fitxer PGN.

El joc del TERCETI : una unitat didàctica multimèdia sobre GNU/LINUX amb suport DVB-MHP i SCORM.

Fent ús del programari lliure s'ha generat la unitat didàctica del joc del terceti per a la televisió digital interactiva i s'ha desada en format SCORM. La facilitat d'ús del comandament a distància fa possible practicar un tipus de t-learning fonamentat en l'edutainment (education+entertaiment) i provoca que el teleespectador passiu passi a ser un "teleusuari" més actiu.

Serious game de código abierto para la educación y entrenamiento en el procedimiento de artroscopia de rodilla

En esta memoria se describe el diseño a nivel conceptual de un serious game con el objetivo de ofrecer soluciones para la mejora del aprendizaje y adquisición de aptitudes y habilidades de los residentes-profesionales en las técnicas de artroscopia de rodilla, con el objetivo de comprobar la hipótesis de que los modelos de aprendizaje basados en videojuegos pueden servir de puente entre el cuerpo teórico de la especialidad y el ejercicio práctico, reduciendo los riesgos de las primeras intervenciones y acelerando la formación de los especialistas, en otras palabras, difuminando el umbral entre teoría y práctica y reduciendo los costos derivados del ejercicio práctico (económicos y temporales) y a su vez, paliando las necesidades formativas de estas.

I-SS: integrated supervision systems approach based on interactive components

Process supervision is the activity focused on monitoring the process operation in order to deduce conditions to maintain the normality including when faults are present Depending on the number/distribution/heterogeneity of variables, behaviour situations, sub-processes, etc. from processes, human operators and engineers do not easily manipulate the information. This leads to the necessity of automation of supervision activities. Nevertheless, the difficulty to deal with the information complicates the design and development of software applications. We present an approach called "integrated supervision systems". It proposes multiple supervisors coordination to supervise multiple sub-processes whose interactions permit one to supervise the global process

Proposal for the analysis of a video game, a film, and their relationship : Silent Hill as a subject of the horror genre

Aquest treball de recerca fa un estudi comparatiu del videojoc de terror amb el seu homòleg cinematogràfic. L’objectiu és arribar a saber si els dos mitjans de comunicació usen les mateixes tècniques per transmetre les seves històries i per crear suspens. Aquesta investigació és només una part d'un estudi més ampli amb el que es pretén tenir un coneixement més aprofundit de les emocions de la gent i les reaccions que els provoca un videojoc de terror en comparació amb la visualització de l'adaptació cinematogràfica del corresponent videojoc.